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ABSTRACT 
 
The Public Interest in Public Administration: An Investigation of the Communicative 
Foundations of the Public Interest Standard. 
(May 2007) 
Sara Rene Jordan, B.A., University of South Florida 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Cary J. Nederman 
                                                        Dr. Kenneth J. Meier 
 
 
 
The public interest is the highest standard for bureaucratic action in American 
government.  While the importance of this standard ebbs and flows in the literature, the 
eminence of it remains unquestioned as the North Star for the American ship of state.  
As the highest standard in American politics and policy, this standard must be formed 
democratically.  In this dissertation, I examine the formation of the public interest 
standard through the lens of citizen-bureaucratic communication, using the theory of 
communicative action advanced by the contemporary German social and political 
philosopher, Jürgen Habermas.  I support the use of such a theoretical framework in 
America by examining the importance of communication for the American pragmatist 
philosopher, John Dewey.  I examine the ramifications of communication in the 
American democratic state as foundational for the formation and continued expression of 
the public interest throughout the institution of the American executive branch.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL THEORY 
 
“… the basic problem of democratic polities [is] how to make legitimate 
decisions for the society as a whole in the face of fundamental disagreement 
(Guttmann and Thompson 2004, 14). 
  
 Public administration and political philosophy stand together as partners in the 
explanation of the form and substance of political life.  Yet, in the history of both 
subsections of the larger discipline of political science and political theory, there is a 
bifurcation of the two.  The study of political life through the lens of the politics 
administration dichotomy neglects the fullness of politics as a lived experience of 
community.  Politics is the essence of public administration; public administration is the 
form of politics.  We cannot have one without the other.  This much is implied by both 
Hamilton and Guttmann and implied in works from Mill (2002); Marsiglio of Padua (see 
Nederman 1995); Locke (1979), Rousseau (1954; 1962);  Rawls (1999b, 2001); Strauss 
([1959] 1988), Habermas (1998 in particular); Wamsley and Wolf 1996), Wilson 
___________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the American Political Science Review. 
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(1941); Fischer (2003, 2005) ; Forester (1993, 1995); Goodsell (1994); John of Salisbury 
(1990), Christine de Pizan (1994, 1999); Averroës (1966), Al-Mawardi (1996), 
Confucius (1967) and Sun-Tzu (1963).1 
There is, to the best of my knowledge, no theory, or philosophy of politics that 
lacks a theory of administration.  Those political writings that consciously deny the role 
of administration are, in sum, self-delusional or not political.  Even Strauss, certainly no 
advocate for the seemingly base nature of political practices in his day, must agree with 
the necessary role of administration in politics.2   
Philosophy, as quest for wisdom, is quest for universal knowledge, for 
knowledge of the whole.  …  Philosophy is necessarily preceded by opinions 
about the whole.  It is, therefore, the attempt to replace opinions about the whole 
by knowledge of the whole.  Political philosophy will then be the attempt to 
replace opinion about the nature of political things by knowledge of the nature of 
political things.  Political things are by their nature subject to approval and 
disapproval, to choice and rejection, to praise and blame.  It is of their essence 
not to be neutral but to raise a claim to men’s obedience, allegiance, decision, or 
judgment.  One does not understand them as what they are, as political things, if 
one does not take seriously their explicit or implicit claim to be judged in terms 
of goodness or badness, of justice or injustice, i.e., if one does not measure them 
by some standard of goodness or justice….  If political philosophy wishes to do 
justice to its subject matter, it must strive for genuine knowledge of these 
standards.  Political philosophy is the attempt truly to know both the nature of 
political things and the right, or the good, political order ([1959] 1988, 11-12). 
 
Reflecting on classical political philosophy’s orientation to the pronouncements of the 
best regime (to include the “form of state, form of government”) Strauss insists that we 
                                                 
1
 This list is certainly incomplete.  See Raadschelders (1998) for more extensive lists and summaries of 
administrative theories around the world.  See Nederman (1993) for more attention to the works of John of 
Salisbury and Christine de Pizan.  See Nederman (1995) for more attention to the works of Marsiglio.  
2
 Note the tracts that Strauss offer on social science, of which the study of public administration in Strauss’ 
time was explicitly a part.  In particular, see “Social Science and Humanism” in Strauss 1989, 3-12, but 
importantly 5-6. 
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cannot know politics philosophically without understanding the full role of political 
actors and institutions that make up politics.  Indeed, the role of the public official 
cannot be defined without apprehending his knowledge of true political philosophy, in 
which the correct ordering and administration of the state plays a paramount part.  The 
task of political philosophy, like the practice of diplomacy, cannot be divorced 
completely from the study of political administration. 
 With this in mind, the question: what is the use of present political theory for the 
study of administration?  Moreover, more critically, can an administrative rereading of 
these texts revise their status—move them from political thinking to political 
philosophy?3  Regarding the first question, the history of the study of public 
administration in the Atlantic corridor (particularly the American side) has followed a 
course dictated by the changing political realities of the times as well as the changing 
attitude that the field of political philosophy, and later political science, has exhibited 
towards the study of public administration.  As Dwight Waldo, in The Administrative 
State, makes clear: 
one should know that political theory and public administration are in a sense at 
opposite ends of a political science spectrum, with political theory being the part 
of political science most oriented toward values and methods indicated by such 
terms as humanism and liberal arts, and with public administration most oriented 
toward business, technology, and—by ambition if not achievement—science.  …  
But—intriguing paradox, delicious irony—[public administration] a movement 
that deprecated ivory-tower theorizing, that sought to bracket political theory if  
                                                 
3
 Political thinking/ political thought: “… finds its expression in laws and codes, in poems and stories, in 
tracts and public speeches inter alia…  (Strauss [1959] 1988, 12).”  “A political thinker who is not a 
philosopher is primarily interested in, or attached to, a specific order or policy… (Strauss [1959] 1988, 
12).” 
 4 
not to abolish it, proved on examination to be implicitly, and occasionally 
explicitly, engaged with political theory (1984, x-xi). 
Often the citation of political theorists’ concerns in the realm of public 
administration were quashed as moralizing or shuttling values in through the back door, 
while the exposition of the matters of governance in political theory were chided for 
failing to appreciate the true nature of political theory as reflection.  The tension between 
the two provoked divergence to the point that the innovations of the original 
Minnowbrook conference or Blacksburg Manifesto were indeed radical (Marini 1971; 
Wamsley et al 1989).  The radical nature of the re-commitment of political theory to 
public administration (or is it the other way around?) speaks to the answer to the 
question above.  The usefulness of political theory to public administration is to 
highlight those sections of, particularly historically minded, political thought which 
clarify the meaning—the essence, if not the form-- of administrative practice.   
 Waldo (1984) accomplished such a clarifying mission in his seminal work, The 
Administrative State.  Yet, the commitment of avowed public administration scholars to 
political theorizing did not start in 1948, the date of the original publication of The 
Administrative State.  Waldo may lay claim to the innovation of “admitting it”, but he 
was one in a line of administrative thinkers to offer some theoretical insights of 
significant value.  Waldo sought to explicitly connect the two, but before him were 
scholars such as Cleveland (1913), Herring (1936) and Kingsley (1944) that connected 
the two in other, more implicit ways.  These works were formative for the work of 
Waldo and later scholars, such as Long (1962), Frederickson (1997), Mosher (1978), 
Rohr (1986, 1989, 1998, 2002) and Wamsley, et al. (1989) and Wamsley and Wolf 
 5 
(1996).  Despite the path-breaking work undertaken by these scholars, there was little 
attention from professional political theorists to the treatment of such key issues as 
representation and the organization of democracy by scholars confronting administrative 
questions.  Instead, political theory, once disengaged from the questions of 
administration, declined as an endeavor of political engagement and value.4   
This leads me to the second question above: can an administrative rereading of 
political theory-without-administration revise the status of political theorists from being 
political thinkers to political philosophers?  To the extent that we can identify the 
administrative realm as that of engagement in politics and political practice, it may be 
that the salvation of a currently disengaged political theory does lie with the resurrection 
of the administrative as area of valid concern.  Note the lament and admonition of 
Gunnell (at some length (1993, 277)): 
By the end of the 1980s, the principal conversations in political theory ceased to 
speak about actual politics, let alone to it.  To a large extent, they became 
tributaries of the dominant academic persuasions such as postmodernism and 
reflections of debates such as that about philosophical foundationalism that 
permeated the humanities and social sciences.  This was now less a search for 
philosophical grounds to underwrite theoretical intervention than a function of 
academic conformity. Even when an aspect of political theory had a distinct 
practical-issue counterpart and constituency, it was difficult to resist the 
attachment to the tokens of academic authority and the siren of esotericism and to 
speak in a manner that was not opaque to all outside the academy or even those 
standing outside the specialized language of subdisciplines. 
From Willoughby (1923) to Wolin (2004), the concern had been to secure the 
autonomy of political theory predicated on the autonomy of politics and find an answer 
                                                 
4
 Of particular interest is Gunnell’s attention to the career of Francis Leiber (1875) (pages 24-32) and the 
affects of disengagement with politics upon the political theory of Leiber and his contemporaries.  Leiber, 
as author of the Manual of Political Ethics is of interest to scholars of public administration ethics.  
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to its articulation.  Yet, now, much of political theory represents a diverse world of 
specialized and derivative forms of scholarship, in which neither inquiry, nor its object 
have any clear identity and in which textual criticism and the presentation of self in 
professional circles constitutes a form of political action.  Both political theory and 
politics had become abstract intangible entities that rendered otiose any attempt to 
engage in a concrete discussion of their connection.  Reinstating the concern, 
rediscovering the nexus of politics and political theory through the examination of the 
administrative is the object of the remaining text—though I fall victim here to much of 
what Gunnell laments as professionally disengaged political theory. 
 It is with this objective that I have selected, partly consciously and partly through 
the accidents of the unconscious, those texts to rely on to elaborate an administrative 
theory of democratic legitimacy.5  Specifically, I choose those thinkers— Cooper (1991, 
1998), Dewey (1927, 1948, 1961), Habermas (1981, 1984, 1990) Herring (1936), Long 
(1962), Waldo (1984), Young (1990, 1999, 2000)—who consciously engage themselves 
(in their texts if not their lives) with the practice of politics as well as the practice of 
thinking about politics.  There are other scholars' works that may belong here, but the 
selection of these works is purposeful, as the authors' thoughts dominate throughout.   
 In many ways, I see that these authors share a similar objective in their writings.  
Particularly, each seeks to know what it is—those thoughts, practices, procedures, 
moments—that makes democracy a legitimate, and truly good, form of governance in 
                                                 
5
 The notion of a text choosing one rather than one choosing a text is not original to me, I draw from a 
conversation I had with Roxanne Euben at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, 2005.  
 7 
the modern state.  Certainly, Habermas’ work, particularly that after the “communicative 
turn” is illuminating for this project.  Likewise, the work of Dewey on democracy and 
the interaction of education, communication and social action, sheds light on the 
importance of a democratic orientation to the inquiries of life in the contemporary state.  
Drawing upon Young, I use the projects of Habermas, Dewey, and Long to form a 
synthetic notion of representation in a just democracy.  From Long, I take the 
importance of an Aristotelian “walk-about” method for forming a theory of the 
administrative state in a democratic system emerges with little acknowledgement of 
theoretical perspectives that do not take democracy seriously.  From Cooper, I extract a 
theory of complete democratic citizenship, one that takes as given the importance of the 
role of the practicing public administrator for the performance of citizenship in America.  
Finally, from Herring, I draw one of the key insights that hold the remainder of the text 
together, namely the importance of the public interest as a democratically legitimated 
standard for public administration in a democracy.  It is from this starting point that I 
attempt to synthesize a theory of democratic legitimation that incorporates the role of 
public administrators throughout the process of governance. 
 Though the primary task of the work is to develop a theory of democracy, there 
are many tributaries and side-roads taken.  The reader will note that I delve into the 
analysis of communication, particularly Habermas’ theory of communicative action, at 
length in places.  Readers may also note that, while I dive into the depths of particular 
theories, I skim over others.  I do this for reasons of practicality—time, space, 
coherence, and patience are limited.  Specifically, while I make empirical claims at 
 8 
points, I do not undertake extensive analyses of the data that may support these claims 
fully.  Often this is because it is my sense that I am citing truisms.  Additionally, I may 
glance over a theory or a concept without thoroughly explaining it; those common 
symbols—the content of our common sense—is not the point of exposition here.  The 
point here is the construction of a theoretical framework for resolving the problem of 
illegitimacy in the practice of government, any points where I may have strayed are 
accidental, and any points of true synthesis between public administration and political 
philosophy, fully intentional. 
 9 
CHAPTER II 
TOWARDS DEMOCRATICALLY ORIENTED INTERESTS 
 
The importance of the public interest as a commendatory standard for 
government action pervades much of the twentieth century literature on government.  As 
Pendleton Herring suggests in his work Public Administration in the Public Interest 
(1936), invocation of the public interest as a standard for action is crucial to the 
reconciliation of administrative action and the American democratic ideal.  For Herring, 
the intractable problem of reconciling bureaucracy with democracy hinges on the 
satisfaction of the democratically defined public interest by the bureaucracy.  
Specifically, to reconcile the actions of a non-elected branch of government with the 
idea of full citizen control of government, Herring proposes that administrators follow 
the public interest as the ultimate standard of goodness in their daily decision-making.   
Such sentiments for the importance of the public interest are not new to the 
thought of Herring.  The importance of the interests of the public for the definition of a 
standard for democratically legitimate action taken on the part of institutions of 
government is an American democratic concern emanating from the early Federalists 
and anti-Federalists alike, through the thought of the populists and into that most 
American of philosophies—pragmatism.  The public interest occupies a paramount 
position in American thought on the democratic defensibility of government.  In fact, 
 10 
echoing Dewey, we may say that the pursuit of the public interest is the very task of 
democratic government in America.6  
Herring, following a particular strain of Dewey, elaborates extensively on the 
many forms that an appeal to the public interest may take in a complex democracy.7  
Regrettably, though, he leaves open for the reader a crucial step in the reconciliation of 
bureaucracy with democracy.  Specifically, he does not describe the role of the public 
interest in this project.  Herring leaves underdeveloped an argument for the means of 
creation for a democratically legitimate public interest.  He resigns to the reader’s 
estimation alone that the public interest is a standard that is democratic in nature.  In 
doing so, Herring follows the common tendency among later scholars of the public 
interest to leave public interest formation woefully under-articulated in much of the 
literature on the topic.  It is the intent in this chapter to lay the foundation for the purpose 
of the public interest as the highest standard to which public administrators ought to 
appeal in their decision-making processes.   
Despite the clear and continuing centrality of the public interest for political and 
administrative theories of action, ethics and citizenship, a perplexing hole remains in 
                                                 
6
 Such a sentiment we can find in many places in Dewey’s extensive thought, but it is most obvious in his 
elaboration on the differences of aristocratic and democratic government in The Ethics of Democracy.  
“Democracy does not differ from aristocracy in its goal.  The end is not mere assertion of the individual 
will as individual; it is not disregard for the law, of the universal,; it is complete realization of the law 
namely of the unified spirit of the community.  Democracy differs as to its means.  This universal this law, 
this unity of purpose, this fulfilling of function in devotion to the interests of the social organism, is not to 
be put into a man from without.  It must begin in the man himself, however much the good and the wise of 
society contribute” (Dewey 1993, 61). 
7
 Herring himself does not identify himself as a pragmatic thinker.  However, the belief that Herring 
demonstrates throughout the work in the educative purpose of public administration and the importance of 
the public and its interest for the maintenance of democracy is similar in many important ways with 
Dewey’s thinking on the purpose of governing institutions for democracy as practice and idea.  A more 
extended analysis of the pragmatic elements of Herring’s work is beyond the scope of the present 
argument.  
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many articulations of the public interest.  From “scientific” or management perspectives 
given by Schubert (1960, 1962) and Sorauf (1962), to philosophically inspired analyses 
offered by Flathman (1966), Held (1970), Oppenheim (1981) and, (in part) Herring 
(1936), many scholars of the public interest treat the concept as a fact of democratic 
decision-making and governance.  Through the medium of deontological ethics 
(Thompson 1987) or constitutional oaths (Rohr 1978) or administrative conservatorship 
(Terry 2003), the idea of a public interest returns as a “north-star” for navigating the ship 
of the administrative state.  Although, the language of such chapters suggests that the 
satisfaction of the public interest ought to serve as the gold standard for administrative 
actions, the pathways to the public interest and the democratic necessity of a public 
interest remain the judgment of the reader.  Within public administration texts, as 
Schubert (1957, 346) notes, a brief section is often added to the end of textbooks 
concerning the topic of administrative ethics and/ or responsibility.  Furthermore, not 
since the seminal piece by Herring, published seventy years ago, has any administrative 
theorist directly confronted, however nominally, the relevance and importance of this 
standard for administrative ethics and practice. 
The extensive interrogation of concepts, such as the public interest, as concept is 
beyond the conventional scope of work for most contemporary administrative theorists.8  
Nevertheless, by neglecting the role of thoughtful analysis of the public interest concept 
and its formation in complex constitutional democracies, administrative theorists seeking 
                                                 
8
 Certainly, many of us hold Dwight Waldo to be the first (and often last) proper normative administrative 
theorist of the philosophically reflective tradition.  Others, such as Carl Friedrich have followed Waldo 
and, as I will suggest later in this work, done a better job at founding public administration theory in the 
political philosophy tradition. 
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to reconcile bureaucracy and democracy,9 or to refound the legitimacy of the 
administrative state,10 continue to neglect an important theoretical link.   
It would seem a truism that studies of public administration should have an active 
and distinctive conceptualization of the administered public.  Particularly as regards the 
public interest, a critical component of the concept is the account of the interests of the 
public.  It is the definition of the public and its role in the ideal democracy that compels 
the administrative theorist to reexamine the thought of Dewey: 
The public is organized and made effective by means of representatives who as 
guardians of customs, as legislators, as executives, judges, etc. care for its special 
interests by methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of individuals and 
groups.  Then and in so far, association adds to itself political organization, and 
something which may be government comes into being; the public is a political 
state (1927, 257). 
 
An incorporation of the association of multiple forms and means of democratic 
participation widens the scope of participatory accountability within the democratic 
government context.  To elaborate, if the public interest is formed as a legitimate 
democratic process accounting for the voiced interests of all, then all persons 
participating in the formation of the public interest exercise some degree of control over 
the administration of their political will.  Accounting for the formation of the public 
interest as democratic process of association and community deliberation, the tension of 
bureaucracy versus the demos—who controls whom—is resolved through channels of 
                                                 
9
 The number of scholars who have sought to reconcile bureaucracy with democracy is prohibitive of full 
cataloging, however a few notable names should be referred to here: Rourke (1986), Meier (1993), West 
(1995), Wood and Waterman (1994), Behn (2001).  The public interest is not a central concept for these 
scholars.  
10
 This is the explicit project of the Blacksburg School of public administration (Wamsley, et al. 1989 and 
Wamsley and Wolf 1996).  Interestingly however, the matter of the public interest does not garner 
significant attention in either of these works.  
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citizen mediation directly, not channels of instrumentally rational “control” by 
representatives divorced from the face-to-face association.   
The pragmatic preference for normative controls versus (for example) transaction 
cost or balance of power controls (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; West 1995) impinges 
on the assumptions put forth in the later, positivist, public administration literature.  
Specifically, the power of normative suggestion defies empirical quantification or 
analysis and the implicit rationalization of efficiency supposed within.  As such, the 
importance of executive/ legislative machinations as instruments of “control” falls to the 
wayside (McCubbins, et.al., 1989; Moe 1984).   
Though it would be simple to accuse the positivist leanings of the students of 
public administration of promoting a non-normative account of democratic control of the 
bureaucracy, additional sources may be more blameworthy.  Specifically, the 
“conceptual muddle” that is the public interest as concept and standard contributes, as do 
the shifting preferences for bottom up versus top down democracy.  The reliance on 
normative mechanisms of control, one would think at first blush, is contradictory to the 
principle of representative government and the democratic control of the bureaucracy by 
political principals (i.e., neutrally representative legislators).  Such conclusions persist in 
much of the later public administration literature (Finer 1941; McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast 1989; Bendor 1988; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, Wood and Waterman 
1994).  Yet, through attention to Dewey’s thought on democracy and communication, as 
well as Habermas’ theory of communicative action, it is possible to reconstruct a more 
synthetic notion of citizen’s participation in the normative formation of government that 
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accounts for the notion of political control by the synthesis of both principals (elected 
representatives) and citizen’s interests. 
 
Interest Formation and the Role of Economics 
As it stands, there is no general theory of interests that can account fully for the 
public and political nature of the desires of men.11  Indeed the question arises, would we 
want a complete theory of interests?  Would such a theory produce any value for the 
study of politics as idea and practice?  In short, I would suggest the answers would be 
“no” in both respects.  A general theory of interests supposes a general and complete 
theory of man, an exercise that would likely resolve itself through reductivist assertions, 
metaphysical gyrations, or overly complex machinations defending relativism.  The 
problem of interests, like the problem of a public, necessitates a pragmatic perspective.   
Particularly within contemporary political science scholarship, the role of 
economically quantifiable wants as proxies of political interests is undeniable.  Whether 
speaking of citizen’s self-interests, individual interests, group interests, or the interests of 
political principals, the economic model is the most influential.  Basic tenets of the 
economic model of interests are that the definition of interests occurs through the 
socially isolated estimation of individual utilities and the internal cost-benefit analysis of 
pay-offs for players in an exchange system (Laver 1981).  
                                                 
11
 From the perspective of rational choice theory, accounting for the interests of men occurs only if we 
accept a theory of man as socially isolated and imbued with self-interested desires ex nihilo.  Note Laver 
(1981, 21) 
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In modern political and economic theory, relying on the homo oeconomicus 
model of Adam Smith in particular, interest calculation necessitates derivation of 
individual economic utilities.  Simply put, this theoretical framework supports the 
conclusion that all interests are self-interests.  Although Graham (2004) and others 
(Seglow 2004) have attempted to define an impulse towards non-economic self-interests 
altruism for example, many of their justifications are themselves predicated on expanded 
use of the economic model.  Economic models of interest calculation, then, would seem 
to be unavoidable in explanations of politics and the public interest (Hirschman 1977).12 
The foundational theorists of liberal economy and interests (Jeremy Bentham, 
John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, Adam Smith; see Fusfeld 1999, and Grampp 1948, 
1965), describe the interests bearing political man as the expression of self-interests born 
in isolation and confirmed in society.  In their classic articulations, because all men13 are 
individuals by natural cognizance and liberty, only they themselves may accurately 
reflect upon, and importantly satisfy, their specific wants, desires, and needs.  Yet, even 
they give way to the difficult task of fully atomizing the economic man; the individual of 
political economy is not strictly an atomized or anomic individual.  As Smith (1976) 
certainly makes clear, without the imposition of the values of society, man cannot know 
economy itself, much less his own identity as such. 
                                                 
12
 Much of the analysis here is drawn from the contributions of Grampp (1948, 1965), Fusfeld (1999) and 
O’Brien (2004).  This is not a careful study of interests but is a survey of those economists whose works 
are most relevant, or often cited, within the public interest literature.  
13
 The use of the term man is certainly outdated in the contemporary political theory genre; however, in the 
discussion of historical texts, the use of the term man is entirely appropriate.  As Skinner 2002 suggests, 
we must be cognizant and respectful of the historical situation of our authors if we are to render a valid 
critique of them.  To this end, I would argue that we must use the term man, however unfashionable, here.  
Nevertheless, for an assessment of the economics of the private interests of women, see Elshtain 1993. 
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Despite the reductivist, methodological individualism in contemporary economic 
liberal (rational choice) thought, an economic theory of self-interest not solipsistic.  
Moreover, because it is not completely devoid of all social pretenses, the assumptions 
can become political.  All persons construct their interests with respect paid to 
perceptions of others’ estimations of their validity and utility as well.14  Man, is self-
interested as a natural animal, but other-regarding as a social animal in his formulation 
of interests.  According to the liberal economic model, forces of nature and society 
construct men and it is the project of a society to enforce norms and morality in order to 
make man into a livable character.  The livable man is naturally motivated towards 
production of privately and publicly useful goods, though it may be anachronistic to aim 
one’s productive forces towards the later (Laver 1981, 18).  Economic men have an 
economically and politically defined teleology to their lives—improved lives lived 
individually through improvement of their production held in common.  That is, the 
economic man is bound by nature to the production of better and better goods and 
services which would culminate in the ideal society of producing ideally economizing 
individuals, regulated only by the forces of a free-market (that is unfettered by 
government interference of almost all sorts).  Smith notes, in the The Wealth of Nations, 
the tendency of man towards the model of an individually progressive, self-interested 
man: 
 
                                                 
14
 The expression of wants and needs in terms as of validity and utility are basic to the satisfaction of 
Habermas’ standards of communicative action.  Therefore, another supporting argument could focus on 
Habermas’ preoccupation with interest held in common based on the linkage between communicative 
action and two expressions of economically valid arguments.  
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The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, 
the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence is originally 
derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural process of things 
toward improvement, in spite of both the extravagance of government, and of the 
greatest errors of administration (quoted in Fusfeld 1999, 29).  
 
Smith rejected the notion of the fully atomized man as much as he rejected the idea of a 
government in full control of the economy.  Therefore, the conclusion persists that he 
did not reject the idea of a public interest so long as the public’s interest lied with the 
pursuit of individual economic progress. 
Interests defined simply as self-interests, which are entirely private and 
individualistic in their bases, is not an assumption that Dewey borrows from Smith.15  
For him, there was little room in the economic theory of individual interests for the 
intercession of others, including political representatives, in the elaboration and 
satisfaction of an individual’s interests.  This, Dewey noted, is problematic for political 
democracy.  
Dewey’s contention with the economic model of interests is rooted in his 
definitions of both individual and interests.  For Dewey, the individual is not isolated 
from the forces of others: 
In its approximate sense, anything is individual which moves and acts as a 
unitary thing.  For common sense, a certain spatial separateness is the mark of 
this individuality.  A thing is one when it stands lies or moves as a unit  
independently of other things… but even vulgar common sense at once  
 
                                                 
15
 Interestingly, the voluminous literature on the definition of the private and the public often suggests that 
self-interests are economic.  Benhabib (1992) suggests that there are three types of explicitly private 
concerns: “the sphere of moral and religious conscience”, “privacy rights pertaining to economic 
liberties”, and “the intimate sphere” (emphasis hers).  
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introduces qualifications (186).  …we have to qualify our approximate notion of 
an individual as being that which acts and moves as a unitary thing.  We have to 
consider not only its connections and ties, but the consequences with respect to 
which it acts and moves.  … an individual whatever else it is or is not, is not just 
the spatially isolated thing our imagination inclines it to be (1927, 187).  
 
For Dewey, the socially and spatially isolated individual devising his or her interests 
separate from the world around him or her is fictive.  Consequently, all individuals share 
common interests, and define those interests in a common language of experience.  In 
particular, interests arise through the commonality of experience, including that with the 
state itself. 
Only the exigencies of a preconceived theory would confuse with the state that 
texture of friendships and attachments which is the chief bond in any community, 
or would insist that the former depends upon the latter for existence.  Men group 
themselves also for scientific inquiry, for religious worship, for artistic 
production and enjoyment, for sport, for giving and receiving instruction for 
industrial and commercial undertakings.  In each case some combined or conjoint 
action, which has grown up out of ‘natural’, that is biological, conditions and 
from local contiguity, results in producing distinctive consequences—that is, 
consequences which differ in kind from those of isolated behavior.  When these 
consequences are intellectually and emotionally appreciated, a shared interest is 
generated and the nature of the interconnected behavior is thereby transformed 
(Dewey 1927, 26-27).  
 
Interests, like individuals, Dewey argues cannot be defined out of nothing.  
Consequently, when speaking of the public and the public interest pragmatically, it is 
imperative not to speak of either as the mathematical aggregate of individuals and their 
estimations of utility, cost, and benefit.  
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Interests in Politics 
Yet, it is with a heavy dose of the classical economics that later political 
theorists, such as Barry (1976), Held (1970), and Oppenheim (1981) are able to expand 
upon a theory of interests.  Barry (1976) describes in Political Argument three 
connotations of the use of interests in political speech.  Barry offers that the phrase “x is 
in A’s interests” can be decoded to mean: “A wants x”, or “x would be a justifiable 
claim on the part of A”, and/or “x will give A more pleasure than any alternative open to 
him.”  Each of these definitions takes as given that “A” is an individual, not a 
representation for a group of individuals.  Barry goes on to suggest in his own words 
that, “x is in A’s interests” is code for “A wants the results of x”.  The x in question 
being a policy or action (Held 1970, 21-22).  Barry extends the economic liberal 
argument based on what he terms the want-regarding model of interests.  According to 
Barry, there is a link between want-regarding interests and the individual’s calculus of 
interests based upon desire.  Ideal-regarding interests are those tied to altruistic or truly 
other regarding, abstract interests based upon apprehension of the social.  Although 
Barry does not wish to reify the methodologically individualist, want-regarding position 
of many of the economic liberals in his analysis, he does so in the spirit of protecting 
liberal freedoms of choice and decision over the establishment of an “other-regarding’ 
society.  
The interest standards that citizens bring to the public sphere have been 
conceptualized (in part) by Oppenheim (1981), Held (1970) and the classical and welfare 
economists.  Oppenheim’s construction of self-interest is reminiscent of his construction 
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of the definition of public interest -- “It is in A’s interest to do X in situation S” (1981, 
134).  For Held (1970), the most useful definition of self-interest is molded from the 
previous works of Barry, Locke and Pareto to suggest that self-interests are “an action or 
policy is in a man’s [sic] interest if it increases his opportunities to get what he wants” 
(1970, 22).  In the construction of the classical economists, what is in someone’s self-
interest is what maximizes their satisfaction/ utility for the achievement of a particular 
goal on a knowable time horizon.  Using an amalgam of each of these 
conceptualizations, we can arrive at the definition of self-interest that shapes the content 
of relevant discussion material in the public sphere.  The definition of the concept of 
self-interest is an action, utterance, or position (that directly leads to a particular action 
or utterance with minimal variation in possible outcomes).  This interest satisfies the 
needs or wants of an individual actor and the expression of this interest encode our 
mutual understanding of the interest as something satisfying.  In other words, interests 
are what motivate us to suggest that something is good or bad for us in the situation we 
find ourselves in or can reasonably expect to find ourselves in within the knowable 
future.   
In ordinary language, our use of interest-speak is the veneer that covers the 
expressions of implicit or explicitly standards for the achievement of our satisfaction.  
This is not to say that our speech in the public sphere is rooted always and entirely in our 
self-interests alone.  In fact, contrary somewhat to the extreme reductivist assumption of 
some economists that all interests are individual utility driven, I do not suggest that 
interests are always individually calculated or based on the goal of achieving material 
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satisfaction.  As both Held (1970) and Flathman (1966) point out, we define our own 
individual interests within a social context that offers us grounding in what is an 
appropriately held interest and what is mere mania or fantasy.  That is, interest 
expressions can include our expectations for satisfaction of non-rival and non-excludable 
goods such as psychological satisfaction or the satisfaction of a religious/ moral position.  
Nevertheless, the basic definition of interests as the expression of expected standards for 
satisfaction remains.   
The translation of interests into the critical public sphere is the statement of 
citizens’ policy preferences or critiques of others' expressed preferences-- the thinly 
veiled statements that “this policy does (not) satisfy my needs or wants on the time 
horizon/ in the situation that I find myself in presently”.  The public interest as policy 
preference standard suggests the following definition: the public interest is an expression 
made publicly that a particular policy does (not) satisfy the needs or wants that I 
perceive to best serve my perception of the needs or wants of those persons directly 
around me, or whom I can abstractly accept as wanting or needing persons in the future.  
It is the achievement of feelings/ perceptions of a partnership in an intersubjectively 
communicating collectivity—the realization of being a constitutive partner in the 
continued formation of the lifeworld—that occurs through membership in the 
communicatively acting public sphere.  The achievement of these feelings of 
communicative partnership in the public sphere allows for the potential of an emergent, 
holistic concept of the public interest as the commonly held interest that supports the 
institutions that make the communicative lifeworld possible.  
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A basic definition that I suggested fits this requirement was an analytical one 
offered by Oppenheim (1981).  I, borrowing from Oppenheim, define the public interest 
as, “it is in the interest of the public P that A’s enact policy X if and only if it is rational 
for A’s to enact X with regard to promoting the collective welfare of P (1981, 136).”  
Oppenheim’s original definition is incomplete in a number of ways, mainly with respect 
to the definition of the public.  According to my modified definition that guides this 
chapter, "P" means the public as a collection of the many publics that make the whole 
body of persons affected by common public authority.16  To state more precisely the 
content of the public P, I use terminology adapted from Appleby (1952) that the public P 
is: all non-governmental17 public associations for which the government broadly 
understood serves to mediate the competition between them (in a non-coercive way).  
What Appleby alludes to in his definition of the public is the voluntary aggregation 
associations under the umbrella of governmental public authority, which are part of the 
full civil society and potential public sphere.  These civil society organizations become 
public through their interpenetration with one another within the context of other semi-
public organizations and administrative agencies, the domestic government structure and 
 
                                                 
16
 Oppenheim’s definition of public P is “any group of human beings where the unity of the group is 
determined by its organization under a common public authority (1981, 24)” is useful but I believe out-
dated.  As the architects of deliberative democratic theory have pointed out, virtually all members of 
American society are members of some organization(s) that are oriented towards narrowly or broadly 
defined public purposes (i.e., churches).  Therefore, to put all persons ab origio into a public of only 
governmental authority denies the effect of the secondary layer of civic associational authority and 
publicity.  This, I suggest, we resolve through the incorporation of Appleby’s definition.   
17
 In this case, the distinction non-governmental public is interpretable as it is in the international relations 
literature of a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) or non-state actor with an influence on the public 
that is under the authoritative structure of the state.  This definition does not evoke however, the notion of 
the NGO as an actor outside of the state itself (as done in the IR literature).  Appleby’s non-governmental 
actors are within the structure of the state as constitutive and constituting parts. 
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the international governance context.   
To further modify the base definition provided by Oppenheim, if we utilize the 
plural form of agents “As”, this makes the requirement of “if it is rational for A(s) to 
enact X with regard to promoting the collective welfare of P” a problematic statement.  
That is, this definition is problematic to the extent that the agency of all A’s requires  1) 
an authoritatively legitimate representation of their own autonomous (and their 
representatives’ autonomous) estimations of welfare and 2) a rational defense according 
to some mutually agreeable and validated standard.18  Additionally, their decisions as a 
collective must then be suitable to stand up to the standards of scrutiny (by the 
multiplicity of representing and representative agents) for decisions made as an “agency 
having” actor—government defined as an “A.”   
 The persistence of individualistic calculations of interests goes beyond the 
common use of the formula “x is in A’s interests” to characterize the motivations of men 
in an economy or political system.  The individualistic calculus underpins theories of 
group interests.  Groups, in this model, require definition as individual actors in 
competition with other groups, just as the economic model defines individuals as actors 
competing with one another.  Group interest theories, as political theories of man, take as 
given fact that man, when in a group, adopts the preferences of his fellows as his own.   
The language of Truman (1951) on group interests demonstrates clearly this 
trend.  Truman’s description of an interest group is “any group that, on the basis of one 
or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the 
                                                 
18
 By conventional standards of rationality, I mean, goal directed behavior to maximize the actor’s utility 
for a particular good, defined independently by the actor him/herself.  
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establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the 
shared attitudes” (1951, 33).  Truman, throughout his discussion of group interests, 
describes the relations of groups to other groups in a manner reminiscent of the 
economist’s discussion of individual versus individual conflict.  Truman, rather than 
developing a theory of group interest formation, describes group interests as an 
aggregation of individuals with separate interests, and develops his theory by 
considering groups as unitary-preference-holding-actors similar to individuals.  This, as 
Niemeyer (1962) reminds us, is a page directly out of the classical economist’s view of 
man and interest.  
This treatment of group interests as the aggregation of individuals’ self-interest is 
foundational for the logic of later contemporary theories of the public interest.  The 
persistence of economic concerns, particularly those of the classical economists, shapes 
the better part of our understanding of interests brought forth in almost all sections of 
political thought.  In the fields of political theory and public administration, the basis of 
calculation of interests rests largely on the theories of utility maximization, the 
hedonistic calculus, interest aggregation, and an individualized man found in classical 
economic thought.  
In the field of political theory, the persistence of liberalism as a political doctrine 
ties these two points together.  The classical economists, as is often noted, wed to the 
emerging liberal notion of man, state, and society in their articulations of economic 
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theory.  This merger has not yet been uncoupled.19  In public administration, economic 
interests tie not only into the theory of individuality and liberal values, but also into the 
persistence of efficiency, economy and resource maximization as critical values for the 
practice of administration in the public interest.   
 
The Public Interest, the Economy, and Representation 
As has been suggested by virtually all scholars who have endeavored to describe 
the public interest or its function, the theoretical development of the concept “public 
interest” is in a constant state of flux and confusion.20  The public interest is a concept 
that transcends the barrier of political theory and public administration; theorists on both 
sides address issues associated with policy formation and implementation, as well the 
points of Plato and Rousseau.  Despite the bridges built by the discussion of the concept 
between the two sub-disciplines there have been remarkably few “seminal” pieces 
generative of a suitable definition, useful to both public administration scholars and 
political theorists.21   
The multitude of works associated with the definition of the public interest defies 
definitive classification.  For some, the concept of the public interest is critical to the 
mission of understanding good government (Flathman 1966).  To others, the public 
                                                 
19
 However, it is important to point out that communitarians, such as Daniel Bell (1993), also emphasize 
the importance of economic interests in their appreciation of community values.   
20
 For an example of the tendency among multiple scholars to note the difficulty of the concept, see 
Friedrich’s (1962) edited volume The Public Interest NOMOS V.  
21
 For the sake of argument, a seminal piece here is one that makes a positive contribution to the 
understanding of the public interest.  A positive understanding is one that includes a definition, distinctly 
different from platitudes that the public interest is the common good, and critically evaluates previous 
definitions.  
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interest is a concept that is better forgotten (Sorauf 1962). To yet others, the concept 
does not “exist” at all (Bentley 1949).  Nevertheless, the extent of the debate on the 
concept itself suggests that it is a theoretical problem worth further analysis (Zarecor 
1959). 
Despite the difficulty, an impressive number of classificatory schemes for the 
public interest persist as guides in the literature.  Colm, for example, uses the 
“metasociological, sociological, judicial and economic” (1962, 119).  Schubert (1960, 
1962) suggests an adaptation of Leys’ (1943) classification scheme that defines the 
public interest theories into those of the “rationalists, realists, and idealists.”  Cochran 
(1974) suggests a division of the “normative, abolitionist, process and consensualist” 
conceptualizations of the public interest.  
The debate within the literature on the public interest as concept and as useful for 
practice obfuscates the continued importance of the concept for democratic theory.  
Many scholars have developed an argument for or against a particular classificatory 
scheme or have reviewed the foundations of another theorist’s definition of “interests.”  
Of the notable contributions, the work of Oppenheim (1981), Held (1970), and Flathman 
(1966) stands out among the contributions of political theorists, while the works of 
Herring (1936), Schubert (1957, 1962), Redford (1954), Follet (1918), and Cassinelli 
(1958) stand out among the contributions of public administration scholars.  Though 
there are some overlapping tendencies in the classificatory schemes and arguments for or 
against each, the most prominent consistency is the assertion that the public interest is a 
concept with normative force in the process of decision making in government.  It is the 
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task of the next section to provide a review of these and a synthetic definition drawn 
from them. 
 
A Closer Review of Two Concepts of the Public Interest 
 Held (1970) attempts a philosophical reconstruction of the concept of the public 
interest that stands apart from those articulated by earlier scholars.  Her main contention 
is that the formulation of many of the definitions escapes the rigor of a critically 
philosophical way-- one that takes the basic assumptions of interests, interest 
aggregation, and diversity of interests seriously as a way to build a (meta) ethical 
standard.  She posits that such a meta-ethical standard is necessary for resolving the 
contentions that arise between a descriptive public interest and the political functions of 
interests for individuals and groups.  What she seeks to define as the public interest are 
the moral codes necessary for the establishment of a political-moral order capable of 
resolving interest conflicts through a process of validation.  To elaborate:  
A dispute between a valid claim of public interest and a valid claim of individual 
interest can only be resolved at a level outside of the political system.  A settlement 
requires a wider system encompassing both, capable at arriving at valid judgments 
concerning rival positions. A political system cannot ask whether its existence is, 
itself, in the public interest, since the possibility of answering presupposes a decision 
procedure which presupposes the political system’s own existence. Nor can an 
individual ask whether his existence is in his own interest, for the same reason. Both, 
if they exist, can ask if a continuation of their existence is in their own interest (1970, 
197).  
 
Held’s call for a meta-ethical principle for assessing the public interest is understandable 
given the seemingly intractable nature of defining the public interest from within the 
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system itself.  Unfortunately, Held diminishes the applicability of her analysis through 
her insistence on the meta-ethical realm as modal conversation space for solving 
political interest competitions.   
  From the perspective of a pragmatic basis for the public interest, it is of little use 
practically or theoretically to establish a meta-ethical principle, as the consequences of 
meta-ethical principles are presumably fixed, unassailable, and non-experimental.  In 
short, a meta-ethical appeal eliminates the experience of democracy in the public interest 
formation and declares that one finds the true public interest in revelatory philosophical 
procedures.  Nevertheless, from the perspective of the work in progress at present, the 
contribution that Held makes to the suggestion of a public sphere based public interest is 
notable.  Specifically, though the recourse to meta-ethical, validating principles ought 
not to interfere in a pragmatically motivated context such as public administration, a 
notion of a public interest developing outside of the boundaries of political institutions 
through conversation is useful.  As Held suggests that we must find a realm removed 
from politics to resolve politics, the utility of the Habermasian public sphere in its 
original conceptualization appears promising as location for public interest generation.   
Flathman’s (1966) contribution is largely a defense of the normative character of 
the public interest as a commendatory statement used in discourses on the goodness of 
outcomes and processes employed by public authorities.  He suggests,  
We conclude that ‘public interest’ is a general commendatory concept used in 
selecting a justifying public policy.  It has no general, unchanging, descriptive 
meaning applicable to all policy decisions, but a nonarbitrary descriptive 
meaning can be determined for it in particular cases.  This descriptive meaning is 
properly found through reasoned discourse which attempt to relate the 
anticipated effects of a policy to community values and to test that relation by 
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formal principles.  We also conclude that the concept is neither a vacuous phrase 
nor a verbal device useful for propaganda purposes. It performs a function in 
political discourse, and it has a logic which, if taken seriously, will influence the 
kind of policies adopted and rejected and the character of the political process 
utilized to adopt and reject those policies. A politics which takes the logic of the 
concept seriously, a politics of the public interest, will differ in significant and 
predictable manner from a politics which misunderstands or “abandons” the 
concept (1966, 82) 
 
The nettlesome issues of individual interests and the problem of interest aggregation 
(according to the utilitarian or aggregative theory (Held 1970, 44-45) are taken up at 
length by Flathman (1966, 14-53).  A conceptualization of the public interest outside of 
an account of each individual’s stated interests haunts Flathman's work.  He suggests 
that, although the public interest is a common normative standard, public interest 
generation requires due consideration of the constituent interests of the private 
individuals.   
Where ‘interest’ is use in the sense we have designated ‘subjectively defined 
self-interest’ (whether ‘selfish’ or not), the public interest would consist of that 
policy on which unanimity is perceived and expressed among the members of the 
public. Hence, institutional arrangements capable of canvassing and 
implementing the wishes of the public would be appropriate. Conversely, where 
‘interest’ is used to denote an objectively determined relationship between a 
person and a substantive, the emphasis would fall on the ascertainment of reliable 
information about the consequences of alternative policies and the development 
of trans-subjective criteria of value (1966, 31). 
 
He navigates the difficult waters of a descriptively valid normative, universalizable 
conceptualization of the public interest by proposing a “politics of the public interest.”  
In Flathman’s estimation, the politics of the public interest, ”... requires that citizens 
shape their political behavior according to the principles of universalizability and the 
canons of reason (1966, 43)” and that “for a number of reasons, then, the expressed self-
interest of the members of the citizenry has been considered necessary to defining the 
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descriptive meaning of ‘public interest’” (1966, 37).  The importance of the individual’s 
(or group’s) own interest lies in the politics of the public interest—or how it is actualized 
by authority in view of the potential consequences of a particular action—rather than in 
the descriptive meaning of the concept itself.22  The descriptive meaning must come 
from the calculations of the individual moral agent as to how the public policy or its 
consequences in question comport with their own, intersubjectively defined conditions 
of the good in government.   
For both Held and Flathman, the concept of the public interest is symbolic of the 
outcome developed among persons reasonably discoursing on their interests.  
Consequently, when the term is used, packed into it is the expression of feelings on 
government and the expectations for politics to assist in the achievement of the best 
policies for the good life.  As has been pointed out above, these expectations include 
expectations of process.  The importance of expectations provokes an analysis of the 
contributions from administrative theorists and Dewey. 
Mary Parker Follett (1918) has articulated the process associated with 
development of the public interest, in part.  The processes that most informed Follett’s 
work are (predominantly) the creation of a group psychology based on the principles of 
democratic citizenship, such as equality of participants in political debates held in 
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 “We argued that the satisfaction of subjectively defined individual and group interests can be a 
legitimate part of the public interest, and that “public interest” is a normative concept, the descriptive 
meaning of which might differ from the expressed interests on any particular issue.  To the extent that we 
emphasize the first criterion, the root of the problem of the public interest becomes interest diversity and 
conflict in society.  The greater the range of expressed interests on any question, the more difficult it will 
be to find a policy that will satisfy all or any substantial portion of them.  ...  Purely idiosyncratic and self-
serving demands which could not meet the principle of universalizability and the canons of reason would 
be eliminated” (1966, 44).  
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common.  For Follett, the process of democracy itself is essential to the creation of what 
she calls the common will.  “The deeper truth, perhaps the deepest, is that the will to will 
the common will is the core, the germinating centre of that large, still larger, ever larger 
life which we are coming to call the true democracy” (1918, 49).  She claims to do this 
through facilitation of integrative social processes, particularly the formation of groups 
and organizations via the intersubjective relation of feelings, states, emotions, and needs 
held in common.  It is through this socialization to one another and to the processes of 
democratic production in multiple venues of modern life that she proposes that the state 
comes into being.  Although Follett does not delve deeply into the problems of language 
held in common as a foundation for group psychological understanding, it seems clear 
that the issues of language would arise for Follett’s psychological version of a 
democratically defined common will.   
Tied to the language we use to express our feelings on the goodness or 
appropriateness of government policy is the concept of the public interest (Flathman 
1966, Herring 1936, Cohen 1962, Bell 1993).23  It is also, by extension, addressed to the 
effects of public policy, notably its implementation.  In Public Administration in the 
Public Interest, Herring makes the case that the public interest should be that standard to 
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 A contention with Flathman’s definition however, is that he fails to extend the purpose of the public 
interest to judging the outcomes of policy.  Rarely, do we speak of the goodness or appropriateness of a 
policy alone—we speak of the application of policy as being compliant with the public interest.  Because 
of the nature of language with which we describe our normative assessments of policy implementation 
(rather than simply the language of policy itself), the public interest is a topic of imminent concern to 
public administration scholars and practitioners.  Unfortunately, Flathman’s argument for the 
commendatory function of the term “public interest” stops short o serving its function for the full spectrum 
of political action.  
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which public administrators should appeal in the quest to prevent the evolution of 
government towards the Calliclean conclusion that might makes right.  
The task of government in a democracy, we assume, is the adjustment of warring 
economic and social forces. The public interest is the standard that supposedly 
determines the degree to which the government lends its forces to one side or 
another.  Without this standard for judgment between contenders, the scales 
would simply be weighted in favor of victory for the strongest (1936, 377).   
 
Herring suggests that there is no standard common to each of the branches and each of 
the competing interest-factions within the American democratic state, save for the public 
interest.  Although he defines the public interest loosely, he does so with an eye towards 
the importance of conceptual flexibility of the public interest in the face of the evolving 
administrative state.  Because the functions of the government are in a permanent state 
of flux, crescendo, and adaptation, the public interest must necessarily be as well.  
Particularly for the task of administrating the state, the conceptual objective of 
administration must remain flexible as more groups enter into, and demand of, the state 
(1936, 7-9).  He does not make the case that the public interest should be a relative 
standard that has no normative weight.  Instead, Herring’s definition of the public 
interest is almost entirely normative: 
The public interest is the standard that guides the administrator in executing the 
law. This is the verbal symbol designed to introduce unity, order, and objectivity 
into administration. This concept is to the bureaucracy what the ‘due process’ is 
clause is to the judiciary. Its abstract meaning is vague by its application has far 
reaching effects. To hold out the public interest as a criterion is to offer an 
imponderable. Its value is psychological and does not extend beyond the 
significance that each responsible civil servant must find in the phrase for 
himself. Thus, inescapably in practice the concept of public interest is given 
substance by its identification with the interests of certain groups. The bureaucrat 
is placed in a situation similar to the plight of Rousseau’s citizen.  The official, 
however, must endeavor to act in the public interest, but without the consolation 
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of testing his judgment in a bureaucratic plebiscite. He must follow his star with 
but little light on the immediate pitfalls in his path (1936, 23-24).  
 
For Herring, normative weight of the public interest lies within the heart of the 
administrator and guides his or her day-to-day actions.  The public interest in the 
administrative sphere is not devoid of empirically verifiable existence, but is a subjective 
measure that requires a sociological understanding of the bureaucratic environment 
(1936, 25-27).  The subjectivity of Herring’s formulation of the public interest would 
agitate later scholars attempting to define the public interest via empirical, “scientific” 
criterion. 
 The scientific assessment of the public interest is a project done in parts.  The 
reasons for this lie, as so lamented by virtually all scholars of the public interest, in the 
difficulty of defining the concept as one specific standard.  To define the public interest 
in toto is, as Cassinelli clearly states,24 a matter of defining “human excellence” and the 
“good life” (1962, 51).  The difficulty of definitions of the public interest, as Cassinelli 
(1962) has related, is the ties to the definition of the good life that the use of the term 
“public interest” evokes.  It is, in a single concept, the standard for theoretical 
measurement of all political speech and action.  Or as Cassinelli also argues, 
This standard [public interest], however, cannot be separated from correlative 
standards for governmental institutions and procedures, and for the traditional social 
and economic foundations upon which governments rest.  Foundations, institutions, 
and policy are always mutually interdependent... To praise or condemn a pattern of 
                                                 
24
 “It is perfectly reasonable to talk about the desirability of a certain policy-making procedure without 
reference to the public interest, and to argue in terms of a specific interpretation of the public interest 
without reference to the “good life”; everything cannot be said on every occasion.  Nevertheless, the 
logical connections among these levels of evaluation remain the same.  When we approve of a detail of 
governmental organization, we commit ourselves to an interpretation of the public interest; when we 
interpret the public interest, we bind ourselves to a conception of the good life (Cassinelli 1962, 51).  
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public policy is unavoidably to praise or condemn the institutions producing it and 
the society underlying these institutions. Because of this interrelationship, the ethical 
standard of the public interest can be applied to all phenomena relevant to politics 
(1962, 46-47).  
 
Cassinelli’s assertion that the public interest encompasses all of politics may seem 
overstated if we exclude from our calculation the enormity of the administrative task in 
modern states.  However, accounting for the enormity of these tasks and institutions, the 
assertion that anything could lie outside of politics may seem more radical.  That is, all 
institutions and policies are equally subject to the public interest (a critical standard that 
people, who have chosen to enter public discourse, can agree upon as the common and 
common-sensical standards for the goodness of public policy, its implementation, and 
assessment of consequences).  This leaves little room for an apolitical sphere left outside 
the purview of the public interest.  
The expansive nature of the public interest itself guides how we must think of it 
and, more importantly, how we can capture it in our theorizations of the political.  The 
problem with defining the public interest scientifically, then, is the problem of capturing 
the totality of means and ends in politics scientifically.  Stated in this manner, this 
standard is impossibly high, even for the most astute of scientifically inclined scholars.  
The project of capturing the normative character of the public interest is simpler than is 
the project of scientifically analyzing the concept in sum.  Thus, as Schubert (1957), no 
supporter of the idea of a normative public interest concept guiding administrative 
action, suggests,  
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A theory of ‘the public interest’ in administrative decision-making ought, one 
supposes, to describe a relationship between a concept of the public interest and 
official behavior in such terms that it might be possible to collect data for the 
purpose of attempting to validate hypotheses concerning the relationship.  If extant 
theory does not lend itself to such uses, it is difficult to comprehend the justification 
for teaching students of public administration that subservience to the public interest 
is a relevant norm of administrative responsibility (1957, 346). 
 
In Schubert’s estimation, the instruction of students in a totalizing or universal 
conceptualization of the public interest degenerates into the teaching of “administrative 
Platonism” or administrative tyranny.  His suggestions to overcome this are familiar to 
students of administration, particularly those of Simon—divide the concept of the public 
interest into its most relevant application for the process of evaluating public 
administration-- rational efficiency and rational decision-making (Schubert 1957, 1962).  
 It is in the task of resolving the debate on the normative and scientific, or 
practical, importance of the public interest that the importance of Dewey’s contribution 
reasserts itself.  Well known from the analysis of Dewey’s voluminous writings is the 
notion of a divided world between the normative and the practical, meta-ethical and 
intentional, self and society, which is foreign to the pragmatic orientation.  Likewise, an 
assessment of Dewey’s thought on the (political) public reveals his consistent belief in 
the unitary nature of the public through the process of caring for the consequence of 
lived experience.   
The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of 
transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences 
systematically cared for. Officials are those who look out for and take care of the 
interests thus affected (1927, 16-17). 
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The only constant [in politics] is the function of caring for and regulating the 
interests which accrue as the result of the complex indirect expansion and radiation 
of conjoint behavior (1927, 47). 
 
Dewey’s public’s interest then can be analyzed ex ante and ex post in the estimation and 
accumulation of known consequences of action taken as part of caring for the needs of 
the public.  A pragmatic public interest would be the preservation of the best patterns of 
social practice (culture as Dewey may say) for attenuating the consequences, whether 
practical or normative, of lived experience for all persons participating as members of 
the public.  This articulation makes Dewey’s public interest sound particularly 
conservative, but as will be elaborated upon later, there is a particular conserving 
tendency in the act of many citizens deliberating communicatively. 
 
Interests, Public Interests and the Public Sphere 
For the present project, if we use and take seriously the Habermasian assertion 
that it is communicative power that can ultimately ground administrative power—make 
what administrators administer (law/ policy) legitimate—then what we must define more 
critically the content of communication in the public sphere.  I expect that the content of 
communication needs to be closely linked to the intersubjective discussion of interest-
based standards that citizens apply (individually and mutually) in judgments of policy 
goodness and political justice—the public interest.  A potential criticism against the 
utility of the Habermasian discourse theoretic public sphere is that there is little material 
left out of the realm of communicative content in this arena (Habermas, 2001).  
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However, that the intent of Habermas’ project was not to tightly delineate the content of 
communication but to describe the process and outcomes of the public sphere seems 
apparent.  He elaborates in depth on both processes, outcomes and to an extent, 
membership in both The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (2001) and 
Between Facts and Norms (1996).  Though Habermas seems to take more seriously the 
idea of the public sphere as space for political dialogue in Between Facts and Norms, 
there remains a persistent hole in the theory—namely, what is the purpose of 
communication?  
Habermas, in both works, leaves out of the theory a statement regarding the 
proper content of communication in the public sphere.  As a theory aiming towards the 
goal of political legitimacy, the public sphere theory is useful and informative.  That is, 
as a theory that defines the content of political speech, it generally lacks precision and 
content specificity.  If the translation of communicative power to administrative power is 
to go smoothly, then the content of communication must be normatively relevant to the 
process of administration.  Communication in the public sphere should revolve around 
the normative content backing procedures and ethics for administrative action.  This 
normative content should carry substantial weight for decisions drawn both within, and 
on behalf of, the public.  Given the normative interpretation of the public interest as a 
commendatory standard for the content (and application) of public policy, the proper 
content of discussions in the public sphere are debates over interests held in particular to 
their association to interests held in common (Flathman,1966).   
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 As has been suggested above, political participants in the public sphere25 bring to 
the communicative arena their own autonomously defined interests as standards for 
judging the goodness of government action, as well as their own beliefs on the content of 
the interests of their fellow participants.  Additionally, they bring with them independent 
systems and speculations on the role of morality in the public and their interpretations of 
forms of goodness applicable to public behavior.  These same participants bring with 
them a notion of inclusion and humanity that grounds their articulation of what is an 
interest legitimately held by others.  Likewise, they bring with them a notion of what is 
acceptable as a system of common government that legitimately affirms or denies the 
interests of others.  Finally, political participants bring to the communicative arena 
multiple conceptualizations of interest that include self-interest, other regarding interest 
(in the recent and proximal sense of what is in the interests of my family and immediate 
friends) and other regarding interest (in the sense of the abstract concerns for one’s 
ethnic group, city, nation or even humanity in general).  What always already is part of 
the public sphere is the privilege of interests as the topic of discussion.   
The collectively defensible and intelligible rationality standard is problematic in 
a pluralistic environment of the nation as a whole, and on an even more limited scale, of 
the legislative body as a whole.  As MacIntyre (1988) suggests, the problem of defining 
                                                 
25
 The citizens-only model of politically meaningful public deliberation neglects the fact that citizenship is 
a more porous state than originally constructed in the Westphalia model of state-ness taken as the “true” 
form by Habermas, Arendt, and their critics.  In the American model in particular, we cannot ignore the 
importance of non-citizens (illegal aliens, resident aliens, etc) as deliberative interlocutors in the political 
process.  Particularly in states such as California, Texas, Florida, the desert southwest and New York, the 
political involvement of non-citizens shapes the policy process significantly in important areas such as 
labor, agriculture, education, and health care policy.  I will revisit the problem of the representation of 
non-citizen interests in a later chapter.  
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rationality is the problem of defining the philosophical system of the philosopher in 
question, which must be done in the context of a particular tradition. For the 
achievement of rationality standards in the collective decisions made by a legislature, the 
terms of rationality are inevitably multiple as individual legislators bring to bear their 
own philosophical and normative presuppositions of what is a rational action.  Coupled 
with the modern pluralism of a legislative body of a state such as America that is 
certainly plural in its socio-cultural traditions of philosophy and rationality standards, the 
standard of mutually defensible rational decisions in government is notably difficult to 
achieve.  Consequently, when speaking of the effort of government to define and abide 
by the public interest standard, the suggestion of Oppenheim (1981) requires that 
decision-makers conform to standards of strict rationality in their decisions, in order to 
promote the collective welfare of the full public "P.”   
It is unlikely that legislative decisions will conform to the standards of strict 
rationality without the voices of all heard.  Because the standards of rational decision-
making are difficult to define according to standards of strict rationality, the rationality 
standard needs flexibility.  I suggest that this softening of rationality reflect a demand 
that legislators act with a vision of the ideal public interest in mind.  More elaborately, 
the ideal that legislators such are striving for when deciding “in the public interest” is the 
achievement of political stability defined in the near term.  A pragmatic standard of 
political stability ought to be the course.  Certainly, stability as a goal is interpretable and 
could reflect antidemocratic or out-right authoritarian standards, such as institutional 
racism or sexism.  However, the act of decisions made in the public interest within a 
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democratic government structure that takes seriously the notions of pragmatic 
experimentalism in democracy stymies a priori, the perpetuation of antidemocratic or 
authoritarian government.  The ideal standard of political stability in the democratic 
government structure that operates according to a rationally defensible public interest is 
the protection of universal democratic participation.  
 
Conclusion  
The definition of the public interest is, “if it is the consensus position among all 
A's, that X be legitimately enacted to achieve the ideal of political stability defined as 
protecting the institution of the demos, then X contributes to the achievement of the ideal 
of full public P.”  The modifications to Oppenheim’s formulation are useful for defining 
the terms of participation and goal orientation of the act of decision-making in the public 
sphere.  However, the modifications to the definition do not resolve a crucial question of 
politics in the public sphere.  Does this modified definition offer additional advantage 
over the recurring problem of asymmetry between the achievement of political justice 
and fulfillment of the public interest on behalf of both the individual and the larger 
community?   
Through full democratic participation and mutually reflexive discourse in the 
public sphere, one can come to know the interests rightfully included in the public 
interest.  Moreover, it is only through this discursive process that one can know which 
estimations of individual or group interests are common to all in public P.  Given the 
multifaceted character of the modern demos, the decision-making process must fall back 
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upon the common denominator for intersubjectively defined human relations—
communications about our needs.   
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CHAPTER III 
DEMOCRATIC INTERESTS AND A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
 
Implied throughout the previous chapter, is the assertion that the public interest is 
good in itself.  The normativity and optimality of the public interest was “given,”  In 
light of the volume of debate on the utility of the public interest and its true content, 
some of which has been offered for analysis in the earlier chapter, the bareness of 
assertion cries out for further refinement.  Here, I offer a defense for the public interest 
as democratic standard for administrative action.   
Starting with the classical Greeks and Romans, and continuing into the high 
modern age of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the assertion that there is a 
natural political will common to all in a governed body was virtually unchallenged.26  
This argument seems non-controversial when we reflect on the history of the concept of 
political community starting with Plato and Aristotle.27  However, what is often 
unarticulated the preeminent importance of communication for the political community. 
                                                 
26
 Certainly, there are more thoroughgoing assessments of the natural public interest offered by natural law 
scholars or early Christian thinkers to attend to at greater length given infinite time and space.  For the 
moment, I will leave these to the side. 
27
 An extended analysis of the concept of the community in both Plato and Aristotle would be too much a 
digression here.  Nevertheless, within the work of Plato in particular, the notion of a political community 
is a “given” when collections of people grow beyond the capability to serve their needs without assistance.  
In the Laws, Plato offers that there are four types of early political community, which he proposes grow 
naturally from the expansion of the household to the neighborhood and so on.  Extensive analyses have 
been offered by Elshtain 1993, Klosko 1981, 1986 and Nagle (2006, on Aristotle primarily) to support the 
notion of a natural political community in early Greek thought.  
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It is partly inattention to the nature and necessity of political communication that 
fomented the decline of the public interest as critical standard for legitimating and 
guiding the political community.  This much is certainly noted by Dewey in his assertion 
that there is “more than a verbal tie between the words common, community and 
communication” (1961, 4).  What Dewey desired to say here was that the dissolution of 
the impetus, the means and the necessity of true communication, leads to the evaporation 
of a community—that necessary foundation for the political.   
Though there are, of course, competing analyses for the disappearance of the 
public interest as concept and standard, Dewey’s articulation perhaps deserves greater 
attention.  It was not until the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Dewey’s 
period) that the dissolution of the naturalistic thesis for the public interest became so 
readily accepted.  The question that Dewey so often sought to answer was “why?”  His 
analyses suggest that the dissolution of the common will is attributable to the march of 
history as technological progress.  The rise of technological mastery of the environment, 
both social and natural, the mastery of the physical body, as we as the general increase in 
the pace of the lives of even the most “ordinary” of persons, contributed to the 
submersion of the public interest as a social and political “fact.”  Through routinization 
of work, production, knowledge, and travel, the compelling force of a normative public 
interest as basis for the formation of social life diminished in favor of the externally 
imposed force of these other standards.  Rather than the walls of society holding together 
by the mortar of commonality, scaffolding of routine encased the walls like ivy, the 
shiny material of which seemed to be self-generating.  Soon, external controls that 
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seemed so much like Redi’s maggots replaced the notion of a self-sustaining or self-
administering community— evolved from the sweat of common experience.  Societies 
routinized and specialized lost their drive as order imposed from an outside to which no 
one could point enveloped the social and political.   
 This loss of commonality had its effects—nihilism, Nietzsche, Sartre, Dadaism, 
Salvador Dali—each of which demonstrated the loss of the “common.”  In addition, as 
leaders attempted to resuscitate the community from the outside, further losses were 
endured.  The mistake of the leaders was not their chosen end—to revive the social—but 
their means.  Their mistake was to resurrect a social that was not in communication with 
itself, but was, to follow d’Argenson, communicative only with what leaders determined 
to be not-community.28  The means necessary to revive the community did not lie, as 
they suspected, outside of it, but rather within it.  What needed to have occurred was the 
internal rediscovery of the will of the individual in true relation to the social (the family, 
community, and so forth).  Society did not require—in fact, it revolted against—external 
refoundation.  Man, however, took to the project of externalization of himself through 
the politicization of (supposedly) innate differences.  Such differentiation of the 
individual and her will would become the crux of modern liberal democracy, the 
vestiges we can see today in the overwhelming claims of identity politics. 
 The external imposition of routinization, Durkheim (1979) would later note, led 
to a degree of anomie that deflated the conditions necessary to generate a common-will 
or true public interest.  It emphasized the differences between individuals as “things” to 
                                                 
28
 See Rousseau The Social Contract Book II, chapter III, note 1 on d’Argenson’s intent to harmonize the 
social tensions through opposition to a third or external force. 
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be summed, controlled, and made programmatic, not those qualities upon which true 
community as outgrowth of the recognition of true individuality might be founded.29  
Rousseau makes clear that the common-will is the sum of the differences between 
individual differences:  
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general 
will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private 
interests into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills: but take 
away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and 
the general will remains the sum of the differences (Rousseau 1962, 40 (Bk II, 
Ch.III).30 
 
Rousseau’s common will is predicated on a notion of man as more than merely 
self-serving actor—man had a capacity to understand himself relationally.  This 
relational quality of men—something which contemporary theorists of society have 
attempted to redefine as reflexivity—disappeared in the routinization of man and 
environment.  Without this, the commonality of the common will—the social remainder-
- evaporated and the dominance of the will of all became the social norm.  Men 
dissociated from one another and from the unity of common life, even from the law 
itself.  The avalanche of passé individualism that overtook society forced apart the 
commonality of experience and killed the public basis of a conversation intended to 
serve as the operators of the public interest.  Dewey clearly laments this as the death of 
conjoint experience necessary to found a community, “Whenever there is a conjoint 
activity whose consequences are appreciated by all singular persons who take part in it, 
                                                 
29
 Dewey makes a similar argument in Reconstruction in Philosophy (1950).  
30
 Il y a souvent bein de la différence entre la volonté de tou et la volonté générale: celle-ci ne regarde qu’à 
l’intérêt commun, l’autre regarde á l’interêt privé et n’est qu’une somme de volontés particulierès; mai 
ôtez de ces mêmes volontés le plue et les moins qui e’entre-détraisent reste pour somme des defferences in 
la volonté générale (Book II, Chapter III). 
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and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to 
sustain it in being just because it is a good shared by all, there exists a community” 
(1927, 49). 
 This dissolution of the public that occurred from Rousseau’s time (1762) to the 
early 1900s created the conditions sufficient to provoke Dewey to lament the loss of the 
public and the evaporation of democracy in The Public and its Problems.  Dewey's 
problem with the future of American democracy was the eclipse of the face-to-face 
community of the original town hall meeting.  He was intent in his writings to advocate 
it return as force for the generation of the truly democratic society.  His project ties 
together in a fundamental way the desire to recreate the community as necessary 
conditions for a true public interest.  
Dewey turned his eye from the role of a public interest as an externally defined 
standard for the democratic public and focused on the generation of the public interest 
from within the experience of democracy.  This experience of democracy, he proposed, 
is based in the communication of democratic life.  In The Public and its Problems and 
elsewhere, he makes clear that, as an elementary component of the concept of 
democracy itself, communication holds a special place.  What he did not make fully 
clear, however, is how it is that communication, and particularly communication for 
democracy, intersects with the public interest as standard for the operation of 
government? 31  That is, how does the public interest work?   
                                                 
31
 There may be many earlier theorists of a public interest in the ancient and medieval traditions, along 
with theorists of the public interest in other cultures.  I agree with any critics that beginning with Dewey is 
arbitrary.  Nevertheless, any extensive elaboration on the extended history of the concept must wait.   
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 Like Dewey, later philosophers of communication and politics, Habermas (1981, 
1984, and 1990), Honneth and Farrell (1998), Peters (1999), Rorty (1982), and 
Westbrook (1991), have made the case that communication is a critical force in the 
formation and maintenance of democracy.  We can see the work of these later theorists 
as representatives or extensions of this trend.  Nevertheless, as the emblem for the 
concept of communicative democracy in the modern state, the work of Dewey looms 
large. 
 
John Dewey on Democratic Communication 
Specialists in the study of Dewey’s philosophy are quite right to point to the 
presence of multiple Dewey’s on the stage (Thayer 1982, 11-22).  There is the Dewey of 
the scientific method and common sense (Dewey 1938b, Dewey and Bentley 1949; 
Kaufman-Osborne 1984, see especially, 1143-47; Metz 1969), the Dewey faithful to the 
beneficence of science (Dewey 1950; White 1958), the Dewey dedicated to individual 
and community (Dewey 1927, 1929, 1962; Damico 1978), and, of course, the Dewey 
devoted to education (Dewey 1938a, Dewey 1961, Greene 1982). Certainly, the 
categorizations of Dewey as more or less Hegelian or more or less psychologically 
focused are apt.  However, the categorization of Dewey’s thought that requires serious 
attention is the democratic, deliberative, even communicative, Dewey (see Bohman 
1998; Evans 2000; Gouinlock 1978; Honneth and Farrell 1998; Knight and Johnson 
1996; Smiley 1999; Westbrook 1991).  Importantly we must also consider actively his 
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work as demonstrating a unique position committed to the democratic development of a 
public interest, one that is useful for the practice of democracy.32 
 It is difficult to define in a few sentences Dewey’s understanding of democracy.  
Like many topics he would elaborate on, Dewey’s conceptualization varied over his 
lifetime.  Of the many democracies that Dewey put forth, perhaps two are most 
important for understanding democracy as a form of government that captures fully his 
appreciation of the public interest as an element of community and a standard of action.  
Firstly, there is the communal-experiential, which had considerable influence upon the 
procedure that Dewey’s communicative democracy implies:   
A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of 
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.  The extension of space 
of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to 
refer to his own action to that of other, an to consider the action of other to give 
point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those 
barriers of class, race, and national territory which keep men from perceiving the 
full import of their activity.  These more numerous and more varied points of 
contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to 
respond.  They consequently put a premium on variation in his action (1961, 93).    
 
The second, the progressive-educational, influences the substantive ends of democracy 
for Dewey: 
Democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in 
resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial 
arrangements, shall be the contribution they make to the all around growth of 
every member of society (1948, 147).  
 
                                                 
32
 Dewey utilizes public interest, public opinion, and public will throughout his work often as synonyms 
for one another.  While a specialist in the study of Dewey’s selection of language (no small part of 
Dewey’s own studies) may quibble with this amalgamation, I will use public interest to capture what it is 
that Dewey meant when using either of these terms.  
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Though Dewey himself would reject the bifurcation of a definition of democracy into its 
procedural and substantive emphases (as Honneth and Farrell (1998) point out), for 
heuristic purposes of constructing the communicative definition of democracy, the 
separation is useful. 
 Dewey prescribes the scientific method or procedure for analysis of democracy.  
The scientific method, Dewey argues is the application of the “method of intelligence” 
to social problems.  This means little to those unfamiliar with Dewey until the 
descriptions of application, method, and intelligence are unpacked.   
 Application of the methods of scientific inquiry—namely an experimental 
posture relative to the understanding of experience as valuable—means that we adopt an 
experiential or experimental posture towards the occurrence of social life as we 
understand its going on around us.  That is, we apply the scientific method “in” 
experience: “Application in life would signify that science was absorbed and distributed; 
that it was the instrumentality of that common understanding and thorough 
communication which is the precondition of the existence of a genuine and effective 
public” (1927, 174).  To summarize a bit more clearly, the application of the scientific 
method in life means that we utilize the language and the background knowledge of a 
scientific methodology of experimentation to convey our experience—to communicate it 
to—one another.  Dewey advocates such a mode of communication as exemplifying the 
political democratic use of the scientific method necessary to solve common political 
problems.  
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 This application of experimentalism is what Dewey describes as intelligence.33  
From Reconstruction in Philosophy, we learn that intelligence “… is a shorthand 
designation for the great and ever-growing methods of observation, experiment and 
reflective reasoning which have in a very short time revolutionized the physical, and to a 
considerable degree, the physiological conditions of life….”(Dewey ix; quoted in Metz 
1969, 242).  Intelligence is the remaking of patterns of intellectual inquiry based on 
critical observation.  This intelligence accumulates through experiences as an individual 
and an individual-in-the-community.  Intelligence is a shared property-- the product of 
knowledge acquisition between men and the world at large.   
In the classic philosophy, the world is essentially a haven in which man finds rest 
from the storms; it is an asylum in which he takes refuge from the trouble of 
existence with the calm assurance that it alone is supremely real.  When the 
belief that knowledge is active and operative takes hold of men, the idea realm is 
no longer something aloof and separate; it is rather that collection of imagined 
possibilities that stimulates men to new efforts and realizations (1948, 147).  
 
Thus, the scientific method can be conceptualized as the communication of knowledge 
drawn from the experience of the world as a series of on-going experiments.  We know 
that the scientific method works when we can verify, in common, through 
communication, that a particular hypothesis about an experience explains away the 
problematic components of a social problem.  
This is the crux of Dewey’s communicative democracy, both in its substantive 
and procedural forms: through the communication of shared experience of life as 
experience of the world through the lens of hypothetical reasoning, those people sharing 
                                                 
33
 However, complicated democracy and the public interest are in Dewey’s thought, they pale in 
comparison to Dewey’s elaboration on the form and content of intelligence.  I distill this use of 
intelligence considerably and it is far from the full characterization of intelligence Dewey renders. 
 51 
form a community—a public which shares critical symbols34—which is the basic 
associational (cooperative) unit of government.  It is only through the communication of 
our hypotheses of experienced life that we gain traction on the problems we share in 
common.  That is, in the development of the public interest as genuine, full community 
(einverständnis), agreement on the importance of shared problems depends on a 
communicative conceptualization of democracy. 
 
John Dewey on the Public Interest 
 Like Dewey’s definitions of democracy, his thought on the public interest also 
varies according to his position in life and the purpose for which he wrote.  This 
variation, though, is not without unifying and useful themes.  Dewey emphasizes, in his 
definition of the public interest, the importance of the experiential, the educational, and 
the purpose of morality.  As a philosopher consistently focused on the importance of 
experience, Dewey placed considerable faith in the ability of experience, and 
importantly for politics-- shared experience, to point the way to future progress.   
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 I will attend to the importance of shared symbols in the evaluation of the pragmatics of Habermas’ life 
world.  For the moment, the following quote from The Public and its Problems is illustrative: “Symbols 
control sentiment and thought, and the new age has no symbols consonant with its activities.  Intellectual 
instrumentals for the formation of an organized public are more inadequate than its overt means.  The ties 
which hold men together in action are numerous, tough and subtle.  But they are invisible and intangible.  
We have the physical tools of communication as never before.  The thoughts and aspirations congruent 
with them are not communicated and hence not common.  Without such communication, the public will 
remain shadowy and formless, seeking spasmodically for itself, but seizing and holding its shadow rather 
than its substance.  Till the Great Society becomes the Great Community, the public will remain in eclipse.  
Communication can alone create a community.  Our Babel is not one of tongue but of the signs and 
symbols without which shared experience is impossible” (1927, 324).  
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This philosopher [Dewey], considered by many to be the foremost American 
thinker, insisted on the absence of a single, fixed, and final goal in moral and 
political matters.  Every practical decision made in a specific situation involves a 
risk.  Therefore every problem must be solved, not by reference to a fixed end, 
but by the application of shared experience to that concrete problem (White 
1958, 353). 
 
However, encompassed in this resolution is not the prescription of programs or ends, but 
rather the realization of common thinking— a common “morality.”35   
The resolution of problems through the application of shared experience, the 
application of truly communicative democracy, is not an end of itself for Dewey.  The 
end (as it may be called) was the realization of a moral education that formed the 
common basis for the continuation of the community itself; the resolution of public 
problems through democratic communication is not “complete” (nothing is resolved) 
unless there is education which derives from the sharing of experience and the 
application of experience to problems.  Dewey’s process of moral education presupposes 
the communicative formation of the public interest as a standard for government action. 
Realization that need for reflective morality and for moral theories grows out of 
the conflict between ends, responsibilities, rights and duties defines the service 
which moral theory may render… Moral theory can (i) generalize the types of 
moral conflicts which arise, thus enabling a perplexed and doubtful individual to 
clarify his own particular problem by placing it in a larger context; it can (ii) state 
the leading ways in which such problems have been intellectually dealt with by 
those who have thought upon such matters; it can (iii) render personal reflection 
more systematic and enlightened, suggesting alternatives that might otherwise be 
overlooked, and stimulating greater consistency in judgment. But it does not 
offer a table of commandments in a catechism in which answers are as definite as 
 
                                                 
35
 As with many concepts, Dewey espoused an idiosyncratic definition of morality.  Morality for him was 
a conditional moral imperative (though he did brush against Kantian morality in places).  A moral 
judgment was, as Gouinlock tells us “the plan of action which would transform the situation from 
problematic to consummatory” (1978, 220).  Consummatory experience is unified activity motivated by 
the common end-in-view (action to integrate the shared situation and improve it for all members of the 
community).  
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are the questions which are asked.  It can render personal choice more intelligent, 
but it cannot take the place of personal decision, which must be made in every 
case of moral perplexity (Dewey and Tufts 1910, 175-76).  
 
It is the moral education that derives from community and communication that lends 
normative weight and preference to the public interest.  The public interest defined 
through communication is flexible according to the standards of the community itself—it 
is respectful of the diversity of common forms, of individuality in the community.  In 
addition, more importantly, relying on Dewey’s understanding of communicative 
democracy, it is universally accessible.  That is, Dewey's form of communication 
recommends permission for all persons into the conversation.  He implies hopefully that, 
by virtue of their participation, all are fully participatory in the knowledge derived there 
from.  The public interest is common knowledge in the truest sense.   
 As ideal as this is, Dewey himself realized that there would be pitfalls in the 
creation of such a public interest as the product of moral education.  Namely, not all 
citizens would find the expression of the virtue of scientific reasoning easy, much less 
amenable to their understanding.  Citizens would inevitably fall into the modes of 
individualism that precluded their ability to be a fully scientific communal public:  
Non-scientific modes of practice, left to their natural growth represent… 
arrangements of objects which cluster about the self, and which are closely tied 
down to the habits of the self.  Science or theory means a system of objects 
detached from any particular personal standpoint, and therefore available for 
every possible personal standpoint…  [Science] takes its stand not with what is 
common with some particular neighbor living at this especial [sic] date and in 
this particular village, but with any possible neighbor in the wide stretches of 
time and space (Dewey 1916, 440-441; quoted in Kaufman-Osborn 1984, 1153).  
 
That he realized this, however, does not mean that he elaborated extensively on the 
resolution of these problems.  As later critics would note, he failed to make clear how 
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citizens could strip themselves of their particularities and engage in moral deliberations 
that would lead to true public interest dialogue (Gouinlock 1978).  It is for this reason 
that contemporary pragmatic thinkers are compelled to look towards others for a theory 
of communication that could satisfy the needs of communicative democracy and the 
pragmatic public interest. 
 
John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas 
 Recent theorists of communication and democracy have alighted upon the 
similarities between John Dewey’s and Jürgen Habermas’ theories.36  While there have 
been some elaborations on the role of communicative action for moral education in the 
democratic community, there has not been extensive comparative analyses of the 
theories of democracy in both.  Some preliminary starting points come from and his 
collaborators: 
 To follow Habermas and Bernstein, a later pragmatist of a Deweyan stripe:  
He [Bernstein] critically compares the proceduralist notion of a democratic 
process- presented as the sole source of political legitimation—with Dewey’s 
substantive conception, and arrives at the conclusion that a discourse theory of 
law and democracy…must tacitly presuppose a substantial notion of a 
democratic form of ethical life: “Dewey… is most concerned with ‘the means by 
which a majority comes to be a majority’, that is, with the public debate, 
discussion and persuasion that precedes and influences this voting practice. We 
can, of course, call this complex process ‘procedural’… because even after the 
most responsible and enlightened discussion, it is still an open question as to 
which substantive decisions will be made by majority rule.  It is here that the 
crucial ambiguity arises, for this is a very different sense of procedure.  Such a 
procedure involves substantial-ethical commitments.  When Dewey speaks about 
‘debate, discussion, and persuasion’, he is not simply referring to formal rules of 
                                                 
36
 Richard Bernstein would certainly be an example, as would those contributors (including Habermas 
himself) to Pragmatism, Critique and Judgment (Benhabib and Fraser, editors 2004).  
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communication, rather his major concern is with the ethos of such a debate.  For 
democratic debate, ideally, requires a willingness to listen and to evaluate the 
opinions of one’s opponents, respecting the views of minorities, advancing 
arguments in good faith to support one’s convictions with new evidence or better 
arguments.  There is an ethos involved in the practice of democratic debate” 
(Habermas 2004, 33-34). 
 
The major elements of similarity are not only the appreciation that both theorists have 
for the importance of communication for democracy and communication in democracy, 
but also their appreciation of the form that communication must take in a communicative 
democracy and the products of communication for the betterment of democracy. 
 Dewey and Habermas’ belief in the use and purpose of communication in 
democracy intersect upon four major dimensions.  First, both suppose the presence of a 
public sphere where communication occurs.  Second, both suggest communication for 
the rationalization of solutions to complex problems borne of democratic diversity.  
Third, both emphasize a mode of communication that is discursive and eschew the 
vagaries of strategic or instrumental rationality for the development of the democratic 
community.  Fourth, both point to the public interest as a “product” of democratic 
communication.  
Communication, for both Dewey and Habermas, occurs in a public sphere that is 
social rather than exclusively political.  Habermas suggests, “The mass democracies 
constituted as social welfare states, as far as their normative self-interpretation is 
concerned, can claim to continue the  principles of the liberal constitutional state only as 
long as they seriously try to live up to the mandate of a public sphere that fulfills 
political functions” (Habermas 1992, 441).  Some political functions, he suggests, 
include recognition and accommodation of plural interests, adaptations to the power 
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structures of the society, the restatement of the importance of deliberation as democratic 
political medium, and the resurrection of a civil mode of society.  Each of these political 
functions he ties to the enhancement of a discursive mode of democratic governance for 
the political public sphere.   
[The] ‘political public sphere’ is appropriate as the quintessential concept 
denoting all those conditions of communication under which there can come into 
being a discursive formation of opinion and will on the part of a public composed 
of the citizens of a state.  This is why it is suitable as the fundamental concept of 
a theory of democracy whose intent is normative (1992, 446).   
 
While Habermas emphasizes the political public sphere here, it is important to reflect on 
his definition of those conditions of communication as social conditions rather than 
merely political conditions.  That is, it is important to recall the connection between the 
civil society and public sphere.  
Habermas’ democratic public sphere is the universally accessible, open 
deliberative space—marked by the products of conversations codified and reified via 
media of all forms—where men and women come together to engage in discourse on 
matters both practical and theoretical concerning those issues they have decided, 
according to their own independent calculations, require solution.37  These conversations 
                                                 
37
 It would be a shortsighted misappropriation of the large volume of Habermas’ work to suggest that 
there is one singular definition of the public sphere found within his contribution.  As Calhoun (1992) 
points out, the conceptualization of the public sphere within Habermas’ own work alone has undergone 
several transformations.  These many transformations are due in part to Habermas’ own revisions as well 
as his appropriation of and response to transformations of the original theory by his multiple critics.  The 
transformations of the public sphere by Habermas’ critics and advocates have served to alter the fabric of 
the original Habermasian public sphere definition.   
To the extent that a singular definition did ever exist, it appears in his original formulation of the public 
sphere, in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962), translated to English as The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989).   
The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come 
together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public 
authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the 
 57 
generate exactly what Dewey meant in his conceptualization of the public (1927).  These 
conversations are not purposeless, but rather are oriented towards the eventual 
satisfaction of all ideas of the good life collectively defined.  Through this 
conversational media, comes realization of the power of the public. 
The joint effort of citizens in the moment of acting in common generates the full 
possibility of communicative power (Dewey 1927, 49; Habermas 1996, 17-151).  
Communicative power as the basis of the larger civil society emerges as actors agree to 
abide by the principles of contractual obligations embodied and reinforced through their 
discussions.  Stated otherwise, communicative power is the original “divine spark” of 
the state in the sense that it is the basis for the communication to found state action.   
It is important to note that the concept of communicative power both catalyzes 
civil society as society and as the political public sphere.  As Cohen and Arato note,  
Civil society is defined in terms of social associations cutting across class 
relations: neighborhood groups, networks of mutual aid, locally based structures 
providing collective service.  More dramatically, civil society is seen as the space 
of social experimentation for the development of new forms of life, new types of 
solidarity, and social relations of cooperation and work (1992, 38).   
 
In civil society, “power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert” (1996, 148).  The basic associative mechanism that grounds each of the 
structures and organizations, which Cohen and Arato suggest constitute civil society, 
predicate the achievement of communicative power, or the “potential of a common will 
formed in non-coercive communication” (Habermas 1996, 47).  At the point at which the 
                                                                                                                                                
basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor.  The 
medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people’s public 
use of their reason (27).  
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power aggregated together requires normative legitimation of the natural tendency 
towards stratification via the division of labor, rules of order and engagement for the 
continuation of communication-- the political civil society—arises.  Here, the public 
sphere emerges.   
Political society... is understood as the space in which the autonomy of groups 
and the articulation of conflict among them are defended and the discussion and 
debate of collective choices occur.  The concept of political society thus includes 
the public sphere as its major dimension, but given the stress on conflict (and 
negotiation and compromise), it is entirely reducible to it (Cohen and Arato 
1992, 38).  
 
As a critical and constitutive power, the political civil society is the place where persons 
come together to do—as Habermas indicates—the business of making law itself.   
The concept of communicative power requires a differentiation in the concept of 
political power.  Politics cannot coincide as a whole with the practice of those 
who talk to one another in order to act in a politically autonomous manner.  The 
exercise of political autonomy implies the discourse formation of a common will, 
not the implementation of the laws issuing there from (Habermas 1996, 150).   
 
Stated otherwise, politically autonomous actors in the political civil society define the 
content of the law, but are not by necessity involved in implementation of it.  As this 
discursively formed law is the product of political deliberations and emanates from the 
communicative action of civil society, connections form between laws (including its 
implementation) as expression of the critical part of the ethical-normative public sphere. 
 The space of civil society, dialogues motivated by social critiques relevant to the 
creation of a common will, as normative ethical grounding for the institutions of 
government, forms the contours of the public sphere.  In Habermas’ words, 
In complex societies, the public sphere consists of an intermediary structure 
between the political system, on the one hand, and the private sectors of the life-
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world and functional systems on the other.  It represents a highly complex 
network that branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, 
regional, local and sub cultural arenas (1996, 373-374).   
 
In the complex political arrangements of a modern state,38 the public sphere lies between 
the conventional sovereign arrangements of politics39 and economics (Habermas’ 
system), on the one hand, and, on the other, those social conventions that form our 
background knowledge held in common (i.e., the life-world40 to include, drawing upon 
Dewey, the socio-functional organizations of society such as familial, gender, sexual and 
labor relations).   
As the critical space where individuals come together to harness communicative 
power through discourse on the norms, structures, and conventions of politics, the public 
sphere serves as the locus of creation for the volonté génèral or public interest.  The 
public sphere is where we define what it is we, both individually and collectively, want 
from our government.  As summarized by Calhoun 1992 (4-10), the essence of the 
bourgeois public sphere is that it serves as “a mode of societal integration” that includes 
all rational-critical discourses about the matters of state, the administration of the state, 
and the economy.  At its core, the public sphere is the counter-position of all individuals 
                                                 
38
 I am referring to the American political society in particular here.  
39
 That is, representative-represented, citizen- legislator, citizen/non-citizen arrangements of power. 
40
 The definition of the life-world varies in the many texts in which Habermas further develops the 
concept.  Unlike more sociologically or philosophically imbued definitions, I accept the definition of 
lifeworld that includes a stronger role for institutions, which Habermas develops in Between Facts and 
Norms (1996, 23): “The lifeworld, of which institutions form a part, comes into view as a complex of 
interpenetrating cultural traditions, socials orders and personal identities.”  
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formerly subject to the state, against the state through the performance of critical 
conversation.41    
The importance of the public sphere for the state is that this newly disaggregated 
audience is interested not only in continuing its participation in state constitution but also 
the improvement of the constituted state according to its evolving discursive ideal.  To 
the participants of the public sphere, this means a new radical openness to the potency of 
state power.  To the state itself, the emergence of the public sphere means the beginning 
of a critical form of accountability from below, one that compels the state to account for 
itself while also compelling compliance from citizens.   
Like Dewey, the basic premise that grounds communication in Habermas’ 
original conceptualization of the public sphere is the belief in the goodness that evolves 
from true communicative action.42  The achievement of communicative action is noted 
when the situation of interactive communication is reached.  Habermas (2001, 58) states, 
“I call interaction communicative when the participants coordinate their plans of action 
                                                 
41
 The modifier critical is important here as the force of the public sphere is tied into Habermas’ 
understanding of the emancipatory project of critical theory.  In many ways, the articulation of the public 
sphere is the extension of the task of critical theory to those beyond the academy.  As such, it is important 
to specify the definition of critique (which is to be evoked when the term critical is employed here): 
“Critique understands that its claims to validity can be verified only in the successful process of 
enlightenment, and that means: in the practical discourse of those concerned.  Critique renounces the 
contemplative claims of theories constructed in monologic form, and in addition, discerns that all 
philosophy up till now, in spite of all its claims, also only presumes to have such a contemplative character 
(Habermas 1973, 2).  Critique, to evoke a term in common use among contemporary critical theorists, is 
an explosion of previous forms.  In the case of the public sphere, critique is the explosion of the traditional 
forms of citizen subservience as audience to the doing of politics and power.  
42
 Johnson (1991) and Mitzen (2005) give two further simplified definitions offered of Habermas’ 
communicative action.  Johnson suggests, “It involves participants in ‘the cooperative negotiation of 
common definitions of the situation’ in which they are interacting” (1991, 184).  Mitzen extends the 
definition of Johnson to “Communicative action, or the exchange of reasons oriented towards 
understanding, is the heart of public sphere theory.  Communicative action builds from the premise that 
reason is intersubjectively constituted and inheres in linguistic communication” (2005, 403).    
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consensually, with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the 
intersubjective recognition of validity claims.”  Dewey would likely have classified this 
as the consummatory experience that arises from actions taken conjointly for the 
fulfillment of the end-in-view.  The goal of communicative action is creating social 
integration—mutual understanding-- of previously atomized individuals who are 
otherwise motivated only towards the fulfillment of their own interests.   
The importance of Habermas’ public sphere as a political foundation of modern 
society is that, in its politically expressed form, the public sphere supports the 
articulation of the public interest.  As both Habermas and his critics allude to, the 
political public sphere is more than the sum of its democratic permissiveness and 
discursive processes; it is a productive organ of society.  In addition, as will be argued 
next, what the public sphere produces is none other than the articulation of a 
democratically defensible public interest.  
Habermas' use of the concept of interests within the development of his thought 
on the public discourse points to the public interest as a public sphere product.  
Habermas himself does not set about defining the pubic or individual interest, though he 
often evokes the trends of interest language.  Interestingly enough, like Dewey’s, 
Habermas’ articulation of the nature of interests in the public sphere often parallel the 
arguments of Adam Smith in his discussion of the formation of a public interest (which 
he often calls the common good).43  That is, he identifies the formation of interests (self 
                                                 
43
 I will not endeavor here to separate the concepts of a general will, common interest, common good, 
general interest, public will or public good from that of the public interest.  As Held (1970), Flathman 
(1966), and Bell (1993), and Kristol (1972), have demonstrated the conceptual muddle (belabored by 
Sorauf  (1962) and Schubert(1960, 1962)) of the public interest is made more nettlesome by the invocation 
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and private) as reflecting the character of the morals and values communicated through 
the exercise of practical reason.  As participant in the community of the democratic 
public sphere, man himself can be homo oeconomicus (self-interested), but he will 
always be fundamentally other-regarding.   
Interests, in Habermas’ parlance, are born in the process of asking both technical 
and practical questions.  Interests embed themselves in our construction of interests and 
our encounters with the world around us, whether we engage fully in questioning our 
experience of the normative aspects of the social world (practical) or acting within the 
normative world (technical).  To elaborate on the difference between the technical and 
the practical, Habermas offers the following distinction: 
Technical questions are posed with a view to the rationally goal-directed 
organization of means and the rational selection of instrumental alternatives, 
once the goals (values and maxims) are given.  Practical questions, on the other 
hand, are posed with a view to the acceptance or rejection of norms, especially 
norms for action, the claims to validity of which we can support or oppose with 
reasons. Theories which in their structure can serve the clarification of practical 
questions are designed to enter into communicative action (Habermas 1973, 3). 
 
That is, questions about the validity of norms for action – of the public interest as 
administrative action standard—should be the topic of communicative action in the 
public sphere.  
To defend the idea of a distinctly Deweyan-Habermasian public interest, it is 
necessary to re-evaluate Habermas’ developed notion of “public opinion” as public 
                                                                                                                                                
of alternative concepts.  “Flathman stated well the futility of abandoning the concept of the public interest, 
and I concur. ‘  Determining justifiable governmental policy in the face of conflict and diversity’, he 
wrote, ‘is central to the political order; it is a problem which is never solved in any final sense but which 
we are constantly trying to solve.  The much-discussed difficulties with the concept are difficulties with 
morals and politics.  We are free to abandon the concept, but if we do we will simply have to wrestle with 
the problems of some other heading” (Held 1970, 10).  See also Douglass 1980 for an assessment of the 
similarities and differences between common good and public interest concepts.  
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interest.44  As shown in the previous chapter, a number of definitions of the public 
interest exist, but the normative conceptualization persists.  This articulation figures the 
public interest as a critical standard that most people, who have chosen to enter public 
discourse, can agree upon as the common and common-sensical standards of goodness 
of public policy, its implementation, and consequences.  In the thought of both 
Habermas and Dewey, public opinion is not merely the sum of uncritical statements of 
acceptance of goodness in government actions or public policies for the individual alone.  
Public opinion is “...the enlightened outcome of a common and public reflection on the 
foundations of social order” (1927, 96).   
To elaborate further on the similarities between Dewey and Habermas’ public 
interest, it is illustrative to examine the common sources from which both draw.  From 
Locke’s law of opinion,45 Habermas draws a more critical conceptualization of the term 
opinion for its place in the public sphere.  Locke, he asserts, was not interested in public 
opinion per se, but rather was concerned with the legitimation of private opinion as 
relevant to political discourse.  Locke, he contends, freed the connotations of opinion 
from those of prejudices (individually held in malice or judgment) towards the authority 
of others.   
                                                 
44
 Some problems of terms and translation plague the reconstruction of Habermas’ public opinion as the 
public interest.  Within Strukturwandel, Habermas uses the terms “public opinion”, “opinion publique”, 
and “public spirit”, as well as the German “Meinung”, “öffentliche meinung”, and “gemeingeist.”  He 
does not draw distinctions between the uses of these terms either.  Consequently, it is difficult to assess 
what Habermas genuinely means in the use of “public opinion” and its English and French synonyms as 
compared to his use of the German rough equivalents.  He does not, however, use the term “public 
interest” or “öffentliche interesse”, although the characteristics ascribed to the public opinion are parallel 
with the characteristics described, by Cassinelli in particular, as the public interest.   
45
 In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke 1979). 
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‘Opinion’ denoted the informal web of folk-ways whose indirect social control was 
more effective than the formal censure under threat of ecclesiastical or governmental 
sanctions.  ... opinion was not tied to reconditions of education (and of property); for 
contributing to it, far from requiring participation in a process of critical debate, 
demanded nothing more than the simple uttering of precisely those ‘habits’ that later 
on public opinion would critically oppose as prejudices (Habermas 2001, 91-92). 
 
Building the thought of Bolingbroke (Habermas 2001, 59-60) into the Lockean 
context, Habermas’ definition of public opinion is augmented by the force of the public 
spirit—“the direct, undistorted sense for what was right and just and the articulation of 
‘opinion’ into ‘judgment’ through the public clash of arguments” (94).46  Through the 
inclusion of the public spirit as a component of the articulation of public opinion, 
Habermas’ conceptualization of public opinion as a common heartfelt (90), “general 
will,” comes close to the “consensualist” or “ethos” definition of the public interest 
offered by later administrative theorists such as Redford (Cochran 1974, 331) as well as 
Dewey.47   
As Redford (1954, 1108) describes the public interest, “It may be defined as the 
best response to a situation in terms of all the interests and of the concepts of value 
which are generally accepted in our society.”  He later developed a more elaborate, but 
not more useful, definition of the public interest.  In Redford’s 1958 definition: 
The public interest, then, is diverse.  It is indirectly-created interests struggling 
with other interests; again it is intrinsic, shared interests of all or most in 
substantial objectives; still again it is interest in machinery for fair consideration 
and for resolution of intergroup and public interest (113-14).   
 
                                                 
46
 There is a strikingly similar position elaborated in Forster (2005).  
47
 Redford and others whom Cochran defines as the consensualists view the public interest as “a vague, 
but valuable term which refers policy debate to a public value consensus” (331).   
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In either Redford or Habermas’ conceptualizations, it is the values of the polity that 
ought to ground the administrator’s search for decision-making guidance.48  Such 
sentiments are echoed in Dewey’s description, though he would have found the public 
spirit in the consent of all persons to the pursuit of scientific inquiry, while neither 
Habermas or Redford are willing to articulate a content of public spiritedness so 
definitively.  “Only continuous inquiry, continuous in the sense of being connected as 
well as persistent, can provide the material of enduring opinion about public matters” 
(1927, 178) 
 These definitions are extended through the modifications to the term public 
opinion made in the development of Habermas’ conceptualization of the public interest.  
Arguing from the perspective of the Burke of the late Declaration of Rights, Habermas 
remarks that “the definition of public opinion as a vehicle and organ of legislative 
importance (or sovereignty)... nevertheless left no doubt concerning the concept of the 
‘general opinion’.  The opinion of the public that put its reason to use was no longer just 
opinion; it did not arise from mere inclination but from private reflection upon public 
affairs and from their public discussion” (1996, 94).  Habermas, as a product of the 
Frankfurt School, is skeptical of the norms enforced by authority through mass media.  
He augers that the media is corrosive of the public opinion, degrading it into non-public, 
private reflections.  Yet, he remains committed to the importance of the concepts of 
public interest and public opinion for constitutional law establishment, formation, and 
                                                 
48
 Many of the articulations of Redford, Schubert, Herring, and Leys emphasize the importance of the 
public interest as a standard useful in cases of difficult administrative decision-making.  I will return to the 
importance of the democratic public interest in administrative decision-making at the end of the chapter. 
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maintenance.  In a sense, like Dewey, Habermas recognizes the “noble lie” function of 
the appeal to public interest in complex, interest based democracies.  The importance of 
the perpetuation of the legal fiction of the public interest backed constitution is, he 
asserts, essential to the realization of democracy.  
“The” public opinion is indeed a fiction. Nevertheless, in a comparative sense the 
concept of a public opinion is to be retained because the constitutional reality of 
the social –welfare sate must be conceived as a process in the course of which a 
public sphere that functions effectively in the political realm is realized, that is to 
say, as a process in which the exercise of social power and political domination is 
effectively subjected to the mandate of democratic publicity. The criteria by 
which opinions may be empirically gauged as to their degree of publicness are 
therefore to be developed in reference to this dimension of the evolution of state 
and society; indeed such an empirical specification of public opinion in a 
comparative sense is today the most reliable means for attaining valid and 
comparable statements about the extent of democratic integration characterizing 
a specific constitutional reality (2001, 244-245). 
 
Dewey argued that the grafting of social scientific conclusions onto the public interest as 
empirical justification for government action renders it more fictive. 
Knowledge of history is evidently necessary for connectedness of knowledge. 
But history which is not brought down close to the actual scene of events leaves a 
gap and exercises influence upon the formation of judgments about the public 
interest not only by guess-work about intervening event.  Here, only too 
conspicuously, is a limitation of the existing social sciences. Their material 
comes too late, too far after the event, to enter effectively into the formation of 
public opinion about the immediate public concern and what is to be done about 
it (1927, 179). 
 
In the final analysis, both Dewey and Habermas advocate a public interest that is both 
maximally attentive to the needs of the citizenry and that is maximally devoted to the 
discursive format.  
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The Public Interest as Administrative Standard 
 This analysis of the similarities between Dewey and Habermas’ theories of the 
development of the public interest helps us to understand and draw conclusions for the 
importance of such a standard for public administration.  Theorists devoted to Habermas 
and the larger critical theory project may initially reject the argument here that the public 
interest Habermas describes has any “real” connection to administrative practice.  
Indeed, some commentators such as Friedland would suggest that the administrative 
could not, by its very nature come into full communication with the true arenas of 
communicative action (i.e., the public sphere).  
The system of administration can never be wholly detached from language: in the 
end, the system of rules, laws, commands, and so forth remains linked to 
understanding embedded in language.  But bureaucratization takes on its own 
self-propelling, self-regulating rationality: purposive rational action, which 
operates as an objective force over the heads of actors in the social world.  As 
power becomes linked to this new form of administration, it too becomes 
systematically removed from the reach of communicating actors in the lifeworld 
(2001, 371-372). 
 
The reason that Friedland cites for this incommensurability of administrative and 
communicative forms is that administration can never become “delinguistified.”  In 
other words, administration can never achieve the status of an element of the lifeworld or 
“those social arenas in which culture, personality, and institutional legitimacy are formed 
through communicative action.  It is a world of lived experience and the arena of social 
integration through which individuals groups, and institutions are knit together” (2001, 
360).49  However, for reasons developed in a subsequent chapter, such a separation of 
                                                 
49
 The administrative is supposed to be part of the system or “those arenas in which integration does not 
take place through communication, but rather through money and power, conventionally the economic and 
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the lifeworld and system cannot occur.  Communicative action—true democratic 
communication—occurs where the system and lifeworld meet.  Consequently, 
generation of the public interest occurs only where the administrative arena meets the 
“citizen” realm.  As such, the public interest is (to borrow from Habermas) always 
already indwelling in the administrative realm, just as it is always already a present part 
of the public itself.   
 The possibility for a role played by this communicatively defined standard-- the 
public interest—prompts consideration of the public interest as a standard for 
legitimating the “system” to the “lifeworld.”  The concept of the public interest has 
powerful normative connotations in everyday use.  When a policy statement evokes the 
public interest, encapsulated in the statement is the belief that the legitimacy of the 
policy rests with the stated interests of the full public.  Yet, how do we arrive at the 
normativity of the public interest as legitimating standard?  What makes the public 
interest “legitimate”? 
Certainly, other concepts such as “efficiency,” “fairness,” “desert,” or “justice” 
are useful for describing the normative desirability of a particular policy.  Nevertheless, 
despite how potentially encompassing these concepts may be (justice, in particular), 
legitimacy, as emblematic of the satisfaction of the public interest, is more compelling.  
                                                                                                                                                
political systems” (2001, 360).  Friedland (2001), I believe is executing here a very limited reading of 
Habermas’ communicative in communicative action.  Communication he proposes occurs where the 
system and lifeworld meet.  There can be no truly communicative action fully divorcing one from the 
other.  In sum, the administrative is as much a part of the lifeworld as is the citizen’s action group.  To 
borrow from Foucault (1977, 1991, 1994), language and power interpenetrate and to divorce the two is to 
ignore the potency of either.  In addition, Friedland is falling into an academic-mental trap (that I call later 
the disposition of anti-bureaucracy), that induces him automatically to deny the positive role of 
administration in society. 
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That legitimacy is a more compelling concept does not suggest that it has particular 
metaphysical or metapolitical (pace Badiou (2005)) qualities that lend a reigning 
rightness quality to legitimacy that the other concepts do not have.  Rather, legitimacy 
has a proximate quality to the lived experience of citizens than do these other concepts; 
legitimacy is desirable precisely because it is not metaphysical. 
 
The Pragmatic Legitimacy of the Public Interest 
The solution to the problem of legitimacy in politics, following Dewey, does not 
come through recourse to metaphysics or other philosophical descriptions removed from 
the lived experience of political life.  There is no “directing bias” in the cosmos that 
gives to us a clear relation between things and values that one could call immanently or 
transcendentally legitimate (Hook, quoted in Rorty 1982, 74).  Nothing in the social 
realm—to include the political—is legitimate outside of our experience of its legitimacy 
as such.   Therefore, in the political ream, our experience of legitimacy—of whether it 
seems “right”, the way of governing we experience-- is dependent upon our feelings of 
political experience.50 51    These experiences, it could be said, only occurs where we are 
able to apprehend or interact with things (facts, objects, and regulatory statements), and 
                                                 
50
 I borrow loosely from Coicaud 2002 here in the definition of legitimacy as the right to govern.  
51
 Consider, for example, the terminology used by whistle-blowers or others who have exited an 
organization under contest.  Consider also, the definition of whistle blowing: “Whistle-blowing has been 
defined as ‘the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate 
practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to affect that 
action’” (Near and Micelli 1985, 4).  Terminology often utilized include “did not seem right”, “did not feel 
right.”  See Bromley 1998, Near and Micelli (1985; 1995), Micelli, Near and Schwenk (1991), Perucci, 
Anderson, Schendel and Trachtman (1980),  
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evaluate them (subjectively, intersubjectively, communicatively) in the context of the 
situation.   
The experiential and communicative necessity of feelings for defining legitimacy 
is integral to the analysis of the public interest as symbolic of legitimacy.  Following 
Dewey, our mind and body (the social and the objective) need unity in order to confer 
the trait of genuine legitimacy upon a process, action, or event: 
Feelings make sense; as immediate meanings of events or objects, they are 
sensations, or more properly, sensa.  Without language, the qualities of organic 
action that are feelings are pains, pleasures, orders, noises, tones only potentially 
and proleptically. With language, they are discriminated and identified. They are 
then “objectified”; they are immediate traits of things. This “objectification” is 
not a miraculous ejection from the organism or soul into external things, nor an 
illusory attribution of psychical entities to physical things.  The qualities never 
were “in” the organism; they always were qualities of interactions in which both 
extra-organic things and organisms partake.  (Dewey, quoted in Rorty 1982, 83). 
 
The unification of mind and body through feelings cannot take place outside of the 
social realm in which the mind and body experience events or objects.  That is, the 
experience of feelings of legitimacy requires a social and intersubjective component.  
Legitimacy requires a conversational definition. 
 The importance of conversation for pragmatic philosophy is undeniable (Rorty 
1982, 164-165).  Likewise, the importance of conversation for feelings and for politics is 
undeniable (Nussbaum 2001; Arendt 1957).52  
For the pragmatists, the pattern of all inquiry—scientific as well as moral—is 
deliberation concerning the relative attractions of various concrete alternatives 
(Rorty 1982, 164)… 
It [pragmatism] is the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save 
conversational ones—no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the 
                                                 
52
 I will take up the importance of feelings and feeling conversation elsewhere. 
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objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided 
by the remarks of our fellow-inquirers (1982, 165)… 
The only sense in which we are constrained to truth is that, as Peirce suggested, 
we can make no sense of the notion that the view which can survive all 
objections might be false.  But objections—conversational constraints—cannot 
be anticipated. There is no method for knowing when one has reached the truth or 
when one is closer to it than before (1982, 165-6).  
 
Pragmatists do not insist on conversational closure when all have agreed (to the extent 
that such an accord would be possible) on the definition of truth.  To do so would not 
only fundamentally disregard the pragmatist orientation to experimentation, particularly 
as basis for democracy, but also would stymie the appreciative stance that the pragmatist 
must take towards experience.  Specifically, to argue the finality of a truth claim would 
end the conversation by establishing a dualism of “time before truth” and “time after 
truth” in which the experiential claims (including the emotional claims to the experience 
as lived) would be declared invalidated by their non-truth orientation.  The continuation 
of conversation is vital to the pragmatist vision of democracy as the establishment of a 
legitimating public interest that is attendant to full public experience. 
The pragmatic orientation toward the establishment of legitimacy, specifically, 
the belief in the primacy of conversation as “method” of inquiry, offers a useful starting 
place for elaborating upon the origin of the public interest.  The importance of 
conversation established previously, the question becomes, what mode of conversation is 
optimal for the definition of a public interest?  While neither Dewey, nor Rorty, offer a 
definition of the substantive or procedural form that a pragmatically appreciative public 
interest conversation would take, both point to a particular form that has found recent 
expression in the work of Jürgen Habermas.  
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The Initial Conditions for Communicative Action 
Discourse ethics demands that speakers seek a normatively neutral and 
procedurally egalitarian stance towards the expression of needs, wants, desires, utility 
estimations—expressions of subjective meaning—among one another.  These discourse 
ethical conditions facilitate the realization of full communicative parity in discourse as 
necessary condition of representation.  According to the standards of discourse ethics, 
and thus in bureaucratic-citizen deliberations, the practice of discourse ethical 
communication entails the creation of a reasonable, rational discussion space.  To create 
fully this rational discussion space as one universally open to all, we must get beyond a 
thin notion of rationality to create a deeper sense of rationality demanded by deliberative 
practice.  
In a deliberative space, the achievement of true communication according to 
standards of public reason is expected.  Problematically, however, public reason in the 
Rawlsian sense is already rife with moral normative assumptions that make it less than 
fully public and therefore not deliberative.  As Berkowitz observes,  
This [public reason] is the form of reason, or that part of reason that should 
govern citizens of a liberal democracy in deliberating about ‘constitutional 
essentials’ and ‘equations of basic justice’. Its content is roughly equivalent to 
the two principles of justice that emerge out of the original position. It is based 
on the idea of the ‘reasonable’ which is exhibited ‘when, among equals say, 
persons are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation 
and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do 
so’. This further requires a ‘willingness to accept the consequences of the burden 
of judgment’, or recognize that citizens in a free society will inevitably come to 
different conclusions about fundamental moral philosophical and religious 
questions (Berkowitz 2006, 124).    
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This version of public reason, while modifying Kantian morality to allow it to be more 
practicable, requires modification if it is implemented in a truly diverse plural liberal 
democracy.  It limits discourse to those who (are able to) choose to 1) be fully public and 
2) are able to meet conditions of rational discourse that accept liberalism and liberal 
values as a starting point.  However, for discourse to occur between citizens and 
bureaucrats, we must abandon the normatively liberal, public reason standard advocated 
by Rawls in favor of a more Habermasian conceptualization. 
Habermas provides a useful synthesis of the demands of thick deliberative 
rationality: 
In rational discourse, we assume that conditions of communication obtain that 1) 
prevent a rationally unmotivated termination of argumentation, 2) secure both 
freedom in the choice of topics and inclusion of the best information and reasons 
through universal and equal access to, as well as equal and symmetrical 
participation in, argumentation, and 3) exclude every kind of coercion—whether 
originating outside the process of reaching understanding or within it—other than 
that of the better argument, so that all motives except that of the cooperative 
search for truth are neutralized. Anyone serious about participating in a practice 
of argumentation cannot avoid pragmatic presuppositions that require an ideal 
role taking, that is, presuppositions that require one to interpret and evaluate all 
contributions from the perspective of every other potential participant (1996, 
230).  
 
To get around the exclusivity of procedural or thin rationality and to take the pragmatics 
of public interest conversation more seriously, there must be stronger considerations 
accorded to emotive claims in addition to those upheld by standards of rationality.   
To summarize, bureaucrats must regard the insertion of dogmatic claims, 
emotions, and other “irrationalities” as expressed claims of need, want, and desire.  
These claims are argumentative assertions of emphasis that add additional weight to the 
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claims, in spite their falling outside of the standards of “pure” reason.53  
Accommodations are necessary for citizens' demands, recalcitrance, tears, and acts of 
minor violence as the speaker punctuates their argument with these as crutches to 
overcome his/her argumentative failings.54  Rather than closing off further discussions 
with emotional or “irrational” clients, bureaucrats seeking to serve as representative 
stewards should understand these punctuations as evidence that further speech or action 
is necessary (Forester 1999, 200-220).   
 Emotion or irrationality does not prevent the realization of discursive parity, 
however, even though it is not per se rational.  Interactions between citizens 
overwhelmed by emotions can be fit into the demands of discourse ethical parity if we 
reconceptualize the appeal to strong emotions as a compensatory mechanism employed 
by citizens who perceive a disadvantage to themselves in the argumentative situation 
(see Nussbaum 2001 and her evaluation of the use of emotions in human--non-human 
conversation).  In order to accept the appeal to emotions as a compensatory mechanism 
in argumentative interaction we must re-think the role of emotions as coercive 
mechanisms.  Rather, we must regard emotional appeals as alternative cooperative 
mechanisms.   
Because Rawls’ original position does not permit consideration of emotion and 
reason, the Rawlsian pre-political situation (the veil of ignorance) is not a useful position 
 
                                                 
53
 “Irrationalism” Rorty (1982 169-175) would insist, is a requirement of the true pragmatic orientation.  
Namely, the pragmatic conversation should not be hemmed in by strictures of professionalism that 
demand that all conversations have a “winner” or “end-point” decided by the force of the more “rational” 
argument.  That is, the conversation must occur outside of the bounds of pure reasoned discussion. 
54
 As Thompson (1985) notes this does not work both ways however.  
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to start from in constructing a notion of deliberation in public administration.  Under the 
conditions of this original position extrapolated to the real—conditions of liberal 
democratic debate oriented towards achieving reasonable pluralism—there are no 
grounds for emotions to carry argumentative weight.  That is, those “things” which we 
become emotional about-- our identity, family, culture, status-- matter not.  If emotions 
carry no weight and need exclusion from true deliberation, the content and membership 
of the discussion evaporates to merely uncontestable points debated by a homogenous 
population hemmed in by the dogmatism of presumably shared rationality. 
 Discussion unhemmed, however, entails seriously considering the importance of 
emotional interchange as a necessary secondary component of communication.  This 
means that policy deliberations should permit all speakers to address those matters of 
identity, family, culture, and/or status requiring full deliberation according for the 
development of participant identities.  To reinsert the value of emotion into discussion 
entails contradicting a centuries old academic tradition of rationalist, social contract, 
liberalism, and trading it for a more pragmatic communitarian conceptualization of the 
political.   
We must get beyond rationalist liberalism primarily because of the veiled 
emotions smuggled in that serve to stymie true deliberative debate in the ordinary, day-
to-day practice of politics.  As Mouffe (2000), Dryzek (2003) and other agonistic 
democrats (see Wagner and Karagianis 2005) make clear, the detachment of politics 
from the emotions, particularly for those for whom political rules truly constrain life 
possibilities renders politics sterile, provincial, and anti-democratic.  To make the case 
 76 
for emotional appeal in discussion suggests that political actors—citizens, bureaucrats, 
legislators—turn back to the substantive practice of democracy known in the ekklesia 
and the forum, not just imitate its form.  
 To remake the true forms of democracy captured in the ekklesia would be 
practically impossible in large polities.55  However, the standard of some forms of 
homogenizing influences or homogenizing institutions are necessary for a democratic 
government, particularly if emotional appeal and the rhetoric of politics are to return full 
force.  That is, there must be a constant assumed in the process, a useful basis for 
utilization of pluralism. 
In the framework of pragmatic philosophy and communicative action, this basis 
is the shared vocabulary of experience.  Specifically, there must be a minimally shared 
lifeworld, which is stable between the discursive partners.  This lifeworld, this stable 
grammar, and vocabulary held in common, forms the background knowledge that 
underlies the market of communicative commodities (speech-acts) used by discursive 
partners.  That we can accept speech acts assumes that we begin from such a shared 
objective and subjective vocabulary.  To elaborate from Rorty (1982, 83), that we can 
communicate at all assumes that some of those questions that characterize the debates in 
professionalized philosophy on the mind/ body split-- such as, “Is my interaction with 
this table brown, rather than, as I had previously thought, the table being brown?”-- are 
left to the side as always already answered (Peerenbohm 2000).  Likewise, that we may 
accept emotional appeals necessitates that we begin from a shared understanding of what 
                                                 
55
 As is well known, and oddly, debated, the homogeneity of the ekklesia required extensive exclusionary 
practices that contravene liberal standards of participation and equality.    
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emotions are, and how they shape our experience.  There are certainly some problems 
with this requirement.  
 First, that discursive partners share a similar lifeworld does not automatically 
generate situations of discursive parity—each partner must also be committed to the 
value of discourse to begin with.  In the estimations of theorists of liberalism and 
theorists of deliberative forms of democracy, the goodness of discursive parity is an 
unproblematic axiom drawn from the assumption that all persons' motivations are 
rational.  To suggest that discursive parity is always attainable requires sharing the 
lifeworld, as the basic moral-ethical framework for interacting communicatively or 
socially at all.  This assumption is unproblematic if the axiom holds (as it may very well 
hold) in estimations of ordinary political interaction between rational-legal motivated 
legislators and citizens appealing to legislators on such terms.  In situations where this 
axiom is problematic from the outset, such as instances of inter-cultural communication 
between two actors with incommensurable metaphysics, such assumptions help us very 
little.56 
                                                 
56
 Here it may be somewhat helpful to delve into the literature on multiculturalism and multicultural 
communication in order to elaborate on examples where this axiom “discourse is good” does not hold.  
Theorists of multiculturalism such as Taylor 1989, 1994, Kymlicka 1995, Rawls 1999, 2003(somewhat), 
and Levinas 1969, 1981 have grappled extensively with this issue but, not unexpectedly have in most 
instances theorized a multiculturalism that is abstract from the consequences of lived experience in a 
multicultural environment.  These major thinkers of multiculturalism have posited schema for reconciling 
differences (Rawls’ overlapping consensus) or coming to a meaningful appreciation of them (Levinas in 
particular, though Taylor and Kymlicka have substantive expertise to contribute), yet neither has described 
extensively how it is that citizens living in a multicultural environment “get along” day-to-day.  For 
example, who has the right to arbitrate and on what grounds, what is essentially a cultural-practice based 
dispute between my neighbor (who likes to dry squid and fish on a rack in his back yard) and I (who prefer 
the absence of fishy smell and insects in mine)?  How does the practice of an overlapping consensus 
(Rawls) or seeing me truly reflected in the other through unselfish eyes (Levinas) help an arbitrator of this 
dispute?  More viscerally, how does either theory help us to get along with one another so that tensions do 
not escalate?  Note Kymlicka: “In the areas of official languages, political boundaries, and the division of 
powers, there is no way to avoid supporting this or that societal culture, or deciding which groups will 
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Second, this assumption is problematic in the bureaucratic context for the reason 
that bureaucrats do not deal exclusively with individuals who share a commitment to the 
worthiness of discursive parity either consciously or unconsciously.  Bureaucrats 
encounter, in their daily activities, individuals who for reasons of psychological, 
physical, or social defect may not have (or be able to express) a lifeworld shared in 
common, and individuals whose background knowledge is a lifeworld that is divergent 
from (or only infrequently convergent with) the secular, rational or legal.  Those truly 
problematic identities, those individuals who are unable or stalwartly unwilling to 
communicate (those who theories of multiculturalism leave out oftentimes), do not 
evaporate under the weighty hand of theoretical efforts-- they “go somewhere.”  That 
“somewhere” is often the system of bureaucratic assistance.57  
 Clearly, if the shared lifeworld, thick rationality, rhetorical appeal, and a  
 
                                                                                                                                                
form a majority in political units that control culture-affecting decisions regarding language education and 
immigration” (1995, 113).  Kymlicka supports a practice of benign neglect which is not instructive for 
those persons—public administrators in many cases—who must arbitrate one way or another.  Neutrality, 
one may say, is not an option.  Thus, we return to the problem, what is the process, what can we do, when 
incommensurable facts of culture clash?  What to do about the formation of organizations in a 
multicultural environment that is highly charged?  How can one create, say, the multiculture pals?  I would 
not go so far as to argue that communication and communicative action is a panacea for every social 
complaint, however, starting with the process of representation taken up in Chapter VII, there may be a 
possibility of meaningful resolution.  
57
 What to do with a citizen who is unable to communicate with—to participate meaningfully at all—with 
the production of the state, and yet requires extensive support from the state, is a question to deal with in 
order for any theory of social justice or multiculturalism to have purchase.  The example brought 
immediately to mind is of a man or woman of majority age, whose parents are deceased, and has (through 
extensive assistance from modern medical practice as well as extensive financial support from the state) 
severe cerebral palsy with multiple confounding conditions.  This person would become a ward of the 
state, in most cases, to receive support and care through multiple state programs.  And yet, this person has 
no “say” in the care they receive—not only are they unable to participate in their direct care but are unable 
to participate in the process of making the state, upon which they are completely reliant.  They have no say 
in the lifeworld and no say in the system, save through the representation of their interests through an 
assigned state caseworker (or, if they are quite fortunate, a public non-profit volunteer).  What, do we “do” 
with the citizen who is at once part of the state but is communicatively divorced from its production?  This 
question is set aside for now, but will be taken up on subsequent work at greater length. 
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commitment to the goodness of discursive parity, are prerequisites for the remainder of 
discourse ethical communicative actions, bureaucratic client interaction between partners 
that do not share these values, will be problematic.  Yet if the goal is to develop 
communicative social processes that facilitate representation, then directly addressing 
this problem is necessary.  To achieve discursive parity requires that we, first, suspend 
the prior background knowledge presumed in common; and, second, focus on the 
objectives that motivate the discourse at all; and third, accept that true discussion (that 
discussion which can found representation) is multiply iterative.   
 To suspend the requirement of the full lifeworld in order to develop a situation 
where actors can potentially reach discursive parity on relevant issues—a situation of 
bracketed communicative action—places an alternative set of constraints on the 
bureaucratic participants in deliberation.  Specifically, it requires that the participants 
bracket their previous moral-ethical commitments, do not attempt (via strategic action) 
to “smuggle in” these commitments in vague or duplicitous language, and concede to tell 
the full truth to one another.  This demands that the participants be able to dissect their 
needs and statements of satisfaction from their original moral stance.  This may be 
problematic for persons who see their religious/moral/ethical commitments as all 
encompassing, but satisficing on the grounds of attaining understanding of basic 
immediate needs is all that is required in first iteration interaction.  In addition to 
committing themselves to the bracketing of the axiomatic bases of their lifeworld, this 
situation of bracketed communicative action demands truth and full information sharing.  
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While this may render the first iteration of communication less substantially meaningful, 
the bracketing of axioms allows for productive second iteration communication.58 
 To prefigure an argument elaborated at greater length in a subsequent chapter, 
first iteration interaction does not achieve more than modus vivendi toleration at most.  
The purpose of second iteration interaction (theoretically and practically) is to ensure 
that the possibility of conversation continues.  In second iteration, communicative 
partners attain true communication, deep toleration, inclusion, acknowledgement, 
intercourse, and the groundwork for representation.    
In second interaction communication, there are deliberations between citizens 
and bureaucrats over matters of value, which offers to citizens an avenue for expression 
that may be more meaningful in the democratic sense.  As Warren (1996) makes clear, 
due to restrictions on citizens’ capacity to obtain relevant information, all citizens may 
not be able to participate fully in all policy discourses.  Nevertheless, citizens, like their 
governors, will defend their interests and values, even if they lack formal authority to do 
so.  In the context of a discursive democracy, this is a critical defense of the citizens’ 
essential position—the citizen is always already an authority on his or her values and 
should be treated as such in all policy discourses.  While first iteration interaction is 
centrally important, the value of representation (bureaucratic or legislative) for citizens 
lies primarily in the assurance that their values, their interests, count in the public 
interest and later public policy.  This exchange of values is the content of second 
iteration communication that builds the basis of representation and the public interest. 
                                                 
58
 Yes, it is common knowledge that bureaucrat-citizen interaction is iterative, but it is helpful to 
acknowledge the content and process of interaction that can lead to active bureaucratic representation. 
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Conclusion 
The initial conditions for communicative action described above set up the 
framework of deliberation as normative for the establishment of the public interest.  
These initial conditions ameliorate the obvious tensions that arise when defining the 
public interest as a compromise between the individual’s definition of self-interest and 
interest collectively defined.  These tensions are, in sum, questions about the validity of 
collectively defined standards of a) what is a legitimate interest,  b) who the interested 
public ought to be,  and c) how can we “know” if the interest is truly public or merely 
representative of a momentary domination by one section of the public or another?  
To expand upon this, it is necessary to look closely at the definitions of self and 
public interests reached when asserting intersubjectively defined statements of interest.  
The intersubjectively defined public interest-- particularly one that conforms to the 
definitions of public interest given above and the strictures of communication described 
above-- is realizable only under the conditions of a discourse theory of public interest 
formation.  As Habermas describes it, discourse theory 
takes elements from both sides [liberal and republican] and integrates these in the 
concept of an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making.  Democratic 
procedure, which establishes a network of pragmatic considerations, compromises 
and discourses of self-understanding and of justice, grounds the presumption that 
reasonable or fair results are obtained insofar as the flow of relevant information and 
its proper handling have not been obstructed. According to this view, practical 
reason no longer resides in universal human rights, or in the ethical substance of a 
specific community, but in the rules of discourse and forms of argumentation that 
borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action oriented to reaching 
understanding.  In the final analysis, this normative content arises from the structure 
of linguistic communication and communicative mode of sociation (Habermas 1996, 
296-297).  
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In this model of discourse theoretic public interest construction, one attends to 
both the liberal construction of an individual’s own calculus for satisfaction and the 
individual has forecasted calculus of the interests held by others.  The communitarian/ 
republican element of discursive public interest formation suggests that the constitutive 
power of the community creates the background knowledge for the creation of an 
interest held in common.  In this model, the individually calculated estimations of self 
and other regarding interest are combined (but not aggregated in the sense of utility or 
vote aggregation) to emerge intertwined through the common vocabulary of 
intersubjective norms.   
The discourse theoretic relation of public interest formation requires that 1) 
public participants are coequal interlocutors who 2) arrive at the discursive platform of 
the public sphere arenas conscious of their own socio-political narratives that, 3) when 
interchanged in a dialogically appreciative fashion, 4) openly and truthfully inform other 
participants of the content of their self interests and their expectations of other’s 
interests, and are 5) oriented towards the satisfaction of wants and needs held in 
common, not merely their own.  This occurs in a public—that is, political—setting, the 
conditions of which inhere in the public sphere.59  
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 It may be helpful to point out an historical link between the evolution of the public sphere suggested by 
Habermas in Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (2001), and the emergence of the public 
interest as a politically important term of discourse in Gunn’s recount of Politics and the Public Interest in 
the 17th Century (1969).  For both Habermas and Gunn, the pivotal social changes that lead to the 
emergence of strident citizen critique of government was the post revolutionary period in 17th century 
Britain.  Both point to the emergence of the political press and the recognition among individuals of their 
own capacity as political commentators.  Gunn suggests that the unsettling of the monarchical power 
provoked the elaboration of a standard held in common by all formerly subjected to the standard of the 
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The success of these deliberations about competing procedural interests lies in 
the collective discussions of citizens who are able to not only develop and reflect upon, 
but also to agree to institutionalize, the agreements reached as well as procedures for 
further discourse.  It is “successful” legitimation discourse if done without the coercion 
of strategic action or the resort to metaphysical badgering (such as the intervention of 
exogenous moral codes such as the appeal to revealed religion).  It is finally successful if 
it results in an accord that institutionally protects the deliberative public interest.   
This successful deliberation does not translate automatically into success 
measured as uncritical continued compliance with the discourse, primarily due to the 
structure of human interaction. 
The structures of the public sphere reflect unavoidable asymmetries in the 
availability of information, that is unequal chances to have access to the generation, 
validation, shaping, and presentation of messages. Besides these systemic 
constraints, there are the accidental inequalities in the distribution of individual 
abilities. The resources for participating in political communications are in general 
narrowly limited.  This is evident whether one examines the time available to 
individuals and the episodic attention to topics and issues with histories of their own; 
the readiness and ability to make one’s own contribution to these topics; or the 
opportunistic attitudes, affects, prejudices, and so on, that detract from a rational 
will-formation (Habermas 1996, 325-6).  
 
                                                                                                                                                
monarchy.  While he does not make the argument that the public interest discourse of this period was 
egalitarian or all-encompassing by any means, he does indicate that the newly found critical freedom of 
the discoursing public lead to multiple elaborations of the public interest as a common standard.  
Habermas similarly makes the case that the dialogue of the politically engaged—though not equal among 
all by any stretch—laid the foundation for later, more democratic, critiques of government by the 
secondary and tertiary actors of government.  Though neither author connects strongly with the ideas of 
the other (both are decidedly disciplinary in their biases in these works), the historical correlation that a 
present author can draw from the discovery of the same historical circumstances leading to conclusions on 
the same theme appears to be more than simply coincidental.  According to my estimation, while 
Habermas was concerned with the sociological and governmental developments that the emergent 
bourgeois public sphere brought about, Gunn was concerned with the philosophical and political content 
of the emergent bourgeois public sphere.  Here I try to blend the notion of both content and process in my 
estimation of communication in the public sphere.  
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The infusion of the discourse theoretic model of participation with a 
communitarian ethic of full participation more readily accommodates those outside of 
the constraints of these structural variables by relaxing the extreme position of liberal 
democrats rooted in models of reasoned discourse as cover for elaboration of 
individually derived economic interests.  Primarily, by reinforcing the tenets of 
democratic discourse ethics described above, all actors are able to appeal to independent 
and/or communal positions on policy positions.  The discourse theoretic model does this 
by allowing the idea that individuals are able to choose rationally to agree with the 
standards of the community that has developed a democratic discourse on the topic-- that 
individuals can relinquish their individuality to the community standards on some policy 
positions when it is in their better interests to do so.  This model allows more people to 
participate seriously as rational, independently relevant actors, even if they do not 
contribute an individually reasoned position, but rather lend their support to the norms of 
the community. 
Discourse theory, in consequence, offers a method for readdressing the 
contentious issue of elite domination and political apathy by introducing the assumption 
that submission to elite dialogue or apathy on particular points is the expression of an 
authentic ethical position.  I see as advancement over the models of public interest 
formation predicated on the aggregation (summation) of utility common to some 
definitions found in the political theory and public administration literature.  Under the 
guide of discourse theory in the public sphere, the formation of the public interest can be 
both active and passive simultaneously.  Important to the formation of public positions 
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on the collection of policy possibilities, this theoretical position relaxes the assumptions 
of the social contract theoretic model of general will formation that assumes access to 
information and argumentation, on all potential horizons, for all citizens.  That is, 
defined through democratic discourse, the discursive public interest offers a more 
democratically defensible foundation for the public interest representative of the ethical-
normative policy goals of the full public. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND THE RECONCILIATION OF 
BUREAUCRACY WITH DEMOCRACY 
 
 In the writings arguing for the importance of a public interest standard for public 
administration, a recurring theme is the idea that the public interest is, and should be, the 
standard to which all administrative actions should be oriented.  As we expect, however, 
there are a multitude of competing models for the development and deployment of this 
standard.  In recent literature that takes a managerial approach, the emphasis is on the 
deployment of the public interest standard through the emphasis on secondary values of 
efficiency, efficacy, and procedural equity of service delivery (Du Gay 1996).  
Development of the public interest standard has taken a back seat, despite the obvious 
reasons for the importance of democratic development of the standard itself over the 
deployment in the name of democracy.  Among recently devised models of public 
interest development, more discursively focused models have been introduced, such as 
that offered by Goodsell (1990).   
Given the central importance of the democratic public interest for the 
legitimation of the actions of the administrative state, it appears paradoxical that there 
has been little substantial, recent discussion in the public administration literature about 
the utility of the standard of the public interest as a truly legitimating factor for actions 
of public administration (Goodsell 1990).  The lack of discussion however, is an 
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implication of unimportance.  Goodsell, in order to remedy the neglect of public interest 
development, reintroduces serious debate about the concept of the public interest as 
central for the execution of good governance by public administrators.   
Relying on Herring (1936), Souraf (1957), Friedrich et al (1962), and Flathman 
(1966), Goodsell makes the argument that the public interest is, and should be, a 
symbolic and verbal-discursive standard for the practice of public administration.  
Goodsell’s argument for the symbolic function of the public interest suggests that use of 
the concept of the public interest in policy formulation lends symbolic legitimacy to the 
regime that seeks to abide by the standard.  That is, by appealing to the standard of the 
public interest, we accept the government's policy development as adhering to 
transparent publicity that comports with accepted definitions of democratic legitimacy.  
For the purposes of this argument, however, the verbal-discursive description of the 
public interest is central.  Goodsell suggests that, according to the verbal discursive 
notion of the public interest, when used as a signifier of discourse on government, the 
concept lends democratic legitimacy to the state through allusion to the following values 
held in common by individuals in the constitutional state: legal-moral, political 
responsiveness, political consensus, a concern for logic, a concern for effects and an 
awareness of agendas (1990, 103-106).  
 According to Goodsell, the legal-moral quality of the public interest lies in the 
use of the public interest as a standard that indicates compliance with the accepted norms 
of “good” and “law.”  “Use of the term public interest implies that, at the very least, the 
user is claiming to be law-abiding and decent” (1990, 104).  That is, when a person (at 
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any level of the governance structure) uses the term public interest, we can assume that 
they 1) have and appreciate the concept of the public and the potential for an interest 
held in common by all members of the public, 2) that they are sensitive to, and are 
willing and able, to abide by a public interest standard, and 3) that they are willing to be 
held accountable to this standard should the need for legal or moral sanctioning arise.   
The political responsiveness characteristic of the public interest indicates that 
political agents and representatives recognize the public in full and not simply those 
persons directly their constituency.60  That is, they recognize the legitimacy and 
difference of interest concerns of each the individual as individual, individual as part of 
the community, and the full community itself.  In addition, if public administrators (and 
representatives) act with the objective of democratically participating to reform the state 
to satisfy the ideal of the public interest, they must realize that they themselves are part 
of the affected and effective community of the public interest.61  When used in the action 
of political discourse, this characteristic of the public interest concept is closely 
associated with what Goodsell calls the characteristic of “political consensus.”  For 
Goodsell, “public interest discourse not only requires officials to defend themselves in 
terms of what the public wants, it also requires contending groups within the public to 
defend their positions in terms broader than naked self-interest” (1990, 104).  The 
political consensus requires that groups as agents agree to express their interests in an 
intersubjectively communicable manner that is debatable via multiple concurrent 
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 Constituency is defined here as those persons in a political agent’s/ representative’s district, donor 
community or clientele.  
61
 Warren (1996) considers this standard an integral part. 
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conversations within the community.  The import of this characteristic lies in the idea of 
the public interest as a democratic, consensually defined standard with nearly universal 
normative appeal.  The public interest so defined must be defensible on the basis of 
intersubjectively defined and agreed upon norms, not simply those defined by the 
atomized (utility maximizing) individual or a single interest community.  The politically 
responsive public interest is independent of any one individual’s or individual social 
groups' direct interest satisfactions.   
Though the first three characteristics are of central importance for understanding 
the necessity of a democratic public interest, the remaining three are critical for 
understanding the content of such a standard.  The “concern for logic” suggests that any 
appeal to the public interest standard be defensible through appeals to logic and 
rationality.  These appeals rest on the grounds of suppositions that the speaker can 
communicate these characteristics as elemental parts of the public interest concept.  This 
characteristic of logical defensibility requires that the public interest itself be made of 
logical and rational content.  If necessary, a disarticulated public interest is useful in 
defense of any particular conceptualization.62  This particular characteristic is 
problematic in the discursive public sphere.  Particularly given the requirements of an 
agonistic public sphere described in an earlier chapter—that western systems of civil 
discourse, non-emotive rules of rationality, and linear-analytical systems of logical 
defense are inadequate to plural expressions of interests in a multi-identity polity, such 
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 Determining the strictures of rational or logical content to public interest debate is beyond the scope of 
this section of the chapter.  I confront the problem of rationality in debate later in this chapter and in the 
next.  
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as America.  Though Goodsell’s requirements seem to permit a less agonistic form of 
discourse than is perhaps desirable, the basic requirement that a public interest standard 
be defensible according to an intersubjectively accommodating standard does not seem 
to transgress even the most strident of agonistic expectations.   
The “concern for effects” suggests that, when speakers use the concept of the 
public interest in political discourse, they are recognizing the broad applicability of 
consequences for all who are part of the public, whether currently engaged in the 
discourse or not.  According to this characteristic, the use of the public interest standard 
is valid if, during the conversation, we put forth the range of consequences of a policy 
for all involved, not simply for the direct participants or an elite class of claimants.  That 
is, the concern for effects requires that we take the Rawlsian (1999) demands of justice 
as fairness, along with the Deweyan (1927) admonition to consider the full public in all 
of its diversity as good in its consequences, seriously.  This standard requires that the 
consequences for the “least” person in the public be given due concern with a weight 
proportional to those of the “greatest” person in the public.  This does not necessitate 
consideration of an endless stream of fantastic consequences reductio ad absurdum, but 
that all participants make good faith efforts to permit all perspectives a voice.  
Lastly, the standard of agenda awareness indicates that use of the term public 
interest in public discourse, requires the speaker’s recognition of the necessarily 
provisional quality of the interests that s/he understands to be represented in the public 
interest at present.  If the speaker abides by the rule of discourse theoretic use of interests 
based on the standard of agenda awareness, s/he will recognize the problems of both 
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limited time horizon and the potential for infiltration into the larger public of sub-altern 
publics not currently recognized.  
We can get around the potentially homogenizing tendencies suggested by 
Goodsell by introducing the concept of discourse theory.63  The most appealing reason 
for the use of a discourse theory of public interest formation as ethical normative 
guidance in public administration is that it is more fully democratic in its elaboration 
than are standards previously devised based solely upon aggregative models of the 
defined public interest.  The discursively defined public interest, that is, a deliberative 
model liberated from the elitist and limiting constraints of traditional models of 
democratic participation64 and common will formation,65 is defensible vis-à-vis all 
communicating actors in the space of the state.  The discursive model, as opposed to the 
aggregative model, opens the conversation on interests to more participants and more 
modalities of participation.  If we accept the equalitarian needs of a modern democracy, 
particularly given the fully administered character of the modern democratic welfare 
state, where the effects of sanctioned administrative power touch all actors in the space 
of the state, then the discourse theoretic model is almost certain to be more 
democratically appealing both in content and character.   
The imperative for the discourse theoretic model is clear if we accept that all 
citizens should have a voice in government.  For administrative power to have 
legitimacy over their lives, it is imperative that all citizens (and non-citizens residing in 
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 Goodsell (1989), perhaps despite himself, does imply throughout a “typical” homogenous form of 
interaction that presumes much of each participant’s competencies, which, in a truly diverse state, may be 
too simplified. 
64
 Majoritarian voting schemes for example. 
65
 The will common to all rational persons, as in the Rousseauian model of Social Contract theory.  
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the state-space) have a voice in determining the legitimating standards for the exercise of 
administrative power.  To do so I suggest that we must revisit the possibility of a public 
interest building communicative power indwelling in the lives of all possible participants 
(citizens, non-citizens, disabled, trans-gendered or otherwise non-typical in identity 
characteristics).  The imperative for a fully democratic public interest is arguably most 
important in the exercise of administrative power over individuals that have not 
voluntarily surrendered their autonomous sovereignty to the institutions that reify 
administrative power in their lives.  It is also important in situations where some may 
have effectively surrendered their autonomy to a given state but do not perceive that 
administrative actions taken on their behalf are, in fact, legitimate.66  
The discourse theoretic understanding of public interest formation suggests that 
all public participants are coequal interlocutors endowed with their own unique socio-
political narratives that if mutually exchanged for understanding builds the basis of 
public participants’ own potential vis-à-vis the satisfaction of the wants, and needs they 
hold in common (Habermas 1981, 117).  The discourse theoretic construction of the 
public interest is the creation of a symbolically meaningful, common standard for joint 
action that acceptable by all who willfully acknowledge themselves as part of the larger 
system and lifeworld of the public.   
As will be further developed, the discursive public sphere, particularly when 
interpreted as a model of participatory democracy (as is done by Dryzek, 2003), is 
arguably more democratic in a plural environment than are aggregative or majoritarian 
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 Members of the Freeman’s movement for example.  
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models of participatory democracy.  In particular, the discourse theoretic model of 
democratic participation relaxes the assumptions of rationality and trust that are implicit 
in these other models.  Within Habermasian discourse theory, the standard of rationality 
requires only that participants be engaged in reflexive and mutually accommodating 
discourse that culminates in learning in common.  However, this communication must 
abide by the standards of discourse ethics.  Fortunately, the strictures of discourse ethics 
are broader than traditional assumptions about democratic participation suggested by 
empirical democratic theorists, such as Dahl or Schumpeter (Held 1996).  Participants 
act rationally in the discursive model when they communicate—this communication 
does not have to take a traditionalist form such as voting or participation in the selection 
or informing of leaders.  By enhancing the notion of rational participation to include all 
forms of communication, many more people become relevant political actors than is the 
case in models of democracy based on the traditionally elitist assumption of strictly 
rational participation in conventional political processes.   
Particularly in the context of aggregative and majoritarian democracy, those left 
outside of the aggregate or the majority must trust in the imagined constitution of their 
social contract position to ensure that those in the majority will not seek to define their 
minority interests out of the model of public interests.  This is particularly true, if we 
assume the Schumpeterian definition as the democratic ideal, that democracy is the 
“‘institutional arrangement... which realizes the common good by making the people 
itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to 
carry out its will” (1942, 250) or “ ‘that institutional arrangement ... in which individuals 
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acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ 
(1942, 269)” (Krouse 1982, 444). In such a case, the participants (citizens only in this 
model) must trust in their democratic counterparts to establish institutional arrangements 
that are favorable to the fulfillment of their interests as well.  Particularly in the 
definition of the common good, the problem of majoritarian democracy becomes clear: if 
a majority elects representatives of itself who are motivated only to perform their good, 
the political process will exclude minorities left to the mercy of their majority 
counterpart’s representatives to acknowledge their voices at all.  That this state of the 
tyranny of the majority dominates suggests that the public itself, to paraphrase Dewey, 
no longer is the democratic public (Dewey 1927; Guinier 1994).    
 The use of Goodsell’s qualities suggests that, through the medium of 
intersubjective discourse theory, participants may come to know the public interest by 
engaging in active deliberations on the many qualities that the concept signifies.  The 
discursively defined public interest, by definition, takes into account each of the 
characteristics elaborated upon by Goodsell—legal-moral awareness, political 
responsiveness, political consensus, the concern for logic, the concern for effects and 
agenda awareness.  In discursive deliberations, citizens must offer mutually 
understandable reasons and must abide by the standards of discourse ethics.  Practically, 
this means they will appeal to the shared vocabulary of legal-moral codes, the concerns 
for logic and effects (rationality and appreciation of consequentialist ethics), the 
importance of consensus as a standard toward which all participants should strive, and 
will appreciate the range of potential policy positions brought to bear.   
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Goodsell’s standard of political responsiveness, however, is problematic in the 
democratic conceptualization of responsiveness as full representation.  Though I will not 
take up the argument for full representation as full responsiveness, an argument exists 
for the importance of bureaucratic responsiveness for development of a meaningful 
public interest standard.  In taking bureaucratic representation seriously, the political 
responsiveness standard reinforces demands that politics and the definition of relevant 
political actors be considerate of the bureaucracy as a crucial institution in political life 
(Du Gay 2000, 2005; Peters 2001; Rohr 1986; Terry 2003, Wamsley et al.1989; 
Wamsley and Wolf 1996).  As it stands, even in the formulation of Goodsell (1990, 
104), the actors assumed to be responsive are not the administrators themselves, but their 
“principals” in political positions.  The persistence of bureaucratic exclusion in the 
political discourse prevents the full realization of the democratically defined public 
interest.  That is, if we define the public interest with the full force of discursive 
democracy behind it, then public administrators themselves must become intersubjective 
participants in the deliberation about and expression of the public interest; bureaucracy 
and democracy must be reconciled.  
 If we take seriously the enormity of the public interest as the standard for all 
politics, the problem of reconciling bureaucracy and democracy becomes one of 
reconciling the actions of a limited section of the public with the entirety of the public.  
The promise of the theory of the democratic, discursive public interest, then, is that it 
stands to reunite theoretically the public of the government with the public of the critical 
public sphere through the idea of full communicative participation.  The public interest 
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defined in the communicative public sphere that meaningfully includes the 
administrative state improves the chances for a reconciliation of bureaucracy and 
democracy because it places the democratic standard for the bureaucracy at the front-end 
of the governance process where it is effectively isolated from the vagaries produced by 
the rise of interest group liberalism (Lowi 1969).   
Many recent theories that attempt reconciliation of bureaucracy with democracy 
rely on the ex-post model of control of administration.67  That is, administrators are 
assumed to be acting democratically when they respond well to controls placed upon 
their actions by the legislative, the executive, the courts and administrative due 
process—those branches and patterns of government that are determined to be 
definitively democratic.68  However, a faulty assumption of ex-post controls of the 
bureaucracy is the belief in the possibility of fully democratic participation.  Ex-post 
control of the bureaucracy assumes that, representatives' actions incorporate the interests 
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 The expansive literature of the political control of the bureaucracy I will not catalog here.  For the 
purposes of exposition, I draw much of my understanding of the political control literature from Epstein 
and O’Halloran (1999); McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (in their various combinations); Wood and 
Waterman (1994); Bendor (1988, 1994); Bendor, Taylor and Van Gaalen (1985, 1987); Bendor and Moe 
(1985), and Moe (1985).  
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 West 1995 offers a comprehensive look at the procedures and institutional controls of the bureaucracy 
that appreciates both the impetus for political control as described by scholars of political control of the 
bureaucracy as well as the difficulties of public administration recognized by scholars such as Goodsell 
(1994).  Note: “Given the realization that agency decision making is political, balanced interest 
representation has arguably supplanted accuracy and consistency as the goal of administration.  
Participation in the context of administrative due process is restricted by a variety of factors, however, 
including its costliness and its confinement of input to the consideration of single, well-developed 
alternatives.  The most fundamental deficiency of the interest-representation model is that participation is 
ultimately constrained by the central assumption of the adversary process that decisions are demonstrably 
correct or incorrect.  Indeed, the inherent difficulty of reconciling administrative law with the realities of 
bureaucratic politics is underscored by the fact that the extension of due process to agency policy making 
has frequently been justified on instrumental grounds as well.  Whether or not devices such as formal 
hearings and decision making on the record are effective means of getting at the truth on the empirical 
issues that inform actions such as rulemaking, they necessarily inhibit the resolution of conflicting 
interests” (West 1995, 206).   
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of all subject to bureaucratic action, even though representatives owe allegiance to a 
small body of constituents.  Note the following criticism of representation through 
administrative procedures offered by West: 
Participation in the context of administrative due process is restricted by a variety 
of factors, however, including its costliness and its confinement of input to the 
consideration of single, well-developed alternatives.  The most fundamental 
deficiency of the interest-representation model is that participation is ultimately 
constrained by the central assumption of the adversary process that decisions are 
demonstrably correct or incorrect.  Indeed, the inherent difficulty of reconciling 
administrative law with the realities of bureaucratic politics is underscored by the 
fact that the extension of due process to agency policy making has frequently 
been justified on instrumental grounds as well.  Whether or not devices such as 
formal hearings and decision making on the record are effective means of getting 
at the truth on the empirical issues that inform actions such as rulemaking, they 
necessarily inhibit the resolution of conflicting interests (1995, 206).  
  
Though the administrative procedures put into place, along with the top-down control by 
political principals are democratic in practice, these practices represent barriers to 
participation in the realization of full democracy.  
Further, as Downs (1967)69 and the many later theorists of democratic 
government in America show, the interests of elected officials lies with reelection.  The 
demonstrated interest in reelection appears as the adjustment of public policy positions 
to reflect the wants, needs, or desires of the interests of a limited (voting, elite) public.  
Reelection interests are ill served through the accommodation of limited and non-vocal 
interests; service to a broadly construed public interest that includes a vast number of 
persons who are not part of the critical constituency an official seeking re-election is not 
a goal of representative officials in an electoral democracy.   
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 See also Colm (1962) 
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Incorporation of the interests of the full public does not occur through ex-post 
controls.  At worst, ex-post controls reflect the wants of limited publics of vocal 
economic consumers, not the full public.  At best, ex-post controls echo the wants of the 
majority of the public (Nachmias and Rosenbloom 1973).  Downs himself warns of the 
tendency towards majoritarianism in the public interest:   
Anything that is in the long run detrimental to the majority of citizens cannot be in 
the public interest, unless it is essential to the protection of those individuals rights 
included in the minimal consensus.  This principle of long-run majority benefit 
follows from the principle of majority rule, which is in turn derived from the axiom 
that each man has an ‘ultimate’ value equal to that of each other man. The principle 
of long-run majority benefit also provides the basic link in a democratic society 
between the public interest and the private interests of the citizenry (Downs 1962, 9). 
 
The persistence of a conceptualization of democracy as actualized through the 
basic democratic venues such as representation and voting fails to catalyze progress 
towards a state endowed with full democratic “control” of its un-elected officials.  The 
articulation of a public interest standard, drawn from the Habermasian public sphere, 
comes closer to the fully democratic mode of control sought by administrative theorists.  
The open discourse of the public sphere, grants to all citizens the potential to contribute 
to the public interest through their speech and action.  Even the most minimally engaged 
consumer is permitted a voice (however minimal) in the articulation of the public 
interest through his/her consumption of media, (non) compliance with regulatory law, 
and interaction with the officials that compose the street-level bureaucracy.  The 
enhancement of the communicative public sphere as the place where the standards of 
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democratic government are forged circumvents the persistence of divided publics and 
majoritarianism in American government by de-formalizing the modes of participation. 
 
Citizens as Bureaucrats and Democratic Participation 
The “de-formalization” of participation demands that we look beyond ordinary 
channels of representation and control as access points.  If we consider public 
administrators as part of these access points, then public administrators become first- 
line points of access between the state and its citizens.  As subsections of the public 
administration literature on deliberative modes of citizen empowerment suggest, 
however, access to citizens and citizen expectation is far from easy (Hill 1991; Tyler 
1994).  Conventional positions on the bureaucratic relationship to the public suggest that 
bureaucrats are responsible for implementation of the law at the public, not with or for 
the public.  This view, I argue, is shortsighted and neglects the productive role that 
bureaucrats (as citizens) play in the making of the legitimate democratic state.  I suggest 
that bureaucrats are participants in the creation of the public interest in two ways, first, 
as citizens themselves and, second, as facilitators of deep citizenship among “ordinary” 
citizens.  Bureaucrats, contrary to the expectations of adherents to anti-bureaucratic 
rhetoric (in its many forms, which will be elaborated upon shortly), should be considered 
public participants with a unique role vis-à-vis other citizens and the act of legislation.   
 The concept of a citizen-bureaucrat is intuitively appealing to many.  Yet, 
unfortunately, the concept has been subjected to decades of anti-bureaucratic rhetoric 
aimed at driving a wedge between those in power and those “out of” power.  According 
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to the rhetorical flourishes of anti-bureaucratic stances, the similarities between citizens 
and bureaucrats stop at minimal citizenship or personhood status.70  Citizenship in itself 
is cast as merely a minimal characteristic of affiliation between citizens and bureaucrats 
and a form of pseudo-citizenship status is invoked within efforts at derogation of 
bureaucrats as a class of citizen “others.”  The tradition of anti-bureaucratic rhetoric has 
tried to separate the notion of bureaucrats from their citizenship status broadly defined as 
“being one of us”. 
 The rhetoric of bureaucratic separatism is rife with quips about the headless, 
soulless, and personality-less bureaucrat as a robotic automaton who does not occupy the 
world of “ordinary” people.  The perpetuation of zombie or machine metaphors for 
bureaucratic citizens serves primarily to enforce the notion of the bureaucrat as a 
fearsome member of a separate class of person.  Much of the anti-bureaucratic rhetoric 
emanates from misapplication of a misreading of Marx’s “theory” of bureaucracy.  
According to this reading, Marx explicitly denies the positive role for bureaucracy 
prominent in Hegel’s conceptualization of the civil society (Duquette 1989, Leibich 
1982, Shaw 1992)).  While it is verifiable that Marx denies that bureaucrats have an 
expressly positive role in society, he does not suggest that they occupy a separate class 
of person that must be revolted against as part of the superstructure.  The misapplied 
reading however, makes this suggestion an assertive point of fact—that bureaucrats are a 
class of persons against whom the proletariat should rightly revolt (Leibich 1982).71  
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 It is difficult to point to any one definitive text that defines or articulates the stance “anti-bureaucracy.”  
It is, as I make clear later in the chapter, a “mood.”  
71
 Leibich offers a thoroughgoing analysis of the role of bureaucracy in the thought of Hegel and Marx, 
much of which informs my analysis here, but which I cannot go into for issues of space.  Nevertheless, the 
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This perversion takes a particularly strident and shrill form in the work of 
Bauman (2001).  Bauman’s basic argument is that bureaucracies (as symptoms of 
modern rational society itself) are internally hardwired toward genocidal action.  
However, in stark contradiction to Bauman’s thesis, the tradition of anti-bureaucratic 
rhetoric of which Bauman is a part suggests it is legitimate to hold the view that 
bureaucrats are a class of people against whom a genocidal urge is appropriate in a 
democracy.  In Bauman’s work, the only truly justifiable genocide is one against those 
employed in the public service.  This most vitriolic example of the tradition of anti-
bureaucratic rhetoric attempts to quash the intuitive expectation of the bureaucrat as a 
citizen while ignoring both its own genocidal justificatory language and exclusionary 
impulses.  Simultaneously, Bauman and others also ignore the assessments of 
bureaucracy offered by the litany of public administration scholars committed to the 
study of bureaucracy as legitimate institution of government. 
 
The Anti-Bureaucracy Disposition 
 Anti-bureaucracy is not itself a coherent idea, but is rather a persistent mood in 
the thought of multiple political and social theorists.  Following the definition provided 
by Oakeshott, anti-bureaucracy is a “disposition” (1991, 407) that runs like a current 
                                                                                                                                                
following is important enough for quotation at some length here: “The fact of Marxism today is almost 
invariably connected with the problem of bureaucracy.  …  Indeed the notion of the bureaucracy as the 
“new class” and, more specifically, the new ruling class has grown from the status of a metaphor to that of 
a thesis, on the right as well as the left.  At the same time, most accounts lead one to the conclusion that 
the problem of bureaucracy was one relatively underestimated by Marx himself.  …Marx’s references to 
bureaucracy are few and far between and [that] together they do not add up to a theory of bureaucracy 
(1982, 77).”  Liebich establishes here that the reading of Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as 
being vehemently anti-bureaucratic is a misunderstanding of the objects of Marx’s true concern, 
“representation, public opinion, and constitutionalism.”   
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through the thought of liberals, libertarians, conservatives, democratic theorists, 
economic rationalists and post-modernists alike.  While the reasons for the persistence of 
anti-bureaucracy in each of these traditions differ, particular common themes endure.  Of 
these themes, a rejection of hierarchy and inequality, rejection of non-elected 
“interference” in the project of politics, and a belief in the a priori neutrality of 
procedures and laws, are common to the disposition.  Summarization of the fullness of 
particular elaborations on anti-bureaucracy is beyond the scope of present argument.  As 
such, I will focus on the dominant themes listed above rather than on the thought of a 
particular scholar or school specifically.   
 
The Rejection of Hierarchy and Inequality 
 The rejection of hierarchy and inequality founds anti-bureaucratic thought in two 
primary ways.  First, the rejection of hierarchy supposes that, in democratic and 
republican forms of government, no one citizen is above another.  Drawing upon the 
post-feudal system of governance and economics, the rejection of hierarchy is wedded to 
a belief in the equal rights of men over against any natural or given set of stations.  The 
rejection of hierarchy blends with rejection of the possibility of a class or caste system in 
the organization of the state.   
The rejection of hierarchy is easily justifiable on the grounds of liberal or 
democratic political theory.  The rejection of inequality parallels the rejection of 
hierarchy.  To reject inequality is to reject the notion that any one citizen can have any 
more or less power vis-à-vis another.  In other words, the rejection of inequality assumes 
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that the thoughts, wants, needs, actions and articulations of citizen A will always be held 
at the same constant value as those of citizen B.  This rejection links also to the belief in 
equal rights of all persons as voluntary partners to a contract or covenant (Cooper 1991, 
154-157).  The contractual and covenantal systems suppose equality but say little about 
the persisting need for hierarchy even under the auspices of covenantal forms of 
decision-making.  However, the implementation of a liberal or democratic form of 
government renders the rejection of hierarchy a knotty problem.  As theorists of 
organization often point out, hierarchy is a persistent fixture in decision-making 
institutions.72  The task of decision-making is emboldened by hierarchical frameworks in 
which the situation of full equality is difficult to realize.  
 The notions of contractual and/or covenantal forms of social political ordering 
have become constants in the articulation of the structure of the modern state.  The 
difficulty of articulating a covenantal relationship in particular has provoked change in 
the language of discussion from one of contracts and covenants to a language of liberal 
or democratic rights.  In terms of specific traditions of thought, the development of the 
idea of the bureaucrat as an "other" has deep roots in underlying theses of both political 
liberalism and governance by democratic means.  These tendencies are, simply stated, 
liberal exceptionalism and democratic gravitas.73   
The idea of liberal exceptionalism suggests that all persons in a liberal polity 
have an exceptional standing vis-à-vis all others.  By virtue of this unique individuality 
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 See Hatch 1997, 269-290; Perrow (1986, 29-46), Scott (2003, 41-52; 160-169).  
73
 These two terms, while not intended to be lasting neologisms, I use to clarify what it is I mean in 
language that is not “pre-loaded” by another thinker.  
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bestowed upon the liberal individual by existence alone, no one person can treat another 
justly when treating all in the same manner, with no thought to exceptional 
circumstances.  We find the roots of liberal exceptionalism in the understanding of the 
liberal individual as one who is at once a member of a self-constituting group but is also 
outside of the group as an individually valid claimant upon the norms and actions of that 
group.  Expectedly, this uniqueness ties into the politics of identity, recognition, and 
interests.   
The liberal individual, in order to be satisfied in his/her context as a political 
actor, requires the recognition of his/her independent identity’s contribution to the 
livelihood of the groups against which his/her identity markers are defined.  This form of 
exceptionalism is rooted in what Berlin calls the heteronymous condition.  Heteronomy 
arises from the tension between the needs of liberals as fully autonomous individuals and 
liberals as communally constituted (and sanctioned) individuals.  “Individuals… can feel 
free and secure and see themselves as self-governing only if they live within a social 
setting which is theirs” (Tamir 1998, 282).  Thus, the liberal person must feel at once 
separate (and therefore exceptional and distinct) from the social setting and the social 
rules of that setting, but also as a key constitutive part (and therefore, again, exceptional) 
to that social setting.   
The difficulty that liberal exceptionalism encounters with bureaucracy is that, by 
nature, bureaucratic rules are fixed in a context and time, unmovable with respect to 
each individuals claim.  The liberal claim against bureaucracy is that the identity of an 
individual, with all of his or her attendant rights and demands, must have purchase over 
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the actualization of particular rules, which individuals themselves must help to 
constitute.  With respect to the liberal encounter with bureaucracy, the individual must 
be able to create the system, and then break with the system at will, with no further 
explanation than the recourse to individual circumstance as right.  
The liberal exceptionalist concept, however, stands in contradiction to the 
contemporary efforts of theorists of political liberalism to establish an anti-perfectionist 
liberal pattern based upon procedural liberalism.  Procedural liberalism seeks to establish 
the recognition and treatment of all liberal individuals equally under the same procedural 
rubric without the “smuggling in” of any conceptualization of good through the language 
of procedures.  As the story goes, the state treats all persons equally with respect to their 
negative liberties while taking great pains to avoid imposing any conceptualizations of 
what one should do with those liberties (Appiah 2005, 156-170).  As Sandel simply 
summarizes, “This [procedural liberalism] is the liberalism that insists that government 
should be neutral toward competing conceptions of the good life, or, in the philosophers’ 
parlance, the liberalism that asserts the priority of the right over the good” (Sandel 1999, 
210).   
This procedurally equalitarian notion of liberalism emerges because of the 
attempts of liberal thinkers to square their demands for exceptional degrees of self-
defined autonomy with their simultaneous demands for procedural equality and justice 
as fairness.  As Taylor suggests, the procedural state is a logical (though not always 
preferable) way out of the problem of defining feasible and universalistic 
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conceptualizations of any moral or prescriptive standards of living in a liberal 
environment.  
If our under-standing [sic] of the citizen’s roles and rights abstracts from any 
view of the good life, it avoids endorsing the views of some at the expense of 
others.  Moreover there is a common terrain on which all can gather: Respect me 
and accord me rights solely in virtue of my being a citizen, without regard to my 
character, outlook, or goals, not to speak of my gender, race, sexual orientation, 
and so on (Taylor 1998, 151).   
 
Procedures, in this view, reconcile the need of liberals to feel that their individual 
identities are recognized and protected from the potential encroachment of others' 
conceptualizations of morality and the good, the construction of which they have not 
individually been part.  However, the fault of procedural liberalism is that it fails to 
make reasonable headway towards the satisfaction of the liberal requirement of anti-
perfectionist constitution (or codification in general) of these procedures themselves.  
That is, the failure of a procedural form of liberalism lies with its naïve belief in the non-
neutrality (always already perfectionist tendency) of procedure/ law and its 
implementation.   
The procedural liberal argument against bureaucracy is less clear than is the 
ordinary rejection of hierarchy and inequality.  Procedural liberals, on the face of their 
arguments, will not be against the notion of bureaucracy as merely a system of rules in 
institutions.  However, the actualization of these rules is problematic when procedural 
liberals confront the underlying heteronomy of liberalism—that the individual must be 
part of the construction of procedures yet must stand as an exception to the procedures 
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that they themselves have constructed.  While in the ideal procedurally liberal situation, 
the individual may freely interpret the rules themselves while participating in the 
ongoing community adaptation of procedures to fit the changing social context, this is 
not easily realized.74  To elaborate, in the creation of a bureaucratic state that does or 
does not assert the priority of one form of good over another, the perpetual reflection 
upon procedures itself asserts a form of goodness that claims that constant adaptation to 
the individual’s context is itself good.  The inevitable challenge to bureaucracy from this 
variant of liberalism is that bureaucracy, when implementing procedures (as is its 
primary function in society), must assert that something/ someone is more or less 
acceptable than is something/ someone else. 
While liberal exceptionalism stands against an assertion of priority for or a 
perfectionist definition of the interaction between the state and the liberal citizen, 
democratic gravitas is a quality of the political person himself or herself.  The concept of 
democratic gravitas suggests that the decisions of all persons in a democracy are of equal 
worth if only by virtue of their self-formation and subsequent performance as a member 
of the demos.  Democratic gravitas simply put suggests a notion of symmetrical 
seriousness of all decision-expressions put forth by members of the demos.  This 
practice underpins the organizational logic of most theories of participatory democracy, 
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 The definition of reflexive which will be used throughout this work is one I draw from Mead via 
Aboulaifa (2001): “For Mead, although many animals have the capacity to gesture to each other, human 
beings are capable of reflexively responding to symbols, which most often occurs through vocal gestures.  
I can hear my words as I speak, and as I speak, I can see your response.  A capacity for responding to 
one’s own gestures as the other responds to them emerges, and with it, there develops a consciousness of 
meaning based on a functional identity of responses.  One learns to anticipate the responses of others and 
thereby also learns to respond to oneself as if one were the other” (2001, 65). 
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including majoritarian and proportional representation.  For example, according to the 
theories of participatory democracy that take voting for representatives to be the ultimate 
democratic act, all votes ought to be counted equally regardless of the seriousness of the 
voter’s intention to uphold and respect the regime for which s/he votes.  Nor must there 
be consideration of the seriousness of the voter’s efforts to inform themselves of the 
content of the policy platforms they are voting for in the form of a representative 
person(s).  The quality of gravitas possessed by the democratic person is non-negotiable, 
even given variations in sincerity of an individual's participatory effort.  While strong 
theories of democratic citizenship suggest that, the true democratic citizen is both 
informed and sincere in his or her decision expressions, the fact that a person is neither 
informed nor sincere does not and cannot negate their vote.   
Similarly, theories of participatory democracy, that interpret participation in 
conversation or discourse as the essential act of democratic decision-making, suggest 
that all expressions seriously contribute to the discourse in a symmetrically worthy way.  
Particularly within theories of democratic participation that assume an agonistic view of 
the democratic situation, the “reasonableness” or “rationality” of an expression does not 
grant to the speaker any more or less weight in the conversation (Mouffe 2000, Young 
1990).  These theories, regardless of their interpretations of the importance of one act 
over another (voting or discourse); require a grant of equal seriousness to all 
contributions, all participants, and all forms of participation in the democratic space. 
 Embedded in the disposition of anti-bureaucracy, of which the belief in liberal 
exceptionalism and democratic gravitas are part, is the belief in equalities of power at all 
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costs, potential and consequence in decision making among liberal or democratic 
citizens in the polity.  Liberal equalitarianism and exceptionalism does not easily permit 
the justification of a regime that explicitly accepts inequalities, hierarchy, and clear 
demarcations of power.  The outgrowth of the equalitarian liberal position has been the 
steady rejection of institutions, theories, and practices that do not appreciate or facilitate 
individually reified equality as a primary good.  Democratic gravitas, likewise does not 
permit the justification of a regime that permits the ranking of one person’s value to the 
state over the other.  Democratic gravitas rejects the notion of any one citizen or group 
of citizen being “more equal” than others.  The consequence of the persistence of these 
thoughts has been the rejection of bureaucracy as institution and practice on the basis 
that it does not facilitate the convenient satisfaction of all individual’s expressions 
equally.  Rejections of rights or material claims by members of the bureaucracy 
seemingly merit the cry from citizens that “bureaucracy” itself is the cause of the 
inconvenience, not the incompatibility of the request and the interests of the full 
community itself.75   
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 Another tendency attached to liberal exceptionalism and democratic gravitas in the tradition of anti-
bureaucracy is the belief that bureaucracy (and indeed government in general) is a “magic goodies creator” 
which should be available for immediate dispensing of material or social goods on an “on-call” basis.  In 
much of liberal theory, it seems to be that government itself has lost status as an “entity” with rights, 
claims, or needs.  Such a view fundamentally rejects the possibility that there could be such things as a 
public, and more importantly, a public interest.  Interests, for modern liberal thinkers, are individual, ad-
hoc, and inalienably justified by the existence of the person as person separate from any community 
concern.  
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The Rejection of Bureaucratic Interference 
 Two dominant themes list under the heading “bureaucratic interference”.  The 
first theme is the reification of the politics-administration dichotomy or the division of 
politics into reflective and active phases.  The second is the expectation that production 
in the private (market) environment is more efficient than is production in a public 
setting and that bureaucratic production of government interferes in the natural tendency 
towards efficiency that would be found in a competitive system free of rules.  A third, 
less prominent theme is the expectation that bureaucratic employment interferes with the 
natural progression and goodness of individual’s personalities and selves.  A fourth and 
final theme of bureaucratic interference is that bureaucracy itself is an inherently 
conservative institution that stymies the “inevitable” progression of the individual and an 
individualistic society, with its tendency towards rules and traditions.  
 The politics-administration dichotomy is a persistent theme in public 
administration literature as well as in the literature on political institutions.76  In short, 
the politics-administration dichotomy suggests that politics include two phases and two 
classifications of institutions.  The first phase is a reflective or political phase where 
citizens and their (representative) legislators deliberate on the meaning, content, and 
applications of law.  This phase of politics many consider the historically legitimate 
form of politics in a liberal, democratic, and/or constitutional system.  That is, politics is 
legitimated by participation of citizens in the reflection and eventual codification of law; 
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 A summary of the politics-administration dichotomy and some of the influential research on this model 
(and its eventual debunking) can be found in Frederickson and Smith (2003); Martin (1988); O’Toole 
(1987, Rosenbloom (1993); Sayre (1958); Svara (1998); Waldo (1988).  
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all other acts of politics should follow directly from the standards and acts specified 
during this phase.   
The second phase of politics is the active implementation of the laws developed 
during the reflective codification phase.  This phase, per the politics-administration 
dichotomy, is divorced from reflection by either citizens or implementers themselves 
and is merely the performance of actions already concretely specified.  The active or 
administrative phase of politics is legitimate only if there is no modification to the law 
specified in the previous phase.  The assumption that guides the assertion of political 
legitimacy and potential illegitimacy of the administrative phase is the level of (indirect) 
citizen control and involvement in each. 
 The politics-administration dichotomy assumes that citizens are critical to the 
process of politics only within the reflective phase and assumes that they are passive 
“takers” of politics during the administrative phase.  As citizens are uninvolved in the 
implementation or administration phase, any adaptation of the law previously developed 
is taken to be a subversion of the original intents and wants of the citizenry, and 
therefore illegitimate in the context of a representative-controlled system of government.  
The adaptation of law during the active phase of politics suggests to some a violation of 
the original covenant of citizen sovereignty over the political.  Preservation of the split 
between these phases theoretically protects this covenant by eliminating unaccountable 
(non-covenantal) interference in the actions of the governors over the governed. 
 Two classifications of institutions underpin the estimations of the politics-
administration dichotomy.  Simply put, they are the institutions of accountable and 
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covenantal politics and the institutions of non-accountable and extra-covenantal 
administration.  In the formulation of the politics-administration dichotomy, the 
accountable institution (such as an elected legislature) is removable through the 
application of force by citizens.  In the situation of the non-accountable institution of 
administration, citizens have no direct control over the membership of the institution, but 
must first go through the institution of politics.  The indirect relationship of citizens to 
administrators underscores the distinction between the typology of institutions as 
political-accountable and administrative-unaccountable (Behn 2001; Burke 1986).   
 The role of the politics-administration dichotomy in the continuation of the anti-
bureaucracy disposition lies first in the failure of the idea to capture properly the nature 
of political institutions.  Crucially, the politics administration dichotomy takes as given 
that legislatures formulate concretely specifiable laws useable as procedures with clear 
demarcations of acceptable and unacceptable behaviors under such law.  However, it has 
become almost axiomatic that legislatures do not formulate law clearly or with great 
specificity as this undermines the project of legislators themselves to continue to be re-
elected.  The reflective phase of politics, contrary to the expectations of the dichotomy, 
is also the reactionary and the self-promoting phase, easily exploited by political actors 
who believe themselves outside of the mechanisms of democratic accountability.  Given 
the mistaken configuration of the politics side of the dichotomy, the active 
administrative side of the equation is also mis-specified.  Specifically, the institutions of 
administration cannot implement directly what is not directly stated.  The active 
administration of law remedies vague legislation through interpretation, a practice 
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exploited by legislators, intent upon shirking their original responsibility for designing 
specific legislation in protection of citizen values.  The politics-administration 
dichotomy, as part of the disposition of anti-bureaucracy, sets up the very real possibility 
of bureaucratic scape goating to cover for legislative evasion.  
 Contributing to the disposition of anti-bureaucracy is the near-axiomatic belief 
that capitalist market systems dominated by competition among private providers will 
naturally tend towards the production of goods with the least waste, highest quality and 
maximum efficiency possible.  This line of thought suggests that the market system is 
capable of provision of all goods and services, even “public” or “common” goods such 
as national defense.  Much of the literature proposing a model of government based upon 
the privatization of public bureaucracies argues that the private production of goods and 
services is more efficient than is production in the public sector.  It is common in these 
lines of argument to find suggestions that private sector organizations produce goods and 
services more quickly, with more accountability for results and with more attention paid 
to customer needs (Osborne and Gaebler 1996).  However, many of the goods produced 
by public bureaus are primary goods unattainable in the private sector such as social 
justice (distributive and redistributive programs) and national defense.  Assumed in this 
model is that short-run gains of efficiency and maximization of customer values 
supersede values of long-term stability or predictability of good and service provision 
(Birkland 2005; Lowery 1998; Straussman 1981). 
 The third theme of anti-bureaucracy rooted in an expectation of bureaucratic 
interference is that the condition of employment in a bureaucracy is damaging to the 
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natural expression of individual personalities and identity/ self-hood.  The diseased 
bureaucratic condition is unacceptable to the truly autonomous individual.  More than 
that, some suggest that the conditions of employment in a public bureaucracy render the 
employee “headless and soulless”, seeking after only “control and efficiency” to the 
detriment of commonly held values such as “justice, freedom, violence, oppression, 
illness, death, victory, defeat, love, hate, salvation and damnation” (Hummel, quoted in 
Goodsell 1994, 103).  This line of argument prefigures bureaucrats as non-human 
entities that lack the basic values or characteristics of the remainder of humanity, by 
virtue only of their occupation as public officials.  Extensions of this argument tread into 
areas of profound contradiction, as the bureaucrat is “othered” to the point that his or her 
very characterization is meant to provoke a need in the reader to annihilate the 
bureaucratic class.77 
 This argument, a part of the disposition of anti-bureaucracy, insists upon the 
rejection of bureaucracy because the existence of the institution itself violates basic 
principles assumed held by all.  Understanding the institution of bureaucracy to be the 
institutional embodiment of rejection of values held in common by liberals and 
democrats (equality, parity, and individualism), the rejection of the bureaucrat as a 
diseased individual or one who is in a diseased state allows theorists in this disposition to 
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 I take great issue with the argument posited by Zygmunt Bauman (2001) that bureaucracy as institutions 
and individuals working in those institutions (bureaucrats) are naturally homicidal/ genocidal.  I find 
Bauman’s argument to be a rather thin view of bureaucracy and a strange and uncomfortable paradox: the 
Nazi program undertook radical propaganda efforts aimed at dehumanizing the intended victims of 
“liquidation”, these same efforts (the same imagery and rhetoric) are what Bauman heaps upon 
bureaucracy.  Rather than make a compelling argument that bureaucracy is a genocidal institution, 
Bauman makes well the argument that programs of dehumanization of any one class or category of 
individuals renders the elimination of that class or category all the easier.  Although I take issue with this 
critique, I will not elaborate further on it.  
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reject the bureaucrat as a full, healthy contributing member of the society.  The 
categorization of the bureaucrat and the bureaucratic condition as diseased offers an 
additional avenue for placing the bureaucracy outside of considerations of politics, thus 
rendering the task of theorizing politics in a liberal and/ or democratic mode much less 
problematic.  Unfortunately, this exclusion also closes an important avenue for the 
realization of participatory democracy. 
 The final criticism of bureaucracy—that it is an inherently conservative 
institution disrupting the progression of the individual—is a criticism of bureaucracy 
leveled by those who would argue for a naturalistic view of human nature.  In this view, 
human nature is inevitably progressing, whether through the reflexive generation of the 
liberal personality or the progression of competitive advantage via participation in an 
efficient capitalist system.  Bureaucracy, by enforcing rules that prohibit exceptions for 
individual desires or individual advantage, seemingly contradicts this natural progress.  
That rules are inherently conservative of a preferred pattern of human behavior renders 
rules the mechanisms for the preservation of these behaviors, but the institutions that 
enforce rules are themselves not necessarily conservative. 
 In the sense that we can appreciate the conservative position, as does Oakeshott 
(1991, 407-438), bureaucratic enforcement of rules does present a conservative trend 
against the atomization and ethical relativism of liberalism taken to extreme.  However, 
contra Oakeshott, bureaucracy does not itself prevent changes from occurring.  While 
bureaucracy is an agent of social stability through its preservation of rules, it is not an 
agent of reversal.  Far from this, and contrary to the anti-bureaucracy disposition, the 
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reversal of social processes and the slowing of inevitable progress is not an intended 
consequence of bureaucratic management in society, but is rather an unintended 
consequence of attempting to rule any organization of persons according to a fixed 
pattern of social preferences codified into law.  The “inherent conservatism” of 
bureaucracy is little more than an historical accident of the role that the institution plays 
for society. 
 
Anti-Bureaucracy and Legal Neutrality 
 The belief in the frequency and malfeasance of bureaucratic interference in 
politics emerges from the assertion, earlier articulated, that legislatures create law that 
does not require interpretation for its implementation and that any “interpretation” by 
bureaucrats is actually interference.  Packed into the belief in legislative perfection is the 
notion that legislators construct law that is non-porous and value neutral.  Again, the 
suggestion is that any interpretation by bureaucrats for the purpose of implementation is 
simply the injection of their individual values (which, recall are not part of the value 
schema held by ordinary citizens) and subsequently, bureaucratic domination over the 
citizenry for the sake of the aggrandizement of their maladjusted (diseased-state) values 
alone. 
 However, as structural-functional theorists and theorists of language 
demonstrate, there is no neutral language deployable in situations of organization, or 
social life in general (Foucault 1991, 1994).  To evoke Foucault, power inheres in all 
language.  Consequently, as law evolves in the accumulation of language, the notion of a 
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neutral law, of neutral procedures, is a falsehood from the beginning.  This falsehood is 
not without its usefulness.  Legal neutrality has been edified by scholars (procedural 
liberals) seeking to navigate around the necessity of authority, command, and a 
perfectionist tendency in government (Letwin 2005; Rohr 1978; Tyler 1994; Warren 
1996).  Specifically, the call for neutral procedures is a call for the elimination of all 
possibility of empowered authority in society.78  
Many variants of the dominant theories of liberalism, particularly those that elide 
theoretical liberalism with the practice of democracy, perform a covert evacuation of the 
law (procedure) in order to side step the true nature and definition of law as text and as 
practice that either restricts or promotes a particular type of social behavior.  In virtually 
the universe of procedurally liberal theories, there is this inconsistency between the 
neutrality of law as statement or text and law as practice.  This is, in part, what 
Habermas hopes to clarify in Between Facts and Norms.  Habermas defines law as: 
Modern enacted law, which claims to be legitimate in terms of its possible 
justification as well as binding in its interpretation and enforcement.  Unlike post 
conventional morality, law does not just represent a type of cultural knowledge 
but constitutes at the same time an important core of institutional orders.  Law is 
two things at once: a system of knowledge and a system of action.  It is equally 
possible to understand law as text, composed of legal propositions and their 
interpretations, and to view it as an institution, that is, as a complex of 
normatively regulated action (1996, 79).  
 
The mistaken interpretation of law as neutral with respect to implementation denies both 
the negative and positive aspects of law.  In addition to neutralizing that which cannot be 
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 As Meyer (1978) makes clear, the tradition of liberalism in politics has lead to the progressive decline of 
authority as legitimate due to (inadvertent) fusion of the concepts of authority and power.  Authority has 
become the use of the individual power of the (elite) person in an authoritative position over the individual 
power another.  The use of authority, even authority derived from law, some equate with the rejection of 
the liberal right to exceptionally self-determined individualism. 
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made neutral (lest law become mere “recommendation”), the quest to neutralize legal 
procedures to satisfy liberal needs for intolerant tolerance,79 ignores the necessarily 
performative implementation of laws, and rejects the notion of a quality of law being 
possible.  This expectation of procedural neutrality fundamentally ignores the true state 
of politics based upon law or procedure; that law requires implementation order to be.  
 To return to an earlier point, because bureaucrats are in a more differentiated 
situation than citizens in their relation to law and the exercise of legal power, liberal 
doctrines conventionally reject the unqualified full membership of bureaucrats in the 
liberal polity.  As persons “closer” to the law, bureaucrats are able to exercise a greater 
measure of power over others if we measure the exercise of power here as the nuanced 
expert application or actualization of procedure through performance (Meyer 1975; 
Pennock and Chapman 1987).  The dishonest power that bureaucrats have can be labeled 
bureau power.  Bureau power arises as bureaucrats have more power vis-à-vis others 
because of their knowledge and subsequent application of this knowledge to the 
performance of the law.  The inequality of expert knowledge founds a disparity of legal 
intimacy between citizens and bureaucrats.  Particularly if we accept a notion of the 
nation as the practical embodiment of its constitution, then the inequality of the intimacy 
of bureaucrats with the law and constitution suggests an unequal intimacy of bureaucrats 
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 Intolerant tolerance is the tendency among theorists of liberalism to conflate tolerance for indifference.  
By becoming indifferent to the positions of others, the need for tolerance and liberalism becomes a moot 
point—if we do not have to take seriously the positions of others, then there is nothing to tolerate and there 
is negation of the whole reason for being of the liberal state.  In this context, if we construct laws and 
procedures that only reify the intolerant tolerance position of liberalism, then the result is only despotism 
of apathy.  In addition, the worst form of a tyranny of majority is not the implementation of a totalitarian 
or totally administered state as a result, but is actually the despotism that comes from the persistence of a 
desire for material comfort, micro-economic stability, and individual insularity that comes from despotic 
apathy.  I will address the issue of bureaucracy and toleration in a latter chapter in much more detail.  
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with the nation itself.  The inequality of intimacy with the nation as law deeply 
contradicts the expectation of liberal doctrine that suggests that all members of the 
nation exercise equal sovereignty over and within the nation and that no one person can 
be greater or less than another with respect to the whole itself.  Liberal doctrine finds no 
satisfaction with the disparity of intimacy with the law that naturally occurs in a complex 
constitutional society.   
Though the constitutional moment is ostensibly a unifying moment among all 
persons, the moment fades into a diffusion of constitutional power according to a 
division of labor necessary to implement the constitution.  After the constitutional 
moment, the differentiation of labor, and the differentiation of power result in the 
evolution of hierarchies, expertise and specializations, to which no persons will have 
equal unfettered access.  An attendant concern is that not all persons are simultaneously, 
or even sequentially, able to hold power.  The state of modern knowledge and capital 
producing divisions of labor suggests that not all persons can become part of the 
“empowered class”.  Similarly, extending a concern of Rawls for equality of life 
circumstance and opportunity, not all persons can participate in the implementation of 
power given the situation of life outside of the veil of ignorance.  Not all procedures can 
be performed by all equally in practice due to constraints of physical ability or 
differential intellectual aptitudes.  
The tradition of anti-bureaucratic stances in liberalism assumes that those who 
are presently employed as bureaucrats are in an unnaturally, and unwarranted, if not out 
and out unjustly, superior position to those that are not.  Those presently endowed by 
 120 
occupational choice80 with the power to actualize procedure are regarded as “outside” of 
the equalitarian structure of the true liberal society.  Therefore, those in positions of 
power are therefore “other” or “alien” to the naturally equal order that would ensue from 
a truly autopoeitic politics.81    
On the converse side of the equation, bureaucrats are more constrained and less 
intimate with the nation than are “ordinary” citizens.  The close proximity of the 
individual to the neutral apparatus of the state washes away bureaucrats natural right to 
participate in forms of political radicalism and the act of rebellion for the reformation of 
the society.82  While the proximity of bureaucrats to the law renders them powerful with 
respect to the power of the state over citizens, the same proximity alienates the 
bureaucrat from the post 1789 liberal right of revolution.  That is, for the bureaucrat (and 
even the legislator), the act of revolutionary participation is not merely revolting against 
an order external to them, but is revolting against that which sustains them and that 
which they have created in a very intimate sense drawn into the performance of their 
                                                 
80
 The notion of a choice to public service and thus a choice to power squares only tenuously with 
liberalism in a superficial way—public servants have the individual and unfettered choice capacity to 
become what they are.  However, this misunderstands some later variants of liberalism that recognize that 
life circumstances alter the choice situations of any individual and that therefore, the choice to public or 
private service may not be an actual “choice” in the most strict sense of the word.  The literature on public 
personnel reveals a changing demographic of civil service positions from 1964 until present day, which 
includes more women and minorities entering the public sector.  Trends on private employment 
compensation from this time indicates that public employment is a far less lucrative sector and that women 
and minorities may actually be entering the public service as a “choice of last resort” as the private sector 
has continued to favor traditional patterns of employment demographics.  
81
 Conservative critics of liberalism have dashed this belief in the romantic fiction of state of nature 
communism repeatedly and I will not elaborate extensively on this here, other than to reiterate that this 
romantic fiction is simply that, romantic and fiction.  
82
 Note the requirements of the Hatch Act that stipulate the degree and form of political participation those 
public employees may engage in.  
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very lives.  In the context of bureaucrats and legislators, the act of revolution and of 
radical politics is not merely assault upon the state as it is an act of murder-suicide.83 
The explosion of the fiction of legal neutrality is necessary however, to the 
assertion of any type of bureaucratic legitimacy in the state.  As Cooke makes plain,  
[T]he constitutional state does not simply recognize the autonomy of citizens 
without regard to their substantive ethics commitments and convictions… 
constitutional principles and the legal system are inevitably interpreted in the 
light of some substantive conceptions of the good life. Habermas, we might say, 
no longer straightforwardly affirms the ethical neutrality of the constitutional 
state… (1997, 277).   
 
As such, the continued reification of the neutrality imperative for administrative 
personnel means the persistence of an untenable fiction, necessarily replaced with a 
substantive view of “actual” politics and actual interpretive personnel (bureaucrats). 
 
Thin Bureaucrats and Thick Citizens 
 The disposition of anti-bureaucracy is more than simply an indictment of the (in) 
capacities of bureaucrats within the formation and maintenance of the constitutional 
republic.  It suggests an implicit theory of citizenship as well.  The disposition of anti-
bureaucracy includes within it what I take to be a remarkably thin view of bureaucrats 
(as both citizens and as persons in institutional roles), and a thick view of citizenship that 
involves assumptions of citizen duty that are more advanced than the ordinary practice 
of citizenship in most modern constitutional republics.84 
                                                 
83
 Thus, following Walzer (1970) on obligation, the revolutionary bureaucrat commits an unforgivable act 
of irresponsible treason.  
84
 For an assessment of the role of the individual in theories of citizenship see Portis 1986. 
 122 
 Citizenship, as with most essential concepts of political theory, has an extended 
history punctuated by particular “moments” (Carens 2000; Shklar 1991; Thompson 
1970; Wolin 2004).  Within citizenship theory, these moments can be divided into 
roughly two periods—the ancient republican, “duty bound” versus the modern liberal 
“emancipatory”—versions of citizenship.  The ancient Greek conceptualization of 
citizenship requires that the citizen experience alternating modes of subservience and 
participation within the polity as an institution with a purposeful goal of the maintenance 
of the good life.  This theory of citizenship called for the full participation in 
deliberations on the actions of the polity, but not determination of the good life itself.  
Alternatively, as elaborated by Plato, citizenship was, primarily, a subservient mode 
tying the good citizen’s function into obeying the commands of those who knew better 
in order to advance a more stable polity.85  The later Roman conceptualization of 
citizenship married these two Greek traditions into a view that encouraged the promotion 
of a communal ethic and ethos of citizenship (as holistic end of the state) via individual 
participation in the enactment of law determined by a republican participatory mode.  
The Roman conceptualization of citizenship involved a more Aristotelian reflexive view 
of power that called for the citizen to both make and take the law as one among many.86  
The reflexivity of Roman citizenship was not voluntary as would be later versions of 
                                                 
85
 Plato’s notion of citizenship and that of Aristotle both had a reflexive tone: the best citizen could rule 
and be ruled in turn. 
86
 Wolin’s summarization of Roman citizenship is helpful here: “In Cicero’s revealing definition ‘the 
peculiar mark of a free community’ consisted of the principle that it was illegal to violate the civic 
privileges or private property of an individual except by the decisions of the senate, the people, or an 
appropriate tribunal.  Henceforth, the element of participation became of secondary importance, and the 
operative role of citizenship was to provide the only common status or meeting ground for men who were 
otherwise sharply distinguished by social, economic, religious, and cultural differences.  What was 
political about citizenship was its role in overcoming heterogeneity, numbers and space” (2004, 83). 
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citizenship.  Rather, Roman republican-- “thick”-- conceptualizations of citizenship were 
founded on the expression of citizenship as the manifestation of a person’s semi-
volitional acceptance of certain duties.  
 This ancient republican tradition of citizenship has persisted through political 
theory as an ideal mode of citizenship, wherein members of the polity are motivated by 
an ethic and ethos of patriotism, obligation, duty, or common-purpose to participate in 
the activities of the state.  In this conceptualization, the state and community takes 
priority over the individual.  This thick notion of citizenship has particular purchase in 
communitarian circles as a form of citizenship based upon a set of common shared 
values.  Charles Taylor, in particular, has advocated this thick citizenship as the ideal, 
most practicable, mode in the American constitutional republic.87  
 The republican, thick notion of citizenship stands in opposition to a more liberal 
view that appreciates the practice of citizenship as the pursuit of one’s individual 
interests, with minimal attention paid to the appreciation of a universal interest held in 
common by all individuals.  Following the late eighteenth century revolutionary period, 
the content of citizenship expectations shifted toward the liberal model and an 
individualized notion of citizenship and citizen rights.  Rather than in a republican 
modality, in the liberal view the individual takes priority over the community.  The 
formation of a citizen community, then, requires methods of calculation such as 
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 “Taylor finds a conception of citizenship that links together the communitarian’s holistic ontology and 
the liberal’s commitment to freedom.  The political community, on this understanding is not simply an 
instrument for the advancement of individual interests.  Rather, republican politics is organized around the 
idea of a common good, which can and ought to enter into the citizen’s conception of his own good.  This 
fusion of individual and collective interests, which finds expression in the practice of civic virtue, is the 
political condition that makes liberty possible” (Hill 1993, 68).  
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aggregation and utility summation.  As Haddock (2005) explains, the appreciation of a 
common ethics or “cult of virtue” steadily diminished in the later part of the century, 
exacerbated by the confrontation between the actualities of a large state apparatus and 
the ideal of a common purpose driven state.88  The purpose of the state moved away 
from the promotion of a notion of good and towards the constraint of all vis-à-vis the 
others so that each individual could pursue liberty on their own terms.  The consequence 
for this shift was the evolution of a permissive citizenship that made no explicit demands 
and held no obligation above the heads of the members of the polity. 
 These two moments of citizenship are in essential conflict with one another.  As 
Cooper (1991) elaborates, this manifests itself in the evolution of citizenship theory 
within The Federalist debates.  Likewise, Rohr (1986) alludes to conflict between 
modalities of citizenship that play a substantive role in the foundation of the Continental 
and American appreciation of the relationship of the citizen, the state, and the 
government apparatus.  Elsewhere, the conflicts over competing models of citizenship 
play out as competing models of political theory.   
The conflict between these citizenship goals has not been resolved in either 
political thought or political practice.  Specifically, within the context of public 
administration, conflicts over the measures the state can enact for the objective of 
promoting a collective identity or ethos persist.  As a feature of the disposition against 
                                                 
88
 “A cult of virtue, for example, of the kind associated with Robespierre or Saint-Just, might very well be 
a fitting reflection of the cultural homogeneity of an ancient republic.  In a state the size of France in the 
nineteenth century, however, an insistence on moral or political uniformity would necessarily involve the 
suppression of a plethora of interests and points of view.  Modern citizens prized individual liberty above 
all else.  They were content for the political authorities to ‘confine themselves to being just’; they were 
perfectly prepared to ‘assume the responsibility of being happy’ for themselves” (Haddock 2005, 44).  
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bureaucracy, the liberal atomized notion of citizenship takes precedence as the ideal 
model for citizens who naturally adhere to common values independent of one another.  
Consequently, the efforts of bureaucracy to promote the values held in common (and 
democratically codified into policy and law) seen through the atomized liberal lens, 
interprets bureaucratic action to be an infraction against the individual-affirming rights 
granted to modern citizens.  
This interpretation of bureaucratic interference has neglected the role of the 
bureaucrat as a citizen performing an obligatory duty on behalf of the state for the 
maintenance of the republic itself.  That is, bureaucrats have become non-citizens as 
citizenship itself has lost its cultural and social value.  Evoking the ontology of 
citizenship posited by Hill (1993), the problem of bureaucracy and citizenship is that 
while the citizen qua citizen has become an entity ontologically prior to the community, 
the citizen as bureaucrat is estimated to be either 1) outside of the community with no 
particular ontological standing within it at all or 2) an antithesis to the community and 
the standing that citizens themselves occupy.   
The problem of reconciling citizens and bureaucrats, particularly within the 
context of the anti-bureaucracy disposition, is that because individuals are ontologically 
prior to a community (and therefore any communal good such as a holistic public 
interest) realization of communications within a state occurs only in a simplified 
relational mode.89  As one person does not and cannot take precedence over another in 
liberal models of political thought, and because one’s expectation and action of 
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 Thanks to Phil Gray for a long discussion of relational communication and liberal political thought.  
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citizenship is no better or worse than another’s, and likewise, because no sovereign 
power (i.e., God or a “good” state) can rightfully intercede on moral or ethical grounds, 
all relations within the state, we presume to be best when they are “fought” as the war of 
one against another.  This war of one versus all others is done only on the grounds the 
individuals themselves choose and any third party intercession—any bureaucratic 
interference—is the imposition of an alternative reasoning not agreed upon in a prior 
(contractual) situation.  The disposition of anti-bureaucracy persists because the 
intercessory third party (bureaucracy) stymies the desire for all relations to be 
contractually determined prior to the act of relating.  Again, in this model, the citizen 
who acts “thickly” acts based on his or her own set of calculations of the good, which 
only by the acts of the invisible hand are the same as another.  The citizen who acts 
“thinly”, then, acts upon a set of goods (which the dispositional anti-bureaucrat assumes 
s/he is only mimicking without interpretation) not reasonably argued in the negotiation 
of a contract.  In this model, the bureaucrat is unreasonable as an ordinary citizen and 
therefore, out of the inter-relational system established. 
Ultimately, the anti-bureaucratic disposition toward citizenship argues against the 
possibility of a state at all.  That is, there can be no political community not predicated 
by a tenuous series of contractual positions.  This argument collapses the state in on 
itself by promoting the idea of the good citizen as a self-aggrandizing, rent-seeking, 
utility maximizer unless she or he is in a position to act upon others.  At the point where 
one citizen can act upon another, the possibility of being a good citizen in the previous 
model stops and the only possibility is that the bureaucrat who desires to be a good 
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citizen is the one who seeks to excise himself or herself from the bureaucratic situation 
and to return to his or her “natural” state as an atomized individual.  The good citizen of 
this state will always be the one running from the state itself.  For the anti-bureaucrats, 
acting “thickly” for the state is of a lesser order of good than is acting with a “thickly” 
individualist intention.   
The disposition of anti-bureaucracy, despite its lack of any singular coherent 
center, occasionally bears the markings of an ideology when we juxtapose the 
disposition against the empirical reality it purports to explain.  Hood (2005, 18) 
concisely comments, “Ideology is also often defined as a world view that is not readily 
‘disprovable’ by facts and events, because after every apparent failure the true believers 
can argue that the problem (whatever it was) arose because their preferred approach was 
not applied vigorously enough, rather than it was tried and failed.”  Often the ideological 
trappings of anti-bureaucracy emerge in the examination of particularly egregious cases 
of bureaucratic malfeasance (Adolph Eichmann (Arendt 1994; see also Benhabib 1988) 
and the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment).  However, these examples are but a small 
number of the routine “bureaucratic” acts that occur daily in any one nation, not to 
mention the universe of political events.  The dispositional argument withers when 
confronted with the bare empirical evidence of bureaucratic humanity and the evidence 
that ordinary citizens are often pleased with their experience with bureaucracy (Peters 
2001).  The disposition of anti-bureaucracy, when confronted with the empirical 
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evidence presented by ordinary politics rationally selected,90 either 1) becomes more 
ideological in its bases or 2) falls upon its own sword. 
 
The Values of Citizens as Values of Bureaucrats 
As alluded to above, a basic tendency of the anti-bureaucratic disposition is to 
believe that bureaucrats hold values inimical to those of the “ordinary” citizen.  Of 
course, the values of citizens are difficult to quantify and even more difficult to identify 
in relation to a stable lasting set of values held in common by all.  In fact, it is difficult to 
define the notion of a value held and the ideological tenets subscribed, in any meaningful 
way.   
Defining values requires defining the identities of the citizens of the nation.  In a 
highly pluralistic liberal society, this task of definition is quite problematic.  As citizens 
themselves differentiate, so do their values.  As Mooney summarizes well,  
the core values that stimulate morality policy debate are rooted deeply in a 
person’s belief system, determining how he or she defines himself or herself and 
his or her place in society.  These are the values of primary identity: race, gender, 
sexuality, and especially religion, which is for many people the basis of their 
most fundamental values.  Unlike more secondary identities, such as class and 
socioeconomic status, most people never even hope to change these primary 
identities, even in the socially mobile, optimistic US culture (Mooney 2001, 4).   
 
These primary identity markers shape the values of all citizens, and become an intrinsic 
part of the political environment in which bureaucrats play an integral part as both  
 
                                                 
90
 I say rationally selected here for a specific purpose, the language of the anti-bureaucracy disposition, 
despite its cast (in recent literature in particular) of neutral or scientific rationality, is often highly emotive 
and intended to provoke an emotional response and rejection from the reader.  The tendency towards 
promotion of an emotionally charged (and linguistically simplistic) analysis is a trapping of an ideological 
project rather than a scientific or “rational” one. 
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observers and citizens themselves. 
The identities of bureaucrats are, as Mooney (2001) and Golden (2000) allude to, 
multiple and characterized by primary and secondary factors.  Within their context as 
citizens alone, bureaucratic values follow the same primary and secondary value 
structures as could be expected of citizens.  Within their context as bureaucratic officials, 
the line between an individual’s primary and secondary values blurs.  Moreover, within 
the literature on bureaucratic “neutral competence” the line between primary and 
secondary, citizen and bureaucratic values evaporates.   
An attendant problem of defining bureaucrat versus citizen values arises when 
we try to capture the notion of bureaucratic values as embedded in the legal context in 
which they serve professionally and the “moral” and symbolic context in which citizens 
live their lives.  The reconciliation between the legal and moral context of government 
has been the subject of extended treatises on politics and is a central concern of the 
project of political and administrative theory as a whole.  This reconciliation has been 
performed through two modes.  The first one (which I call the Habermasian) constructs 
an ideal-typical situation of the political in which the two can be reconciled through the 
avenue of creating the communicative situation of politics in an ideal form.  The other 
(which I call the Oakeshottian) takes a more experiential approach that attempts, not to 
reconcile the two, but to explain them as distinct parts of the experience of political life 
altogether. 
The Habermasian mode of moral-legal union hinges upon the proper 
performance of communicative action according to discourse ethics.  To simplify the 
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argument here, the performance of intersubjective communicative action results from 
two social streams crossing.  The first is the creation of a lifeworld-based constitutional 
order in which the laws and norms of the state are continually reinforced through 
communication; and the second is the creation of a lifeworld-affirming moral 
consciousness (and order) in which the mores of the community is continually reinforced 
through the implicit norms of discourse ethics.  Since each of these streams hinge on the 
communicative situation, both morality and legality can be reconciled through reversion 
to the communicative situation and the performance of communicative action with an 
aim towards reifying both the moral and the legal elements of the lifeworld shared in 
common.  This ideal-typical construction is helpful in the project of reconciling 
bureaucrats and citizens as symmetrical forms through the realization of both as 
intersubjective participants in the communicative action situation.  The foundations of 
the goals/ values/ morals of bureaucrats are the same as the goals/ values/ morals of 
citizens because they arise from the same communicative substrate. 
Oakeshott does not attempt a project of moral-legal reconciliation as such.  In 
fact, he does not admit the possibility of a moral legal reconciliation because the two are 
fundamentally different states of political being in the modern state.91  To quote directly 
from Oakeshott (1993, 16-17): 
An absolute coincidence between conduct believed to be morally wrong and 
conduct which is prohibited by law is not to be expected anywhere; still less is it 
to be expected that there will be an absolute coincidence between conduct 
believed to be right and conduct enjoined by law.  Even where, as may be the 
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 He does suggest that morality and legality can unite, courtesy of fanatics (in Calvinist Geneva, for 
example) in a theocracy, but his implicit assertion in the passages on theocracy is that is it neither modern, 
nor a state. 
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case, there is no discord between what is enjoined or prohibited by law and what 
is believed to be right and wrong in human conduct, it is almost impossible for 
the moral beliefs of a community to be reflected in their entirety in its laws.  Law 
and morals normally have the same centre [sic] but not the same circumference.  
This absence of coincidence between law and morals may in some circumstances 
be small, as in the case of a theocracy whose law is itself a religious law and 
where every crime is recognized as a sin and every sin is proscribed as a crime, 
or the divergence may be considerable, as in the case of an association whose 
members subscribe to a variety of religious and moral beliefs and yet live under 
one law.  
 
Taking the Oakeshottian perspective on the problem, the values of bureaucrats are 
reflexive of the context citizen values, but only incompletely so.  As the citizen’s values 
themselves can never fully (as in the full expression of values at this time) be expressed 
in law, bureaucratic values can only be a reflection of the citizen values that were.  This 
makes the values of bureaucrats inherently conservative in themselves, but not 
necessarily inimical to the values of citizens at the present juncture.  The project of 
reconciling bureaucratic and citizen values becomes, then, not a project of asking 
bureaucrats to realize citizen values perfectly, but rather a project of asking the 
sovereign citizens to recognize their values completely themselves (and subsequently the 
request from legislatures that these recognized citizen values be codified quickly and 
completely).  The analogy of reconciling bureaucratic values and citizen values from the 
Oakeshottian perspective is tantamount to asking the mirror to reconcile with its 
opposite completely, despite its own form as a two dimensional space attempting to 
capture three dimensions. 
Returning to the point alluded to above, within a more Oakeshottian framework, 
the values of citizens and the values of bureaucrats can be reconciled through reference 
to their preferences for particular political and social states of being.  The reconciliation 
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of bureaucratic and citizen values, following the Oakeshottian model, is best done when 
bureaucratic values are realized to be an imperfect mirror of citizen values, which are 
constrained by differing (but not inimical or external) forces.  The recognition of the 
imperfect symmetry between citizen and bureaucratic values requires, however that the 
emotive and ideologically charged language of the anti-bureaucracy disposition be 
abandoned to the possibility of experience empirical validation. 
 
Bureaucrats as Citizen Peers 
Cooper (1991), in reviewing the historical tradition of citizenship in America, 
points out that the progression towards a more individualistic society following the 
American founding has resulted in a divorce of the notion of citizenship from the idea of 
citizenship as common-good promotion via public service.  This, as discussed above, he 
figures as part of the tradition of liberal atomized citizenship.  In his words,  
Although in the liberal tradition private citizens have no official roles and are left 
to pursue their own particular interests, there is another stream of thought which 
counters the limitations of this perspective.  Meiklejohn suggested that ‘we are, 
in fact, legislators and judges ultimately of the exercise of power wherever it 
occurs.  In this we are, to paraphrase Jefferson, all public agents, just as we are 
all private individuals, too’.  The responsibility of the citizen is not that of a 
participant in the market—engaging in a competitive struggle for maximum 
personal political benefits—but rather the responsibility of occupying a public 
office.  Citizenship as the public office of the individual member of the polity 
carries with it an obligation to consider the well-being of the polity as a whole 
(Cooper 1991, 138). 
 
While thus far I have emphasized that bureaucrats are, in fact, citizens, in this section, I 
argue that citizens, in turn, are bureaucrats.   
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 The notion of citizen-sovereignty in government suggests that citizens have a 
legitimate claim to direct the conduct of the state itself.  These claims necessitate that 
citizens can constrain their legislators and (per the statements above) constrain the actors 
of the executive.  Nevertheless, embedded in the notion of citizen-sovereignty is the idea 
that the citizen has a dominant place within the actualization of the state itself.  Whether 
the Habermasian or Oakshottian perspective is adhered to, citizens and their values have 
a place in the expression of the state that is equal to the state itself.  As the ab origio 
creators of the state (following sovereignty and Habermas, in particular), the citizens can 
occupy any office of the state without theoretical limit.92 
 Via the Habermasian construct, citizens have infinite opportunities for interaction 
with the state itself through the performance of communication.  Likewise, bureaucrats 
have virtually limitless opportunities for interaction through communicative 
performance.  That interpenetration of the citizen's sovereignty into the structures of the 
state influences the degree to which citizens, bureaucrats are conversant, and 
communicatively acting, the potential for citizen equality with bureaucrats becomes real.  
Through the combination of models of citizen sovereignty and the authorization/ 
legitimation of the state through intersubjective communicative action, the potential for 
equality between citizen-sovereign and bureaucrat in the hierarchy of the state is 
possible.  What are we to make of citizen-bureaucrat equality defined by the law? 
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 Practically, this is of course limited, as the public occupation of Nuclear Physicist in the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission requires some knowledge of nuclear physics for competence.  However, the 
limitations on who can take the opportunity to train to become a nuclear physicist are not legislated.   
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An intriguing problem of reconciling bureaucrats as citizens is that bureaucrats, 
as has been argued above, have greater levels of access to knowledge about the projects 
of the state.  By virtue of this information, they have particular constraints beyond those 
of citizens.  However, the information possessed by bureaucrats also renders them useful 
as citizen interlocutors in a communicative public sphere.  Bureaucrats, by virtue of their 
intimacy and proximity to the law, bring additional value—in the form of language, 
primarily—to the communicative situation that is value additive to the formation of the 
lifeworld held in common by discoursing citizens.  
 
Bureaucrats as Public Sphere Participants 
 To bring bureaucrats into the public sphere requires expansion of the content of 
its membership in two ways.  First, it requires a reworking of the idea of the bureaucrat 
as a peer regardless of status or knowledge disparities.  Second, it requires a reworking 
of the idea of the average public sphere discussant as someone endowed always already 
with the potential to be actualized into the procedural creation of the state.  In short, we 
must make bureaucrats ordinary citizens and ordinary citizens potential bureaucrats.   
 The importance of recasting the bureaucrat as citizen is more than just the project 
of reconciling empirical reality, survey results and the performance of a sed contra to the 
disposition of anti-bureaucracy.  The importance of reconciliation ties into the project of 
legitimating the state as a whole.  The slight of hand performed by adherents to the anti-
bureaucracy disposition to eliminate a full 10% (or more) of a nation’s population from 
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the privileges of citizenship serves, contrary to their arguments that the elimination of 
bureaucracy leads to democratic legitimacy, to de-legitimate the state.   
Specifically, the removal of the bureaucrat eliminates a significant number of 
minorities, non-elite class participants, and women from the process of public interest 
formation.  In addition, the elimination of the bureaucrat effectively silences the voice of 
those whose access points to democratic participation depends upon their interaction 
with bureaucracy.93  Although I address the recognition and communicative/facilitative 
function of bureaucrats later, I address the necessity of bureaucrats for the formation of 
the fully public interest here. 
 According to the argument laid out above, bureaucrats themselves are (simply) 
citizens employed in a vocation of service to the state.94  They are motivated to uphold 
the values of the state as their own but are also motivated towards the protection and 
progress (holistically) of the state which they serve. Specifically, the ideal bureaucrat 
seeks to uphold constitutional values (and their own constitutional oath), values of the 
constitutional community of citizens, and rights as values endowed upon all citizens.  
That is, bureaucrats seek to maximize the public interest and to perform as 
administrative conservators; they seek to uphold the values of the constitution itself.  
 The discursive project of public interest formation suggests that all persons must 
come together as equals to debate the matter of determining what is in the interests of all 
involved.  This project is essentially equalitarian in inputs and expected outputs. 
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 See note 59 for an example.  
94
 I use the term vocation here to indicate the taking of a professional capacity that affects the entirety of 
that person’s life.  Other persons (who may also be bureaucrats) who practice a vocation are physicians, 
police officers, and some clergy. 
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However, the role of the bureaucrat is to serve as an equal partner to the conversation 
and to bring the benefit of information and power proximity to the discussion.  The 
inclusion of those with “more” information or power proximity seemingly contradicts 
the objective or ideal situation of discourse as egalitarian peer communication.  
However, to say so requires the imputation of two inaccurate assumptions.  The first is 
that knowledge directly equals power (pace Foucault) and the second is that pure 
equality (in all arenas) is the only situation where discourse ethics and communicative 
action emerge fully.  
 The belief that knowledge differences are translatable directly into power 
differences collapses in those situations where individuals willfully commit to a 
framework of communicative action and resign their atomistic desires for individual gain 
and strategic action.  The argument made for the equation of knowledge as power also 
supposes that power is a coercive force only, and that in situations where knowledge 
equals power, knowledge is always coercive.  The fundamental argument in this line of 
thought is that human relations and government in particular, is the extension of 
blackmail by any means.  But what communicatively acting individuals—those that can 
be rightfully called part of the legitimate public interest forming community—have 
surrendered prior to even becoming communicatively competent (according to universal 
validation criteria) is the desire to commit blackmail.  The assumption that all politics 
and all interest formation processes are competitions between warring groups for the 
rights to blackmail (interest group theory), is a dreadfully Hobbesian sort of argument 
that borders on ideological real politick.  Just as we know that all bureaucrats are human, 
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we also know that humans are not a being exclusively motivated to blackmail   
Therefore, if bureaucrats can be described as citizens, and citizens as potential 
bureaucrats they (citizens as/and bureaucrats) can be motivated to use their knowledge/ 
power to ends more democratically facilitative and other-regarding than coercion and 
blackmail.  
 The second assumption that inhibits the acceptance of bureaucrats as participants 
in public sphere interest formation is that all discussants in the deliberative/ discursive 
situation must be equals on all grounds (relevant or not).  This is not expressly a 
requirement of the pure Habermasian discourse ethics, but rather comes from the 
misapplication of the Rawlsian criteria of justice to the understanding of deliberative/ 
discursive theories broadly.  Fortunately, Rawls himself (and some later discourse 
theorists, see James 2004) recognize the untenable nature of complete equality and offer 
an interpretation that equality of intent, combined with generally equality of position in 
the discourse, provides a suitable backdrop for discursive participation. 
 Rawls (or the later version of Rawls, anyway) reformulates the principle of 
justice as fairness to allow for a more nuanced view of the liberal person as one with 
many identities.  Consequently, he amplifies the insistence that all can have their 
individual attributes and benefits so long as the exercise of one particular persons’ 
benefits do not infringe upon (by either right or power) the life chances of another.  In 
this, he allows that one person’s handicap or another’s advantage does not make them 
any less a discursive liberal participant, so long as they respect that they cannot act with 
the strategic aim of advantage over one another.  The consequence to bureaucrats is that, 
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providing that they (along with ordinary citizens) do not act upon their advantage of 
knowledge, station, proximity to the law, or other potentially coercive strengths they can 
be legitimate discursive, justly acting, communicative participants in the public sphere 
formation process. 
 Granting, of course, that these are ideal standards, what bureaucrats bring to the 
discursive table is the information (vocabulary, facts) that lay outside of the shared 
lifeworld between citizens.  The bureaucrat, then, acting with his or her unique reflexive 
symmetry as both citizen and bureaucrat, brings the ability to frame, using skills of 
communicatively competent performance, the project of the state in multiple, 
individually specific, and community-affirming ways.  Bureaucrats as citizens facilitate 
the production of discourses of legitimacy by providing discursively valid and useful 
knowledge, as well as solutions, to the public interest formation process. 
 The place of the bureaucrat in the public interest is, then, more problematic than 
originally we might have thought.  That is, bureaucrats are engaged in the project of both 
making and taking the public interest standard (Jones, Greenberg, Kaufman and Drew 
1977; Fischer 2005; Forester 1999).  While this may seem initially to be more 
problematic than promising, if we look at the process of public interest formation, 
codification, and expression, we find that their dual pronged participation is actually an 
additional “safety valve” against legislative despotism or the tyranny of the majority.  
The realization that bureaucrats are discursive public sphere participants makes the 
necessary practice of bureaucratic interpretation less frightening, and perhaps good, 
considering the reality of legislative politics and policymaking.  
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CHAPTER V 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND THE PRODUCTION OF 
LEGITIMACY 
 
If administrative legitimacy is to be the measure of good government, as I argue 
throughout out it is, then the task of the administrative theorist is to posit ways to 
achieve legitimacy for both bureaucracy as democratic institution and democracy as a 
whole.  In the context of addressing the legitimation questions in public administration, 
an ideal-typical approach will necessarily be two-pronged—procedural and substantive.  
Here I will focus on the development of an ideal typical procedure for addressing 
legitimation questions in the context of administrative practice.  
The institutions of public administration are communicative institutions 
embedded in the project of maintaining the democratic state as such.  We can think of 
the importance of deliberation and communicative action to public administration in two 
interconnected but conceptually distinct ways.  Communication in a democracy requires 
procedural conditions for the development of substantively defensible results.  My work 
thus far has been focused on the substantive purpose—the formation of the public 
interest-- of discourse between citizens and the bureaucracy.  However, in this chapter, I 
focus more on the procedural conditions necessary for achievement of citizen-
bureaucratic discourse.  Specifically, I ask here, what are the necessary conditions of 
bureaucrat/ citizen discourse in a communicative context?  In addition, can this provide 
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an adequate normative defense of the practice of bureaucrat/ citizen deliberation as a 
“good” in a political system challenged by issues of illegitimacy? 
The communicative power indwelling in the letter and spirit of the law catalyzes 
the communicative practice of administration.  That power always already present in the 
constitutional state as part of the system and lifeworld, when captured at the 
administrative level, brings politics to the level accessible for the citizenry in a 
communicative form.  We find administrative power at the seam of the system and 
lifeworld; it is where communication in the modern welfare state occurs.  
Full accessibility of communicative channels for all is an initial substantive and 
procedural requirement for the communicative legitimation of the state.  As many 
citizens have limited accessibility to the fullness of legislative channels, in order to 
facilitate the project of legitimation, we must re-think communication at the more 
accessible level of public administration.  To do so requires reconsidering the theory of 
communicative legitimation of the constitution, as Habermas originally proposes.  
Specifically, it requires rethinking the concept of community vis-à-vis the role of the 
constitution and the perception of legitimacy to begin with.   
The procedures initially supposed in Habermas’ theory of communicative action 
are constructed at the level of societal and legislature-citizen interaction.  However, 
these hold for this theory of communicative action occurring at the level of 
administrator-citizen interaction.  It is not merely a “down shifting” of levels of analysis 
or conversation that is required here.  Rather, there are additional conditions placed upon 
the conduct of validating communicative action at the citizen-bureaucrat level.   
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To invoke Habermas directly, “To the extent that the law should normatively be 
a source of legitimation and not just a medium for the exercise of political authority, 
administrative power must remain bound to communicatively generated power” (1996, 
188).  Though this presupposes the existence of some always already present law that 
represents the communicatively generated power of a prior time, I argue that we must 
focus on the transmission, and transfiguration of law into enforceable rules as the key for 
founding a perception of legitimacy at the level of citizen engagement.  The task is not to 
remake the constitution but to ground those rules in communicative power as the 
legitimate validating foundation of the constitution as norm-generating instrument, itself. 
This task—the achievement of communicative legitimation of state action—is 
outside of the purview of expected actions on the part of public administrators operating 
in an instrumentally rational environment.  Communicative action has the intended 
purpose of achieving a synthesis of citizen-administrator beliefs about a regulative 
action’s legitimate foundation by forging a common understanding on the normative 
dimensions upon which legitimacy rests: truthfulness, sincerity, and rightness.  The 
product (to the extent it can be called such) of communicative action is that all partners 
to the situation will understand similarly the normative basis of an action sanctioned by 
the law, and importantly, will voluntarily comply with the law itself.  The achievement 
of communicative action is costly.  It is decidedly more costly than persuading another 
actor to act based solely on compulsion, threat, and external reward, or on other 
instrumentally rational grounds.  A synthesis of normative beliefs based on the 
 142 
deployment of communicative rationality entails a genuine convergence on a set of 
beliefs about the legitimate bases of the values of a rule or law.  
For public administrators, the facilitation of a truly communicative situation is 
more costly than merely compelling through force (economic, physical, and emotional) 
the compliance of citizen clients.  The costliness of communicative action arises from 
the conditions of the administrative environment, primarily its instrumentally rational 
orientation.  Public administrators steep in, and expectedly behave in such a way that 
reinforces a strategically or instrumentally rational position.  Consequently, by virtue of 
the rationality guiding public administration to begin with, they are constrained in their 
ability to engage in non-instrumentally rational action.95  These constraints, which come 
from both administrators’ principals and their clients themselves, inhibit public 
administrators’ range of deliberative options.  In addition, these constraints also force 
public administrators to operate in dual modes of rationality, which in practice are 
appear to be incommensurable at first glance. 
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 Here a brief example may suffice: according to rules of the Veteran’s Administration Hospitals, 
ancillary care specialists (Physical Therapists, Speech Therapists, Respiratory Care Specialists, and so on) 
are required to report billable hours to the facility based upon an expected range of professional services 
offered.  While there are categories such as “patient education”, “family education”, “patient 
development”, and “other”, there is not a billable category for “communication” or “explaining hospital 
policies.”  Nonetheless, these specialists are 1) bureaucrats of a sort, 2) engage actively with patients 
(citizens), and 3) are often involved in elaborating on policies.  That they must report billable hours using 
a highly rationalized system of rigid service categories inhibits them from engaging communicatively 
(read: with little other distraction than the task of discourse at hand) with patients on professional time.  
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Communicative Action, Procedure, and Consensus 
The question that asked of scholars suggesting a communicative approach is 
whether the groundwork or rules of argumentation in communicative action forge a 
stronger consensus between parties, particularly those parties with differing and 
divergent viewpoints.  As suggested above, the themes of the matter follow according to 
three broad world categories—objective, subjective and social—deliberated upon 
according to four antecedent rules—rationality, expressive efficiency, mutuality and the 
orientation towards understanding.  These conditions precede communicative action and, 
in part, precede consensus building. 
Consensus and consensus building are popular terms in contemporary political 
and public administrative scholarship.  Deriving weight from the turn towards more 
deliberative, discursive, or broadly participatory theories of democracy, consensus, and 
the arrival at consensus has a new and mounting normative weight.  Specifically, law, 
policy, or rule suggested to be “consensus based” lends that statement commendatory 
validity.  Encapsulated in the description “consensus based” is the expectation that 
particular democratic procedures encompass individual ontological equality, equality of 
voice, transparency, communally accessible forms of knowledge and epistemology, and 
equalitarian procedures for decision-making.  The commendatory weight of the term 
consensus based means that shared understandings and mutually acceptable procedures 
form the basis of the decision and that there is a shared understanding and mutual 
acceptance of the outcome of the decision.   
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Consensus in Habermas’ definition is a “shared interpretation of the situation” 
where “…a situation denotes a segment of a lifeworld that has been delimited in terms of 
a specific theme.  A theme arises in connection with the interests and objectives of 
actors.  It defines the range of matters that are relevant and can be thematically focused 
on” (2001, 134-5).  Decomposed etymologically, consensus is the “sensation with” 
shared among groups of subjects—consensus requires the sharing of interpretations 
(through our senses, one of which is the sensation of legitimacy) with others.  
Predicating arrival at such a shared sensory interpretation, known often as consensus 
building, is the idea of an orientation of participating individuals towards understanding.  
Individuals will engage in the process of determining those worldviews that are 
necessary for them to reach an understanding on a particular issue.  They will also 
exchange those explanations of orientations required for the development of an 
understanding deep enough to legitimate both the process and the substantive 
conclusion.   
Communicative action oriented towards understanding can encompass the task of 
making understood those bases for the appeal to a consensus, but can also provide the 
groundwork for the consensus building exercise itself.  It may be part of the consensus 
building process, but it is not a precondition for it.  Consensus building, and the 
establishment of a decision commendable for its adherence to legitimate process and 
consequent substance, is but a practical part of the full process of legitimation under 
conditions of communicative action.  Subsequently, we should think of the consensus 
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building process as part of a larger communicative action process of legitimating the 
regime in the broader sense. 
Decomposing the idea of communicative action, and more broadly the 
legitimation of government, into rigid procedures would do a serious injustice to the 
fullness of the concept itself.  Nevertheless, it is possible to describe the communicative 
action process within the framework of a procedure useful for the instrumentally rational 
context of public administration.  Though there may be alternative ways to demonstrate 
this, here I attempt to do so by summarizing communicative action as a rational 
process.96 
 
Understanding Communicative Action 
In general, communicative action is the purposeful exchange of speech-acts, or 
statements of both illocutionary and performative force, between peers in a given 
situation, with the goal of attaining mutual understanding of the material and normative 
conditions for conjoint action.  I will develop the following major points from this 
general guiding definition to elaborate on the components of communicative action to 
consider when discussing the communicative engagement on the part of public 
administrators.  To explicate a procedure for citizen-administrator communication, we 
must hold the following standards and objectives constant throughout—an appreciation 
for 1) rationality, 2) expressive efficiency, 3) mutuality, 4) and orientation towards 
                                                 
96
 Here I am following in the footsteps set by Knight and Johnson (1996, 1998) and Bohman (1998). 
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understanding.  These criteria, though broad, suggest limitations to communication that 
serve as procedural guidance for public administration. 
 
Regarding Rationality 
Habermas, have other thinkers in the modern tradition of political theory, makes 
much of rationality throughout his works, ranging from his theory of communicative 
action through his further theorization of society.  Indeed, the debate continues in the 
secondary literature on the central importance of rationality in Habermas’ theory of 
society and communicative action.97   
Although much debate persists over the validity of the rationality assumption for 
communicative action as social theory, the basic premises of Habermasian rationality are 
imperative for the incorporation of communicative procedures in the context of public 
administration.  To elaborate: irrespective of the rationality orientation of public 
administrative activity-- whether it is instrumental as is posited in the historical, 
positivist, and managerially literature on public administration, or constitutive as posited 
in the post-positivist, critical literature-- rationality as purposefully connected thought 
and action is a basic tenet of administration.98  The rationality assumptions of public 
administration demand an organization of speech and thoughts defensible according to 
standards such as efficiency, equity, cost, or benefit, in order to provide a defensible 
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 See for example, the articles in Calhoun (1992), Bohman and Rehg (1997), White (1995) and see also 
Heath (2001).  
98
 For an analysis of the typologies of rationality, their uses and abuses in public administration, see Cook 
(1996).  
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basis for action according to rationality standards.99  According to the rationality 
assumption of public administration, speech (rules) and action (patterns of enforcement) 
follow one another in a logical causal way.  This style of rationality is largely non-
controversial as an idea, though the application of rationality is sometimes not.  
A similar belief in the connection between thought and action guides 
Habermasian rationality in the context of communicative action: 
In contexts of communicative action, we call someone rational not only if he is 
able to put forward an assertion, and when criticized, to provide grounds for it by 
pointing to appropriate evidence, but also if he is following and established norm 
and is able, when criticized to justify his action by explicating the given situation 
in light of legitimate expectations.  We even call someone rational if he makes 
known a desire or an intention, expresses a feeling or mood, shares a secret or 
confesses a deed, etc., and is then able to reassure critics in regard to the revealed 
experience by drawing practical consequences from it and behaving consistently 
thereafter (1981, 15).  
 
Habermas reiterates and somewhat clarifies the connection of norm guided thought and 
action for communicative rationality more clear later in 1984,  
… The conditions of rationality can be explained in terms of the conditions for a 
communicatively achieved, reasonable consensus.  Linguistic communication 
that aims at mutual understanding—and not merely at reciprocal influence—
satisfied the presuppositions for rational utterances or for the rationality of 
speaking and acting subjects. … the rationality inherent in speech can become 
empirically effective to the extent that communicative acts take over the steering 
of social interactions and fulfill functions of social reproduction, of maintaining 
social lifeworlds.  The rationality potential in action oriented to mutual 
understanding can be released and translated into the rationalization of the 
lifeworlds of social groups to the extent that language fulfills functions of 
reaching understanding, coordinating actions and socializing individuals; it 
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 Stone (1997) elaborates on the connection between these ideas and the goals of public policy 
administration at some length.  
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thereby becomes a medium through which cultural reproduction, social 
integration, and socialization take place (1984, 86).  
 
In the context of social interaction, of which public administration is certainly a part, 
rationality is the hinge between thought and action.  Habermas proposes that rational 
thought is an internal dialogue that follows the patterns of argumentation held between 
two subjects.  The act of mutual reason giving allows such internal subjects to weigh 
decisions and to act on one or another rationally.  Embedded in the reason-giving task of 
thought in action is the norm of rationality.  The explicability of action is what renders it, 
ultimately, rational. 
 This explicative requirement of rationality persists in the thought of Dewey also.  
Specifically, as he comments in Democracy and Education,  
Reason is just the ability to bring the subject matter of prior experience to bear to 
perceive the significance of the subject matter of a new experience.  A person is 
reasonable in the degree in which he is habitually open to seeing an event which 
immediately strikes his senses not as an isolated thing but in its connection with 
the common experience of mankind (1961, 400).  
 
That we can connect our sensation of the world with the experiences of life (of which 
thought is certainly a critical part) that we have singularly and in common suggests that 
we can be, in Dewey’s sense rational.  That we can explicate this is in understandable 
forms to our fellows in common, suggests that we can be communicatively rational in 
Habermas’ sense.  
In terms of procedures in the administrative situation, the expectation of 
rationality mandates that specified, communicatively understood, rules guide actions.  
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For public administrators, particularly line or street-level administrators, the rationality 
requirement requires that they can defend the application of rules.  Rules to defend 
include those that are either quite specific, such as standards of admissibility to 
Medicare, or a more vague or contestable standards such as, the determination of mental 
retardation on the basis of IQ tests and/or tests of skill competencies according to a 
battery of documentary evidence coming from national, state, or local law and policy.  
They must be able to defend communicatively through reason giving, an action based 
upon the presence of documents that themselves are artifacts of previous communicative 
actions.  As a procedural constraint, public administrators at this level should be able to 
defend their actions based on pre-determined acts of speech (i.e., law) that apply 
specifically to the policies.  The rationality requirements of communicative public 
administration demand that speech (the policy itself and the original legitimating 
documents of the policy) support actions (execution of policy).  In addition to 
communicative competencies, the rationality requirement mandates (in line with 
Weber’s original dictum) the continuous presence of documentary evidence of decisions 
and prior actions as explanatory support for action.100 
 
Rationality as Exchange 
Rationality as a basic assumption entails further development, as there are a 
number of different types and typologies of rationality proposed in recent political and 
                                                 
100
 Max Weber, On Bureaucracy, specifically in the section Characteristics of Bureaucracy, points III and 
I.  See Weber (1997) pages 37-38. 
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administrative thought.101  As theorists from Stone (1997) to Shapiro and Green (1994) 
and Shapiro (2005) have made clear, the economic type of rationality has grown to 
dominate much of political and administrative thought.  Therefore, to attend fully to the 
rationality of communicative action in politics and administration, we must attend to the 
economic rationality assumptions within it.   
The procedure and procedural language used to develop an understanding of 
communicative procedure is similar to that used to describe market-based transactions.  
Consequently, when discussing communicative action, similar terminology may be used.  
In the description of market exchange relations, the terms “buyer” and “seller” obtain to 
depict particular player characteristics understood to be basic conditions of market 
transaction.  In the description of communicative exchange, the terms “speaker” and 
“listener” obtain to depict particular player characteristics understood to be basic 
conditions of the transaction.  We can regard the speaker as the seller and the listener as 
the buyer in most incidences, but with an important qualification.  In the communicative 
action situation, players can and must switch communicative roles—speaker becomes 
listener—in order to facilitate the use of communicative rationality.  In other words, 
there is a dialogical mutuality requirement to the acceptance of either role and both 
players must be willing, as a basic component of the communicative rationality 
assumption, to accept the role of the other as necessary to facilitation of understanding.  
                                                 
101
 The exploration of rationality, the types, and implications of rationality are all major components of 
political theory today.  As such, a complete catalog would be prohibitive.  Nevertheless, some interesting 
works that have shaped thoughts in this work include Farmer (1995), Shapiro and Green (1994) and 
Shapiro (2005), Stone (1997), and Wolin (2004).  
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The standard of mutuality suggests that both parties recognize that they are “in 
this together” and that neither can completely exit from the system (lest they were to 
commit a final exclusionary act such as suicide or radical separation from the original 
society).102  Habermas posits that mutuality is always already a condition of much of the 
communication that occurs in the context of modern constitutional democracies.  That is, 
the legitimacy conversations in the state are n-player games from which no one player 
can fully exit (barring conditions already listed which would be non-rational in the 
main), but any player can be more or less involved with at a given time or in a given 
situation.  Specifically, most parties will have been reared in the same environment, 
predisposing them to common experience, common language (to the extent that 
language includes symbols, gestures as well as vocabulary and grammar), and common 
appreciation for the ontological value of one vis-à-vis the other.103  This mutuality of 
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 Michael Walzer in Obligations (1970) makes the point that suicide is an ultimate act of denying ones 
political responsibilities and is, I think it could be extrapolated here, an act of radical exit. 
103
 These Habermasian assumptions of mutuality are also present strongly in Dewey’s estimation of 
conjoint action in a political society.  As relates to the mutuality of communication for democracy, Dewey 
has this point (among others that are a variation on this essential theme) to say: “… the realization of a 
form of social life in which interests are mutually interpenetrating, and where progress, or readjustment, is 
an important consideration, makes a democratic community more interested than other communities have 
cause to be in deliberate and systematic education.  The devotion of democracy to education is a similar 
fact.  …  Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a substitute 
in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created only be education.  …  A democracy is more 
than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated 
experience.  The extension in space of the number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each 
has to refer to his own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give point and 
direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race and national 
territory which kept men from perceiving the full import of their activity.  These more numerous and more 
varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an individual has to respond; the 
consequently put a premium on variation in his action.  The secure a liberation of powers which remain 
suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group which in its 
exclusiveness shuts out many interests” (Democracy and Education 1924, 100-101). Both Dewey and 
Habermas explicitly connect the establishment of genuine connections between members of the demos, 
through communication, with the maintenance of the ideal democracy.  Additionally, as will be elaborated 
upon later, both connect the development of mutual communication with the project of defining the 
common interest and legitimating the actions of the state according to this standard.  
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experience forms the basis of the lifeworld or resources of background knowledge held 
in common.   
As individual persons possess some access to knowledge of the common through 
the medium of shared experiences, they are able to make assertions of fact about the 
world they hold in common (e.g., we live in this space populated by you, others, and me 
simultaneously).  This ability to offer statements pertinent to the lifeworld allows each to 
exchange easily those meanings, symbols, and vocabulary foundational for deliberation.  
The established presence of some level of shared lifeworld allows for deliberation 
between persons of differing world-views (e.g. religious backgrounds) even before each 
is willing to commit to the task of openly communicating.  The discursive exchange of 
normative reasons for action allow the speakers to come to an agreement on acceptable 
grounds for legitimating actions each may take on behalf of the other or the community 
at large, even if the action taken does not satisfy either speakers highest instrumental 
desires. 
To the extent that each member of the society appreciates the symbols and 
meanings of the other (to appreciate the common in their common sense), then they can 
realize a mutual state of being (Kaufman-Osborne 1984, 1148; Habermas 1984, 22).  To 
elaborate, both public administrators and citizens must appreciate that each may have 
differing ways of expressing the same fact, term, concept, or need.  To the extent that a 
symbol or an act has consistent causes and consequences expressed in a meaning, each 
determines symmetrically, the players communicate as mutual, rational partners in 
communicative exchange mediated by appeal to the common sense of each.   
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Communicative action, though not instrumentally rational in the strictest and 
most economically precise sense, does involve exchange as typically understood in 
analyses of market transactions.  Communicative action entails bargaining and the trade 
of “linguistic commodities.”  In the market, players trade goods and services directly or 
indirectly with one another, intending to achieve the satisfaction of their needs or wants.  
Here an implicit recourse to contracts binds players to exchange with one another 
according to implicit rules of transaction such as the utilization of currency, bills of sale, 
and returns of merchandise and so on.  The contractual terms that players agree to in 
market transaction include: 1) sanction and punishment for non-compliance with explicit 
and implicit terms and 2) an expectation of continued transaction.  Ordinary market 
transactions, while often conceived of as “one-shot” forms of non-normative interaction, 
are in practice iterative and the normative-contractual terms of the market stipulate that 
reputational benefits of recurring transaction have bearing upon subsequent transactions.  
Therefore, there is an additional criterion: 3) no player will undermine the system 
because stable market-transactions are critical for the attainment of each player’s 
understanding of the “good life.”104   
In the communicative market place, as in the economic market place, statements 
exchanged have written into their grammar particular contractual obligatory 
components.  Specifically, the illocutionary component of statements made between 
players—the assertive, expressive, or regulative (imperative) force of the statements—
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 The association of market access to the achievement of the good life will not appear here.  Such a 
connection seems to be a “given” in much of political thought since the early Greeks.  Note Aristotle’s 
argument that the attainment of human excellence is tied to the engagement in exchange of material and 
immaterial goods which one has produced in a market forum.  
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instructs the listening player how s/he ought to respond to the speaker’s statement.  The 
performative element provides clues to the listener what materials s/he is to use to satisfy 
the speaker’s statements.  In this, the speaker offers to the listener clues and directions 
for conducting actions that follow from the desire to fulfill the request embodied in the 
statement.  In exchanging speech-acts, the speaker and listener obligate each other to 
fulfill contractually requests and accept actions, given the information supplied in the 
speech act.  By being a speaker, the player obligates him or herself to providing the 
explanatory conditions and justifications for making the initial requests.  By being a 
listener, the player obligates him or herself to fulfilling the request based upon the 
information given.   
In this situation, while it would be most efficient to assume complete information 
on the part of both players, as is done in much modeling of pure economic transactions, 
such an assumption cannot hold.  In the communicative action situation, information 
asymmetry is a given pre-condition, equivalent to the asymmetric ownership implied in 
the original market condition.  This condition in pre-given as the very possibility and 
very need for achieving understanding requires that players do not have symmetrical 
information on all knowledge dimensions.  Specifically, while a speaker may have an 
understanding of the objective world, s/he may not have complete understanding of the 
social or subjective worlds.  It is, in part, because of the condition of asymmetry that we 
must consider the role that obligations play in understanding speech-acts. 
To provide an example: Player A instructs player B to “pick up your shoes off of 
the table.”  In this, speaker A offers to B a statement with the illocutionary force of an 
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assertion (move x object in y direction)—she desires B to act in such a way that the 
material conditions (the shoes will no longer be on the table but will be up from the 
table) will change according to her instructions.  In this statement, player A gives the 
propositional statement that it is the shoes of player B to act upon in a directionally 
determinate way.  In putting forth this speech-act, player A has entered the following 
contractual terms for player B to accept “if you act in such a way that your shoes are no 
longer there (on the table), I will be satisfied” and “I have been honest with you that it is 
your shoes that I wish to be moved, not the cat.”  Just as players enter the market place 
with an expected vocabulary held in common of buy, sell, trade, money, and so on, in 
this example exchange of the shoes, the players have an expectation of a shared 
vocabulary that each has committed to that contains material, directional, normative and 
contractual elements.  In this setting, if both players are to be satisfied—player A 
satisfied that her place-setting is free of player B’s shoes and player B satisfied that he 
has satisfied player A’s conditions (and not incurred the sanctions of not performing 
player A’s request)—then each must have this background knowledge held in common 
and must abide by the implicit contractual terms of the communicative exchange.   
In this and other communicative action situations, however, each player has the 
ability to contest (on yes/no grounds) the validity of statements of the other.  To revisit 
the example: by instructing player B to remove his shoes from the table, A is offering to 
B the opportunity to contest the validity of A’s statement through the following 
embedded questions: “are those my shoes?”, “are those shoes”, “is that a table?”, “is it 
right that the shoes should be moved?”, “is it right that you should request of me to 
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move the shoes?”, “are you sincere in asking me to move the shoes/ will you be satisfied 
if I move the shoes?.”  Using this series of questions, speaker B can challenge speaker A 
on individual points or may summarily reject or accept the conditions and (not) move the 
shoes.  Yet, in doing so, player B is then obligated to follow through with his validity 
questioning and must provide the material and normative conditions necessary to back 
his own claim of invalidity on A’s part.  In summary, in the communicative action 
setting, players engage in communicative exchange, just as they would exchange to 
satisfy material needs in an economic exchange, but here with the intent of satisfying the 
need for understanding and reach an agreeable position.  
 
Speech Acts 
Though I have introduced the basic components of a speech-act—the 
illocutionary and propositional elements—I give here a few more specifications in order 
to fully understand the interaction of speech-acts in a rational framework.  Speech-acts 
are potentially useable in the context of promoting legitimation projects because they 
communicate performatively to each participant the states of subjective being and 
interest and because they do this publicly, or within the objective and social worlds.  As 
knowledge is tri-partite in Habermas’ estimation, we can conceptualize information 
asymmetry as a multi-dimensional concept and must conceptualize understanding as the 
synthesis of multiple dimensions.  This factor introduces the necessity that speakers and 
listeners in the situation offer full disclosure to the best of their understanding.   
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Speech acts, when exchanged publicly as is required by the very nature of actions 
purposively oriented towards the development of understanding, are generative of the 
three forms of knowledge Habermas supposes make up the types of human knowledge.  
The public character of speech-acts, as formulated by Habermas is essential to the 
project of understanding, and is critical for any efforts at modeling communicative 
action within the boundaries of the requirements of communicative rationality.  As 
Heath has argued, 
In Habermas’ view, speech acts by drawing upon a set of shared linguistic 
resources, necessarily involve the agent in a set of public commitments, and 
therefore cannot be modeled instrumentally.  In Habermas’ terms each speaker 
raises a set of ‘validity claims’ through her utterances, claims that can only be 
redeemed through appeal to public justificatory resources.  To understand the 
utterance is, in this view to know the conditions under which these validity 
claims could be redeemed.  Thus public accountability is an intrinsic feature of 
linguistic communication. For Habermas, this serves as the basis for the division 
of action into two primitive analytic types: instrumental action and speech acts. 
He argues that these two forms of action correspond to two different ‘stances’ 
that the agent can take toward others. Instrumental action involves a simple 
concern with the success of action. Communication, on the other hand, requires 
that the agent adopt what Habermas calls the performative stance. The adoption 
of this stance commits the agent in a series of idealizing presuppositions.  So 
while the success of an instrumental action rests in the attainment of its 
objectives, the success of a speech act rests in the achievement of mutual 
understanding (i.e., acceptance of the commitments undertaken) (2001, 19). 
 
Due to their non-instrumental nature, speech acts are not understandable formally.  The 
motivating factor for speech acts are outcomes or objective goals derived from a priori 
sources such as private motivations.  
Likewise, speech-acts outside of social contexts are incomprehensible.  By 
outside of social contexts, I mean that speech acts understood as individual dialogues 
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(such as Augustinian thought) is the province of one individual alone, or outside of the 
context of coordination.  All speech acts, because of their public character, oriented 
towards the goal of reaching mutual understanding (einverständnis), are part of the 
coordination of social action.  That we are able to coordinate actions indicates that we 
have communicated to each other publicly and with the assumption of mutual 
obligation.105  That we achieve legitimately based coordination of action indicates that 
we have engaged in communicative action.  On the other hand, if we have achieved 
coordination through neglecting some actors who may not share in the normative 
understanding of the legitimate bases of the action, we have engaged only strategically.  
To model speech acts, it cannot be that an actor achieves an individual outcome without 
the input of another’s participation and outcome.  Further, in the context of speech act 
legitimation we must accept as a basic condition that each player will be monitoring the 
next for his or her redemption of the obligatory promises each has put forth in the 
original speaking moment.  
As Habermas supposes there are three types of validity claim to be redeemed 
within the context of communication—truth, rightness, sincerity arising from the 
nature of the speech act the speaker uses (assertion, regulation- imperative or 
expressive).  When an agent asserts that a given state of affairs obtains, she 
claims to do so truthfully. When she expresses the intention to perform a 
particular action, she claims to do so sincerely.  And when she requests that the 
other perform an action, she claims to do so ‘rightly’ that is legitimately, or with 
authorization.  Thus, corresponding to the three basic speech act types are three 
validity claims: truth, rightness, and sincerity.  Understanding the speech act 
involves understanding the conditions under which the appropriate validity claim 
is satisfied: what state of affairs would have to obtain for the agent’s assertion to 
                                                 
105
 In some of Habermas’ work, he makes the case that the enforcement of communicative norms may 
occur through recourse to a third party (a public) with the ability to participate and enforce the terms of the 
communicative contract.  I will not deal with this here, as the insertion of a third party enforcement power 
to the model would make it ever more complex.  
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be true.  What actions the agent would have to perform in order to be considered 
sincere, and what norms would have to be in force in order for the agent’s 
suggestion to be legitimate (Heath 2001, 31). 
 
We can suppose that in a speech act, reason-giving, communicative situation, that 
players will monitor each other on these three dimensions.  That is a necessary (but off-
putting perhaps) requirement that must be dealt with in modeling full understanding and, 
importantly for the context of this chapter, setting up the conditions to understand the 
rationality possibility of communicative action in public administration. 
 
Expressive Efficiency 
The rationality assumption, coupled with the tripartite knowledge structure 
requires that actions must be defensible via speech-act using documents and multi-
dimensional communication of legitimating documents, procedures, and speaker 
positions.  However, there is an additional standard of rationality in the context of 
citizen-administrator communication in acts of public administration.  The standard, I 
suggest is expressive efficiency.  According to the Habermasian standard of rationality 
in communicative engagement, other forms of validation are acceptable beyond merely 
the production of validated documentary evidence, such as is the first preferable route of 
defense in public administration.  Specifically, Habermas accepts that other modalities of 
expression are useful for the context of communicative action.  Though Habermas does 
not specify at great length the content of these additional modes of rational validation, 
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these, I argue, following Warren (1996), and Dewey (1924, 1927), may include the 
appeal to authority, the appeal to emotion, and the appeal to values of community.   
The use of documentary evidence falls well into the appeal to authority category.  
However, there is a caveat implied by expressive efficiency.  The standard of expressive 
efficiency requires use of the best means of validation in the first resort.  The “best” 
means of validation are those that minimize time used while maximizing explanation.  
The use of documentary evidence supported by direct, means-ends deliberation about the 
meaning of concepts or expressions therein is the “best” method for use in the first 
resort.  In this, administrators explain concepts using additional documents and/or direct 
verbal explanation in language that is consciously aware of the depth of shared 
knowledge between the parties.  Documents offered need to be in the order from those 
pertinent to the situation, to those broader, to those broader still.106  Explanation should 
go from the particular to the general as the level of abstraction employed in 
constitutional law arguments (for example) may obscure or overshoot the level of 
analysis or explanation asked for or required by the citizen.   
Likewise, the explication of constitutional legal arguments may overrun the 
ability of the administrator.  Expressive efficiency as a standard places limits on the level 
of argumentation used, which by extension limits the uses of argumentation available to 
each administrator alone.   
                                                 
106
 A full classification of documents cannot be provided here.  Nevertheless, a simple typology would 
range from local ordinances, to county policies, to state laws, to agency authorization policies, to federal 
law, and finally to the constitution. 
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The generality that constitutes the meaning of a rule can be represented in any 
number of exemplary actions.  Rules lay down how someone produces 
something: material objects, or symbolic formations such as numbers, figures, 
and words….  Thus one can explain the meaning of a constructive rule through 
examples.  This is not done by teaching someone how to generalize inductively 
from a finite number of cases.  Rather, one has grasped the meaning of a rule 
when one has learned to understand the exhibited formations as examples of 
something that can be seen in them.  In certain situations, a single example can 
suffice for this: ‘It is then the rules which hold true of the example that make it 
an example’.  The objects or actions that serve as examples are not examples of a 
rule in and of themselves, so to speak; only the application of a rule makes the 
universal in the particular apparent to us (Habermas 1984, 16). 
 
On the other hand, appeals to constitutionality of a rule are not useful for a first defense.  
Constitutional appeals merit use only after appeals to specific documents and cases have 
failed.   
The reasoning behind this rule lies in the limited nature of knowledge that both 
parties will have.  Though citizens and administrators can understand one another as 
parts of the whole society, each has graduated knowledge of the context of the other 
(though because of the socialization of the lifeworld, each knows at least enough to 
communicate with the other).  Because of this graduated knowledge, particularly on the 
side of the administrator given administrative intimacy with the law relative to the 
citizens, recourse to constitutional legal arguments in the first instance will serve to 
stymie further legitimation discussion, as it will overrun the ability of the citizen-listener 
to serve as a speaker in the reciprocal instance.    
The basic expectation of peer-to-peer knowledge also supposes a peer-to-peer 
commitment (as has been elaborated above regarding exchange relations), meaning that 
a speaker who intentionally goes outside of the listener’s ability to hear and reciprocate 
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as speaker has disengaged from communicative action commitments and is acting 
strategically. 
Communicative action is able to secure social integration because it is 
underwritten by a set of commitments made by all participants to justify the rules 
that they follow and expect to be followed.  But, these commitments can easily 
outrun any participants’ actual ability to redeem them.  In fact, given the 
structure of Habermas’ speech act theory, the commitments that agents make 
when engaged in communicative action necessarily outrun their actual capacities 
to redeem them (since every speech act is said to raise three validity claims).  As 
a result, agents explore these commitments and the set of possible justifications 
only when they are explicitly challenged to do so or when one of the rules they 
are following becomes problematic (Heath 2001, 43). 
 
The standard of expressive efficiency goes both ways—it is not solely the role of 
the administrator to abide by the requirements of expressive efficiency.  Citizens should 
utilize defensible reasons—those reasons that can be deliberated upon by actors sharing 
the same life world—in the first resort.  Specifically, the assertion that a standard of 
admissibility to the Medicare program should not be challenged on rules of 
constitutionality in the first instance, but should initially be challenged on the basis of 
the case at hand.  Both parties should be prepared to defend themselves at the highest 
level if it happens, but neither should expect it at first.  
However intuitive and restrictive the requirement of expressive efficiency may 
seem, the appeal to emotion may fit the standard if used as is appropriate based upon the 
case.  The appeal to emotion must follow the standard of expressive efficiency in the 
following way: non-emotional evidence should be utilized in the first resort, but as the 
answers (on either side) are found wanting, emotions my be allowed to enter so long as 
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the deployment of emotion does not cause the conversation to transition from a 
communicative action to a strategic action.  That is, emotions are not a means to achieve 
success when reason-giving argumentation fails.  Emotions are damaging in a 
communicative action framework if deployed as a means to success rather than the 
establishment of deeper isomorphic understanding.  The requirement that 
communicative action remain the norm is restrictive for the use of emotions such as 
rage, anger, jealousy, or even happiness.  However, to the extent that the deployment of 
emotion exposes tensions in the fabric of the lifeworld shared between the parties, it may 
be used.  Emotions provide additional information to assist speakers in the conveyance 
of information itself.  It can augment the stated needs of individuals to have rules/norms 
made valid to them.  Appeals to emotion fit the standard of expressive efficiency and 
rationality if used to point to holes in the background knowledge shared between the 
parties.  If they offer additive value to the task of interpretation, emotional appeals are 
useful.  
The task of interpretation can now be specified as follows: the interpreter learns 
to differentiate his own understanding of the context—which he at first believed 
to be shared by the author but in fact falsely imputed to him—from the author’s 
understanding of the context.  His task consists in gaining access to the 
definitions of the situation presupposed by the transmitted text through the 
lifeworld of its author and his audience.  … He seeks to understand why the 
author- in the belief that certain states of affairs obtain, that certain values and 
norms are valid, that certain experiences can be attributed to certain subjects—
has made certain assertions in his text, observed or violated certain conventions, 
expressed certain intentions, dispositions, feelings, and the like.  Only to the 
extent that the interpreter grasps the reasons that allow the authors utterances to 
appear as rational does he understand what the author could have meant.  … 
Thus the interpreter understands the meaning of a text only to the extent that he 
sees why the author felt himself entitled to put forward (as true) certain 
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assertions, to recognize (as right) certain values and norms, to express (as 
sincere) certain experiences (Habermas 1981, 131-132). 
 
The utilization of appeals to emotion in this way brings in the last point about the 
standard of expressive efficiency as an amendment to the rationality standard.   
In a plural society, particularly one founded in part on republican values such as 
the US, the values of the community form an important part of the lifeworld, a precursor 
necessary for the establishment of the public sphere, system, and further communicative 
action for legitimacy.  The appeals to the values of the community also come with 
caveats and standards for utilization.  On the administrative side, the argumentative point 
“that is the way that we do this here” is too thin an appeal, based on only limited values 
inaccessible to all.   In order to be legitimate, elaboration must be available to provide 
the citizen knowledge about who “we” is, why “we” are different from “them” (and who 
the parties are in reality), and why “this” can or does vary by situation.  On the citizen’s 
side, the argumentative point that “this [rule] does not apply to me/us” requires the 
definition of “me/us” be specific in reference to terms that posit the “me/us” as unique in 
ways meaningful for the context.   
For the utilization of appeal to community values, both sides must be willing to 
engage one another based on deconstructing the ontology and epistemology of the 
communities they purport to represent.  That is, both parties must be able to self-define 
their ontology in such a way that their epistemological assumptions that characterize 
their definitions of being are clearly comprehensible to an outside party.   
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For administrators, this means substantiating the origins and depth of their 
expertise or positions to citizens.  This, in practice, entails more than explanations of 
“because I have X set of credentials and you don’t”, it includes offering statements of 
explicit credentialing as well as the offering of experiential knowledge between the 
actors.  There should be reflexive sharing of expert bases for decisions—specifically, 
each speaker should be willing to offer their fields of expertise as provisionally valid for 
the situation while accepting as provisionally valid the expertise claims of the other 
participants.  This entails reflective listening on both participants’ parts, particularly 
listening of the part of the administrators to the citizens’ experience under the system as 
expertise (Fischer 2005).  
Unfortunately, the amendment for expressive efficiency has consequences for 
those persons who define their ontology, epistemology, and emotional lives based on 
non-reason-giving argumentative points, such as being part of a “chosen people”.  
Religion and religious values are difficult to subsume into this communicatively acting 
framework.  In other words, in addition to a rationality requirement, Habermasian and 
public administrative rationality includes an implicit secularist requirement.  However, 
the standard of expressive efficiency, wherein speakers must use defensible reasons in 
the first instance suggests that religious reasons (or reasons of revelation similarly 
oriented), does offer some argumentative room for validation between parties of 
differing religious orientations.  However, the utilization of such grounding must be 
done after recourse to other deliberative forms have been exhausted.  Even then, the 
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stricture of rationality and expressive efficiency limits the utilization of religiously based 
argumentation.107 
 
The Orientation Towards Understanding 
Grounded in rationality and expressive efficiency employed on both sides, 
mutuality and speech-act formation founds the final requirement of an orientation 
towards understanding.  In much of Habermas’ own work, and indeed in much of the 
secondary literature, the importance of the orientation towards understanding cannot be 
understated.  Understanding (einverständnigung) is the final objective of communicative 
action.  As a final requirement, it must encapsulate all of those standards that provide the 
make up for it.  Although I have utilized differing terminology in order to provide 
additional specificity, we can look to Habermas for a similar description of the multi-
layered nature of the orientation towards understanding necessary for communicative 
action.  
Communicative action relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in which 
participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the social, and 
the subjective worlds, even when they thematically stress only one of the three 
components in their utterances.  Speaker and hearer use the reference system of 
the three worlds as an interpretive framework within which they work out their 
common situation definitions.  They do not relate point-blank to something in a 
world but relativize their utterances against the chance that their validity will be 
contested by another actor.  Coming to an understanding [verständigung] means 
that participants in communication reach an agreement [einigung] concerning the 
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 The difficulty of reconciling revealed orientations to life and understanding with a priori secularist 
(modernist) rationality is a major concern for theorists of administration and politics.  While I 
acknowledge the importance of this, the space necessary to elaborate upon this would consume the better 
portion of the present project and must wait until later. 
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validity of an utterance; agreement [einverständnis] is the intersubjective 
recognition of the validity claim the speaker raises for it (1984, 120). 
 
Speakers and hearers, public administrators and citizens and vice versa, must deploy 
speech and action according to rationality, expressive efficiency (in its attendant parts), 
and mutuality with one another if they are to reach a common understanding.   
The appeal to multiple worlds of interpretation allows for speakers and hearers to 
reach a deeper understanding.  Yet, in the situation of developing an understanding on 
rules legitimate for both parties, the matter of arriving at a consensus position becomes 
problematic.  It is in the development of a consensus position of understandings between 
persons that we run into the great difficulty of using communicative action in public 
administration.  Specifically, how do we import an action oriented towards 
understanding into a system where instrumental success is the measure of the 
“legitimacy” of the system as it is in public administration? 
 
“Between-ness” 
I have given the basic definitions of illocution and performance and will here 
move on to the seemingly innocuous “between” in the primary definition given above.  It 
is a basic assumption in the structure of political theory that players are at least 
committed to participation in politics.108  This basic simplifying assumption not only 
                                                 
108
 Such is also an assumption in game theoretic models: theorists here take as a given point that the 
imaginary players are similarly interested and committed to engaging in the game at all.  This assumption 
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belies the genuine complexity of modeling commitment problems, but also makes 
modeling acts of coordination that are more than purely strategy based quite difficult.  
Much of this problem of commitment has been “resolved” by the introduction of 
cooperative gaming and non-strategy solutions, but these innovations still retain a basic 
rationality assumption (namely, individual instrumentalism) that must be altered to 
understand and model the between required of communicative action.   
Habermas’ between is the realization of a position of full mutual understanding 
where the players can rationalize the world together.  The between-ness required in 
communicative action is shared or ‘held in common always already’ in the decision 
situation.  To re-invoke Dewey, it is the presence of a symbolic vocabulary of common 
sense.  To follow Habermas, the between required is in his original formulation of the 
discourse and universalization principles.   
The discourse principle states that “Only those norms are valid that meet (or 
could meet) with the discursive approval of all affected,” where discourse means the 
argumentative testing of the rightness, truthfulness and or sincerity of the grounds for 
action.109  It is the participation of both—participatory sharing of claims and 
counterclaims to validity—that fosters discursive approval or, in other words, the 
approval of a norm held subsequently between the players.  The universalization 
                                                                                                                                                
may be, in some ways, faulty and may avoid the most important question, namely “How do we get people 
to the table at all?” 
109
 This is a discussion of the form of practical discourse rather than ethical discourse.  Habermas himself 
makes a considerable distinction between practical and ethical discourse that I will leave to the side here.  
I take as given in the administrative legitimation context that practical discourse will be the primary form 
of discourse.  Ethical discourse I suggest (following the distinction provided by Habermas) is the province 
of constitution making and the authorization of a society itself, not the legitimation of subsequent rules 
issuing there from.  
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principle states, “A norm is valid if and only if all affected can accept the consequences 
and side effects its general observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of 
everyone’s interests”.  Implicit in the universalization principle is a preference ordering 
of players that is non-strategic in the pure sense; players may re-optimize their 
preferences in subsequent iterations in order to satisfy the universalization principle and 
promote the sense of between-ness required to satisfy the strictures of communicative 
action. 
 
Given and Provisional Situations 
Fifth and lastly, we must explore the condition of a given situation.  Habermas, in 
part because of his theory of “knowledges” and human understanding, proposes that our 
achievement of understanding can only be done in a given context or situation because 
our knowledge does not permit our discourses to be all-encompassing.  Here we can hear 
echoes of Dewey again.  Specifically, Dewey’s conceptualization of reaching 
understanding, as must be done in a democracy, requires that we deliberate on the shared 
experience of a given situation.  We discourse on those topics that, per our interests, 
experiences and needs, require explanation and legitimation.  We do not ask for the 
validation of norms given for topics which have not affected us or do not affect us, nor 
can we apprehend in a discourse participatory way whether the norms that ground an 
assertoric, regulative or expressive statement of something we are uninterested or 
inexperienced in are right, sincere or true.  For forging mutual understanding, we “use” a 
given, limited situation where peers have an equal opportunity for experiencing the 
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situation as well as an equal interest in participation.  Without each of these 
characteristics, the necessary equal potential for reaching a horizon of symmetrical 
understandings on the three dimensions of understandable speech-acts is unattainable.   
Additionally, when understanding the knowledge that each player brings to the 
situation, as well as the knowledge each may obtain through the communicative action 
discourse, the requirement of provisionality must also obtain.110  Specifically, 
provisionality suggests that knowledge changes in accordance with the situation.  The 
provisionalism requirement is not inserted to provide an outlet for historicism or 
relativism as crutches for explaining recourse to strategic action, but rather a requirement 
that allows that players’ knowledge to be adaptive.  Consequently, in the communicative 
action situation, the players must approach the initial conditions as cooperative and 
adaptive with respect to knowledge development between them.   
The boundedness of knowledge within given situations must also be understood 
as a temporal restraint.  Specifically, although dialogues of legitimation could potentially 
go on forever (particularly if we insert the notion of a corresponding ethical discourse to 
accompany the practical discourse) to understand the rationality of communicative 
action, it must be stated that the dialogue will cease once all persons agree to agree.111  
The temporal requirement of the cessation of conversation when einverständnis seems to 
obtain for all players on all knowledge dimensions may limit conversations and may 
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 See Ellis (2004) for a description and definition of provisionalism and how this interacts with 
democracy and democratic theory.  
111
 Here I recall Warren’s (1996) quotation: “Democracy is not an endless committee meeting.”  
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predispose recourse to strategic action in the final analysis, but this requirement should 
be inserted as a corresponding requirement of given situations.   
 
A Summary of Communicative Action as Procedure 
To summarize, in order to engage in communicative action, we must bear in  
mind the following requirements:  
1) Communicative action is engagement on multiple dimensions where players monitor 
one another’s statements 
1a) monitoring is tripartite on each dimension of illocutionary force and 
communicative redemption 
 1b) monitoring for the rightness of normative regulative-imperatives 
 1c) monitoring for truthfulness of objective assertions 
 1d) monitoring for sincerity of expressions of social context 
2) Communicative action must be cooperative and adaptive 
 2a) rationality assumptions are mutual and communicative, not individual and 
instrumental 
 2b) the outcome of communicative action is cooperation itself 
2bi) communicative action outcomes can precede the construction of 
instrumental action in order to resolve initial commitment issues 
2bii) measurement of cooperative outcomes is non-instrumental 
2c) communicative action is iterative games; communicative action cannot be one-time 
2ci) in order to achieve adherence to the discourse and universalization 
principles, players may re-optimize vis-à-vis each other for subsequent iterations 
2cii) re-optimization that is non-cooperative (not oriented to satisfying U) is a 
communications ending move as it renders future action on the part of the re-
optimizing player strategic (non-communicative) 
3) Players must be equal 
 3a) equality of moral being  
 3b) equality of knowledge potential 
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 3c) players have information asymmetries between them as a given condition 
3ci) measurement of information asymmetry according to the tripartite structure 
of knowledge 
3cii) players have an interest asymmetry that is proxy measured by player 
knowledge 
 3d) players are equally committed to engagement in communicative action 
3di) players have an equal belief in the benefit of legitimacy and mutual 
understanding 
3dii) players have an equal desire for the legitimacy and mutual understanding 
 3e) players have equal capacity for attaining mutual understanding 
4) Construction of communicative action for a given situation 
 4c) discourse may cease upon achievement of communicative action-- when players 
acknowledge to one another that they have achieved einverständnis on the three horizons 
of knowledge 
 4d) the knowledge of a given situation is provisional 
 
Communicative Action in Public Administration 
 The initial purpose of communicative action is to coordinate action.  To do so in 
a climate of legitimacy, there must be discursive argumentation about the norms that 
guide and underpin the actions subsequent.  The imperative of coordination cannot be 
relaxed or alienated from the full model.  Nevertheless, because we model 
communicative action iteratively, we can relax the ‘coordination of output assumption’ 
in early individual iterations of the model.  In the final game, however, the coordination 
of output must be the final measure of communicative action in public administration 
contexts.   
As scholars of contemporary governance and network management make clear, 
implementation (the act of policy administration) is about the coordination of action 
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between multiple players.112  Administration of a given rule in a social environment 
cannot occur without the initial task of coordinating the objective, social and subjective 
worlds of the players involved (Grin and van de Graaf 1996).  In the administrative 
context, coordination and cooperation require that both the citizen player and 
administrative player come to understand their position vis-à-vis the outcome 
(compliance in the case of regulation) as co-productive.  We can define co-production as 
a productive pattern of relationships between actors (providers and consumers), 
governed by a system of formal and informal rules reinforced through cooperative 
interaction, where neither player can achieve optimal outcomes without the effort and 
input of the other (Lam 12, 16-17).  Successful co-production must necessarily be 
communicative as it necessitates the convergence of outcome goals between multiple 
actors and requires an appreciative stance of each player with respect to the others.   
In the elaboration of communicative action, the players are speakers and 
listeners.  In the administrative context, we define them as citizens and administrators.  It 
is important here to note that these actors will retain the critical assumptions of speaker 
and listener, most significantly the ability of each to assume the role of the other.  
Consequently, the use of citizen denotes “administrator-citizen” and administrator 
denotes “citizen-administrator”113  In the context of legitimation narratives and the 
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 “Governance relates to any form of creating or maintaining political order and providing common 
goods for a given political community on whatever level” (Risse 2004, 289).  “Governance is the way the 
government gets its job done” (Kettl 2002, xi).  “Governance is a way of describing the links between 
government and its broader environment—political, social, administrative” (Kettl 2002, 119).  
“[Governance] is the processes and institutions, both formal and informal that guide and restrain the 
collective activities of a group” (Keohane and Nye 2002, 12).  
113
 I elaborate on the distinction between citizens and administrators elsewhere and will not go into this 
again here.   
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elaboration of reasons for action (discourse on rules) both players should be 
conceptualized as equal vis-à-vis the other, despite the eventual inequalities that arise in 
the final action context.  Because the outcome is cooperative and the objective is the 
mutual acceptance of co-production conditions, we must consider the final effect as co 
produced.   
To elaborate—given Habermas’ tripartite knowledge structure and the given 
condition of trigeminal asymmetry of information on the part of each player—it is 
known that in each iteration one player will gain relative to the other on a single 
dimension while the other will gain on another (or potentially the same) dimension.  The 
gain in the subsequent iterations however, does not dissipate in subsequent iterations as 
the gains “carry-over” to subsequent games.  This is formally a case of re-
optimization,114 but the gains here are not individually derived or intended for individual 
benefit exclusively.  The exponentiation of knowledge gains is necessary because of the 
communicative nature of the game rationality that is a given condition of the set.  As the 
game progresses, the input of the other raises the understanding of the first (and vice 
versa).  Consequently, in subsequent iterations, the players begin with a new state of 
understanding and knowledge of the other player linked directly to the product of the 
work each has put in previously as well as the shape of the final product.  The 
importance of the co-produced effect redoubles as the players re-optimize their strategies 
with respect to the other.  As each re-optimizes to accommodate the basic conditions of 
the universalization principle, the values each assigns to the conditions of the game and 
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 The definition of reoptimization used here is a selective change in utility given the appearance of new 
constraints.  This is drawn from a selection of economic literature including: Roufagalas (1994, 88) 
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the value of the outcome of cooperation (co-production of policy outcomes) change in 
relation to the other. 
 In the situation of citizen-administrator deliberation on the legitimacy of a 
regulatory action—specifically where cooperative co-productive compliance (as measure 
of mutual understanding) is the socially desired objective—the expectation of the 
capacity for understanding, given asymmetric information, must hold.  In the regulatory 
situation, where assertions and imperative are traded from the top for expressions and 
assertions from the bottom, the tripartite character of knowledge must be upheld as a 
basic conditionality of the exchange occurring.  However, we must note that the 
objective world and social world likely take priority in the exchange of knowledge 
between players.  The major categories of information traded between the players are 
objective imperative statements and expressions of social “fact” desirability.  Yet the 
subjective world between the citizen and administrator mediates the relationship 
between the two.  Therefore, we must bear in mind the importance of intersubjectively 
regulatory statements.   
In the construction of Habermas, this intersubjective regulatory function is 
largely pre-given by the condition of a symmetrical lifeworld (or background 
knowledge) held among the communicators.  Though it is a critical component of the 
mediation of final co-productive outcomes, the creation and maintenance of the 
lifeworld is beyond the primary purpose of incorporating communicative action into 
dialogues on public administration and will be left to the side in the form of an 
additional condition-- symmetry of expectations for intersubjective regulation.   
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Conclusion 
Communicative action, because of the assumptions embedded within does not 
conform to standards of instrumental rationality and is not, generally, amenable to 
situations where instrumental or economic success are the standards of excellence, such 
as in some forms of public administration.  However, though the use of communicative 
action does not conform to instrumentally rational standards, the assumptions and 
conclusions of communicative action are significant.  As Waldo (1984), Friedrich 
(1940), Long (1962), Herring (1936), Simon (1947), Terry (2003), Cook (1996), 
Frederickson (1997) and Kettl (2002) (among others) have made clear, the employment 
of strictly instrumental rationality does not provide all things necessary for the 
functioning, and more importantly, legitimation of the state and state actions.  
Consequently, we should look to the employment of communicative action as an 
alternative structure useful for the endeavor of legitimating the state through the 
administrative institutions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BUREAUCRACY, CITIZENS, LANGUAGE, AND LAW: THE 
SHAPING OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
In the modern welfare state, it is an impossible task to separate the organizations 
that determine the welfare of the citizens from the welfare of those that provide it.  
Disentangling the intertwined democratic intentions, laws, representation, subjective 
desires and objective provision of material satisfaction in the welfare system, is a fool’s 
errand if we insist on using a holist theory of the state.  While, ostensibly and 
theoretically, “the state” is the provider of the general welfare, in the present system it 
does so only indirectly.  The aggregations of organizations that act in the name of the 
state provide the primary modes of social welfare. 
The state is an aggregate of actors who may or may not directly identify as the 
state.  Yet it is not a complete fiction.  Rather, the welfare state mimics the state of the 
common will; within the one, there are many, yet it would be shortsighted to assert that 
there is not the one as state in toto.  Conventional ascriptions of statehood such as power, 
legitimacy, coercion, force, and normative validity are not characteristics solely of the 
state.  These characteristics are aggregates of those qualities of the agencies that provide 
state welfare.   
The description of the state in pragmatic terms—in terms of its symbols and 
consequences—must be done at the level at which these characteristics are the properties 
of actors outside of the aggregate.  That is, we can know the state pragmatically when 
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the state enforces its power or coercion in the sphere of our lives as practiced.  When 
citizens encounter the power, legitimacy, coercion, force, or normativity of the state, 
they first sense it through their encounter with a state agency.  Specifically, the state is 
available to citizens through their relationship with the administrative agencies they 
encounter.  
Thinking about the state and sovereignty requires a kind of dual visions… we 
need to be able to do justice to the reality and consequences of the state-effect… 
we also need to be able to understand these effects as effects, which requires 
attending to the activities through which the state is brought into being and 
reproduced, and particularly to the desires, projects and aspirations that animate 
those activities (Markell 2003, 27-28). 
 
Disentangling the felt effects of the state from the state as theory is the purpose 
of this chapter.115  This chapter is distinct from previous efforts to do so as it explores 
the bureaucracy as an instrument available to citizens to understand the state as 
experienced in their daily lives.  I attempt to do so anew, since the nature of the state and 
the citizens’ relationship to it is undergoing subtle but important changes as the 
networked structure of government and governance become the new norm of statehood 
(see, for example, Farmer 2005).   
The adaptation of the state to an alternating democratic-republican current and a 
diversifying, plural population requires that we rethink the role of the citizen as 
sovereign in differing terms.  This has come about primarily through the notion of a 
clientist or consumerist model where citizens are consumers of the state via the 
                                                 
115
 There have been numerous attempts at this project by previous scholars.  May of these attempts focus 
on the unmediated effects of the state upon citizens.  Examples of this in political theory include Foucault 
(1994), Bendix (1945), Cohen and Arato (1992), and Habermas (1996).  Examples of this in public 
administration scholarship include Goodnow (1967), Long (1962), March and Simon (1958), Simon 
(1947) and Waldo (1984).   
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provisions of the bureaucracy (Pegnato 1997).  This adaptation of the citizens’ role to 
state institutions has altered the way in which thought about the relationship between 
citizen and state must proceed.116  At the present time, marked by the failure of 
legislative institutions’ members to reconnect with citizens and provide true and full 
representation, the importance, and salience of citizens’ concerns withers.  In this time, 
when laws passed in citizens’ names are often compromises between competing identity 
groups and corporate institutions (not citizens in the sense of citoyen or commonly 
interested citizen) the state means less than it did in previous days.  Consequently, I 
propose that to assess the effects of the modern state, the points at which citizens and 
government engage require decentralization and devolution to the individual agency 
(perhaps even individual agent) level.  From this decentralized position, we may 
“recentralize”, into the power of executive agencies, the responsibility for transmission 
of normatively valid citizen claims to the institutions constitutionally responsible for the 
provision of sovereign law.117  
Within this chapter I parse three major effects that the bureaucracy has upon the 
way that we can sense and understand the state— through language (Foucault 1984, 
1994; Balfour and Mesaros 1994; Gadamer 1999, 2000), physical structures (Goodsell 
1977, 1988, 1997), and process expectations (Katz et al. 1975; Jones, et al.1977; 
                                                 
116
 The position that we must view the state through the lens of the bureaucracy or magistrates is not a 
uniquely new idea.  Adam Smith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations alludes to 
the importance of bureaucracy (what he terms “magistrates” or the institutions of public service) to the 
state and economy.  Though he does not make the connection explicit, the notion of the invisible hand 
advocated in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that the invisible hand is that system that provides justice in 
the society, requires an administrative (policing) component.  The idea of bureaucracy as public services 
provider is a key notion in classical economic theory, one that I will return to throughout the chapter. 
117
 This agency-centered perspective I develop from Wamsley, et al. 1989: 114-162. 
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Mladenka 1977; Vedlitz, Dyer and Durand 1980; Sharp 1984; Peterson 1986, 1988; 
Goodsell 1989, 1994; Serra 1995 ).118  I argue that these three effects have real 
consequences for citizens’ perception of and interaction with the state.  Likewise, I argue 
that these three effects alter the nature of daily interactions between citizens in a 
communicative, discursive environment such as the public sphere.  Through language, 
process expectations, and participatory structures, bureaucracy distinctly shapes the 
ordinary daily behavior of citizens.  Bureaucracies, through these influences, provide the 
very scaffolding upon which “being” and deliberations in the public sphere rest.   
 
Bureaucracy, State, Economy, and Society 
As governments have been called upon to do more and more important things, the 
degree of popular democratic control over separate public or governmental decisions 
has been gradually reduced.  In a real sense, Western societies have attained 
universal suffrage only after popular democracy has disappeared.  The electorate, the 
ultimate sovereign, must, to an extent not dreamed of by democracy’s philosophers, 
be content to choose its leaders.  The ordinary decisions of government emerge from 
a bureaucracy of ever-increasing dimensions.  Non-governmental and quasi-
governmental bureaucracies have accompanied the governmental in its growth.  The 
administrative hierarchy of a modern corporate giant differs less from the federal 
bureaucracy than it does from the freely contracting tradesman envisaged by Adam 
Smith (Buchanan 2005, 3). 
 
In a truly capitalist, free market, economy there would be no possibility (or 
perhaps even need for) redressive claims.  That is, under conditions of true market 
freedom, there is no governmental system necessary to accommodate the adjudication of  
 
                                                 
118
 The impact of process expectations is captured in the literature on citizen satisfaction with the 
bureaucracy.  I will argue here that citizens are most satisfied when their expectations of the process and 
outcomes of government contact are met.  
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claims.  However, in a society motivated by justice and the attendant virtues of a just 
society, there must be an adjudicatory power to mediate the competition of interests in a 
market.  To attain the goods of justice, there must be a degree of systematic cooperation, 
something not found in the disaggregated world of the truly competitive market.  There 
must be an “invisible hand” that produces the good of distribution of necessary 
opportunity and goods.119  As the truly free market is fictive for any society for which 
welfare matters, even the welfare of a select few, the immediacy of redressive claims are 
paramount.  As the state attempts to regulate/ mediate/ attenuate free market competitive 
anarchy, governmental adjudication structures are established which are “real” enough to 
absorb and resolve claims of redress.  
  According to Adam Smith, “The first and chief design of every system of 
government is to maintain justice” (Smith 1762, quoted in Long 2006, 301).  The sense 
of justice imparted here is “justice in the sense of the peaceful maintenance of the 
citizens’ perfect rights to property.  Like Hume, Smith maintained that the protection of 
property was the first necessity of every system of government worthy of the name” 
(Long 2006, 301).  The need to resolve redressive claims founds governments, as we 
know them presently.  Specifically, resolution of claims for redress underpin policy 
statements—statements of law-- ranging from charters to constitutions to contracts, each 
of which require an enforcement structure constraining the effects of such devices 
utilized in a truly free economy society.  There must be administrative structures to 
                                                 
119
 In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith uses the phrase invisible hand to describe the process by 
which the economy “is said to produce an equal distribution of necessities, as opposed to luxury goods” 
(Long 2006, 289).  
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address the enforcement of laws passed to assist the amelioration of redress.  Law, in the 
fullest sense, organizes the claims themselves and their institutional adjudication. 
These [rules of law] include not only power-conferring norms that furnish 
government institutions with their special jurisdictions or even constitute these 
institutions to begin with, but also organizational norms that lay down procedures 
according to which legal programs come into being and are dealt with 
administratively or judicially.  Law by no means exhausts itself in behavioral norms 
but increasingly serves to organize and regulate state power.  It functions as a system 
of constitutive rues that not only guarantee the private and public autonomy of 
citizens but generate government institutions, procedures, and official power 
(Habermas 1996, 144).  
 
It is within theories of political economy, statehood, and morality—those 
theories of politics elaborated by Adam Smith-- that we begin to see how the full nature 
of the state as mediator of economic redress claims and the state as actor come together 
in the aspect of policing redress.  
Stable and peaceful relations of interaction and exchange in commercial society 
require a supporting framework of both legality and civility.  They [laws, 
institutions, and morals to protect and stabilize private property and contractual 
exchange] do so by elaborating 1) an ethic of propriety and 2) a jurisprudence 
combining economic attention to “police” with a distinctive and nuanced theory of 
justice.  ‘Police… signifying policy, politicks or the regulation of a government in 
generall [sic]  (Smith quoted in Long 2006, 300). 
 
Long goes on to elaborate on Smith’s understanding of the police function of society as 
“the more complex, general, and at times elusive principles of property and propriety.  
The conceptual arena… for his [Smith’s] thinking about property and propriety, and 
their interrelationship in civil and commercial society, is justice” (2006, 300).  
Moreover, justice for Smith is certainly an administrative task.   
 183 
State control over the economy in the post-feudal, non-totalitarian state is non-
absolute.  Particularly in democracies, the state has no complete control over the 
economy, as it cannot fully harness the productive capacity of its members as its own.  
In the modern world, states and economies are less hierarchically situated co-regents 
than they were in the past.  State, justice, law, and economy are fully symbiotic with one 
another—the one unable to function absent the other.  This much Smith suggests in The 
Wealth of Nations: “Commerce and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state 
which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice” (Smith, quoted in Rothschild 
and Sen 2006, 336).  It follows then that all redress claims made to the state are claims 
against the state together with the economy or the effects of the economy within the 
state.  Consequently, to describe the derivative purpose or end of the state or state 
agency we must attend simultaneously to the mediation of the state and economy 
together.   
The bureaucracy, as with the other essential actors of the state, therefore, does 
not serve an exclusively statist purpose, it also serves an economic purpose.  The 
mediation of the economy by the state is indeed the highest function of the state in the 
welfare economy.  However, law alone cannot do the mediation of the economy-- there 
must also be administration.  Bureaucracy in this environment overwhelms the 
legislature in terms of direct impacts on the citizens’ economic welfare.120    
                                                 
120
 The importance of the bureaucratic (executive) connection to the mediation of the economy is 
demonstrated by the importance of economic well-being for the success of the president (CEO of the 
executive branch).  As head of the executive branch, the president as head of the bureaucracy is partially 
responsible for the failings of the economy.  He endures sanction for failing to marshal the bureaucratic 
resources necessary to mediate economic shocks.  See Rohr (1989). 
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The foundation of Smith’s thought here permeates the remainder of American 
(and Anglo) thinking on the role of policy, law, and economics and, by extension, 
administration.  Individuals make redress claims to “the state” against the economy.  
There are three broad types of claims, which incidentally, these conform to the 
typologies of public policy seen in the contemporary state—distributive, redistributive, 
and regulatory.  Distributive redress claims demand that distribution of resources to 
given populations as a basic condition of relations in that society.  Redistributive claims 
demand that redistribution of resources to one “have-not” section of the population from 
the pool of resources “owned” by the section of the population that “has.”  Both of these 
forms of policy (codified redress claims) are a demand made upon the state for the 
provision of equality (of resource or opportunity) for some members of the state.  The 
third type of claim is the regulative, rooted in the provision of equal liberty of persons to 
do one thing or another free from the possibility that another party will stymie (a priori 
or in medias res) their ability to see that thing through.  Regulatory redress claims 
demand “something be done” to stop/ start something from occurring through the 
application of state-legal coercive force.  Each of these redress claims is a request from 
individuals for use of the state’s power—of which their individual autonomous power is 
a critical part—in the defense of the individual's self-interest defined liberties.  The 
nature of redress claims against the state is that they are appeals to the state for redress 
against an institution that only the state as aggregate of actors can control—the economy 
writ large. 
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 The activity of adjudicating these redress claims in the first instance is the task of 
bureaucratic institutions, as those institutions that have a positive (cooperative and 
coercive) function for the economy and society at a level where citizens are able to 
experientially engage with the state.  I take as a basic starting point here that citizens, 
particularly citizens interested in the public good (even as representative of their 
individual good), cannot know the state or economy without the aid of bureaucracy.  
First: 
[The subject] born and bred up under the authority of the magistrates… sees they 
expect his obedience and he sees also the propriety of obeying and the 
unreasonableness of [dis]obeying… there is the same propriety in submitting to 
them as to a father, as all of those in authority are either naturally or by the will 
of the state who lend them their power placed far above you.  … Everyone sees 
that the magistrates not only support the government in generall but the security 
and independency of each individual, and they see that this security cannot be 
attained without a regular government. Everyone therefore thinks it most 
advisable to submit to the established government, tho perhaps he may think that 
it is not disposed in the best manner possible (Smith, quoted in Long 2006, 293).  
 
There is a process of acculturation of the citizens of the modern welfare state into the 
idea of the bureaucracy as the visible and experientially verifiable arm of the state.  To 
rephrase, execution, more than legislation, is a state act felt by citizens enough to 
provoke a genuine response. 
    Stated otherwise, the bureaucracy serves an epistemological purpose for citizens.  
To borrow an analogy from Farmer (1995), the bureaucracy serves as the eyeglasses 
(microscope, telescope) for citizens to see the world around them.  The bureaucracy is 
not the philosopher-king enlightening the world of hapless cave dwellers, nor is the 
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bureaucracy a Vanguard party of the technocratic revolution.121  Bureaucracy is a 
proximate tool through which citizens may sense, in a more full way, the systemic 
structure of the state, society, and economy (Mladenka 1977, Peterson 1986).  In the 
original state, the lines of the complex interplay between the structures blur in the 
unaided view of the citizen.  
To elaborate, citizens are limited in their ability to apprehend the system around 
them, blinded by the vagaries of uncritically applied group politics, non-public spirited 
versions of self-interest, hyper-specialization of one’s productive capacity leading to 
non-reflexive dependence, and nefarious inter-firm economic competition.  As 
nearsighted individuals, they are unable to apprehend the value of the system that guides 
the structure they may legitimately wish to change.  Alternatively, in a more pragmatic 
reading, they are unable to interact reflexively with the symbols of the state.  As the law 
and the coercive power of the law is applied, citizens alienated from the process of 
legitimation are cut off from the possibility of engaging the symbolic language of the 
state as actors who can reflect back to the other those characteristics of the symbols 
themselves.  As citizens are unable to visualize the fullness of the system—of the 
morality of the invisible hand itself--- little recourse remains for them to provoke 
meaningful changes.   
The first step in a citizens’ effecting a change is to see the full structure of the 
system before the state.  In the complex modern welfare state, this requires an aid—
                                                 
121
 As those in the mood of anti-bureaucracy may be wont to suggest.  
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guidance—a Virgil to the citizen Dante.122  As the office of the bureaucrat is the only 
office fully involved in the lives of citizens and the one more responsively attuned to 
citizens, the access of citizens to change must come from the bureaucracy.  This is not to 
imply that bureaucrats have exclusive access to the superstructure of the state or that 
citizens are a muddling proletariat, but that the bureaucracy and citizens are closer to one 
another, if not the same in many cases.  As described earlier, the bureaucracy is the 
mediating institution between ordinary citizens and the constitutional state.  
Consequently, the full force of the bureaucracy is in its status as citizen’s aid.  It is 
through cooperative or even contested encounters with the language and process 
expectations of satisfying redress claims through the bureaucracy that citizens can come 
to terms with the state- economy in its full complexity.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122
 Dante’s encounter with Virgil in the first Canto of the Inferno is illustrative for my understanding of the 
citizen’s encounter with bureaucracy.  As Dante first fears the appearance of Virgil, he awakens to the 
realization of what he himself owes to Virgil’s writings.  Virgil invites Dante to follow him through the 
Inferno so that he receives deliverance to the higher soul on the opposite side of hell who may bring Dante 
to the light of God.  It would be partially blasphemous to compare the average legislator or legislature to 
God, but the illustrative device I think serves a purpose here.  To quote (in Italian): 
Mentre chi’ rovinava in basso loco, dinanzi a li occhi mi si fu offerto chi per lungo silenzio perea fioco. 
Quando vidi costui nel gran diserto, ‘Miserere di me’ gridi a lui, ‘qual che tu sii, od ombra od omo certo!’ 
Rispuosemi: ‘non omo, mom giá fui… Poeta fui, e cantai di quell giusto figliuol d’Anchise che venne di 
Troia poi che ‘l superbo Ilïón fo combusto. Ma tu perché ritorni a tanta noia? Perché nn Sali il dilettoso 
monte ch’è principio e cagion di tutta gioia? “Or se’ tu quell Virgilio q quella fonte che spandi di parlar si 
larg fiume?” rispuos’ io lui con vergognosa fronte. “O de lie altri poeticonore e lume, vagliani ‘l lunngo 
studio e ‘l grande amore che m’ha fatto cercar lo tuo volume. Tu se’ lo nio maestro e ‘l mio autore… 
Ond’io pre lo tuo me’ pense e discerno che to mi segui, e io saró tua guida, e trarrotti di qui per loco 
etterno… A le quai poi se tu vorraisalire, anima fia a ció piú de me degna: con lei ti lasceró nel mio 
partire’ ché quello imperador che lá sú regna, perch’I fu’ ribellante a la sua legge, non vuol che’n sua cittá 
per me si vegna. (Alligheri 1980, 5-9) 
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Language, Law and the Expectations of Bureaucracy 
Citizens have a wealth of expectations of the bureaucracy (Kettl 2002).  Many of 
these expectations can be realized, some not.123  Fully parsing the “average citizens’” 
expectations of bureaucracy is beyond the present scope, but I offer that there are 
particular typologies of expectations, directed through the language of government, that 
characterize citizens’ desires of the bureaucracy as institution.  
The effect of bureaucracy upon language is most important to, yet distant from, 
ordinary considerations of the bureaucracy.  The language of politics is the language of 
law, constitution, legislative compromise, justice, and morality, all of which are input 
statements into the language of the state as “policy”.  Likewise, the language of 
bureaucracy is that of the law, constitution, justice, and morality.  How we speak of 
politics is the product of how we have come to speak about our encounter with these 
terms through the implementation of policy designed in their scope.  Enmeshed in our 
understanding of bureaucracy are our encounters with it and the subsequent 
interpretation and internalizations of these encounters through sense-language-
interpretation.  Each of these terms is critical for definitions of the language of 
bureaucracy.  We encounter the bureaucracy linguistically—through speech and action 
predefined by speech.  Therefore, I start from the premise that we understand 
bureaucracy hermeneutically.  
                                                 
123
 It is first necessary to assert an obvious point—the expectations that citizens have of government are 
couched in terms of process expectations. Process expectations direct us to how to act in a given role.  The 
expectations that government has of citizens are couched in the language of law.  Briefly, expectations are 
normatively loaded statements of ideal types, designed to imply that things “ought” to be other than how 
they “are.”   
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Bureaucracy, through speech, provides the immediate experience of citizens with 
the language—the symbols in pragmatic terms-- of government.  Through bureaucracy 
and citizen interaction, this language “leaks” into the general vocabulary that citizens use 
to describe their daily encounters of life.  Indeed, for examples of this we need look no 
further than the utilization of the term bureaucracy to denote symbolically particular 
conditions of constrained action.  This cooperatively generated vocabulary becomes the 
specialized language that citizens employ to discuss—both within citizen only groups 
and in citizen-bureaucrat groups--the state and the effect of the state upon the economy.   
A number of continental theorists of language and society, including Gadamer 
(1997), Heidegger (1996), and on the American side, the pragmatist Dewey (1910, 1935, 
1948), analyzed the nature of a cooperatively generated vocabulary for joint action.  To 
summarize very briefly, when acting, internal dialogues foreshadow and describe our 
actions before we act.  Actions are always already sentences in our minds well before 
they take on material form.  Speech expects and anticipates action.  Our actions mediate 
the interaction of symbols within ourselves in anticipation of the reactions of others.  In 
the situation of bureaucrat-citizen interaction, speech mediates the actions of both 
bureaucrat and citizen beforehand.  Language, particularly the reflexive use of language, 
structures communicative interaction and conjoint action.  
The influence of expectations on the bureaucracy and bureaucratic-citizen 
interaction leads to the transformation of the language of public action.  Expectations are 
captured in the reflexive moment of language, which itself directs and is directed by the 
expectations and anticipation of action on the part of citizens and bureaucrats.  To 
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explicate on this further, it is necessary to revisit two major theses of being and language 
that underpin much of the critical theories of language in the world as we know it today 
(Balfour and Mesaros 1994).  Specifically, I revisit the idea of the hermeneutic circle 
and the idea of communication through text.124   
 The notion of the hermeneutic circle comes from the seminal work of Heidegger, 
Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, 1996).125  
In every understanding of world, existence is also understood and vice versa.  
Furthermore, every interpretation operates within the fore-structure which we 
characterized.  Every interpretation which is to contribute some understanding 
must already have understood what it is to be interpreted….  But if interpretation 
always already has to operate within what it understood and nurture itself from 
this, how should it then produce scientific results without going in a circle, 
especially when the presupposed understanding still operates in the common 
knowledge of human being and world? The fulfillment of the fundamental 
conditions of possible interpretation rather lies in not mistaking interpretation 
beforehand with regard to the essential conditions of its being done.  What is 
decisive is not to get out of the circle but to get in it in the right way.  This circle 
of understanding is not a circle in which any random kind of knowledge operates, 
but it is rather the expression of the existential fore-structure of Da-sein itself…. 
The ‘circle’ in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and this 
phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Da-sein, in interpretive 
understanding (1996, 152-153).126 
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 Both of these terms have become part of a lexicon that is largely over-commodified in intellectual 
circles rendered blunt instruments for examining social interactions.  The result has been that public 
administration theory has had little space for these types of critiques as generally done, thus I attempt to do 
it in a slightly different fashion here. 
125
 Being and Time is an efficient translation, but does not fully capture Heidegger’s purpose or the 
complexity that he has incorporated into the terms sein or zeit.  However, an exegesis on Heidegger is not 
the purpose here, so these translations will stand as sufficient.  I argue that the same assertions hold for 
Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), yet, as this is not an exegesis on Gadamer, I avoid 
any further elaboration.  The tradition of modern political theory includes significant attention paid to both 
thinkers and it would be a new project to attempt a catalogue here.  See however, Dallmayr (1993) on 
Heidegger and Gadamer both.  
126
 Da-sein is often translated as “being in the world” or how we ontologically can know our selves 
through an understanding of what it means to “be”, to “be-in” and to “be in reference to” one another and 
to ourselves simultaneously.  “Da-sein is a being which is related understandingly in its being toward that 
being.  In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence.  Da-sein exists. 
Furthermore, Da-sein as the condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity.  Da-sein exists 
always in one of these modes or else in the modal indifference to them.  These determinations of being 
Da-sein, we see and understand a priori as grounded upon that constitution of being which we call being-
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The complexity of the hermeneutic circle as a way of being for the definition of 
individual ontology can be somewhat simplified for the present purpose.127 
The hermeneutic circle can be defined in the following way: we achieve our 
understanding through the circular path of our encounter with the world as we sense it.  
The steps of the hermeneutic circle are: 1) we sense the world, 2) we understand the 
world through the use of whichever language symbolic we have acquired through being 
in the world, 3) in order to interpret the world, 4) so that we may understand the world as 
interpreted through our senses and language, 5) so that we may know that what we see is 
“real” and that we can draw patterned judgments about reality existing in a similar way 
in the future, 6) so that we can recognize that we have an existence relatively defined in 
the world and 7) can prime our senses to take in the world.   
It is through being in this circle that we come to appreciate not only ourselves in the 
world but also those objects against which we define our concrete being (Heidegger 
1996).  
Any attempt to think philosophically or scientifically about our experiences is an 
attempt to deepen our understanding of future patterns of being.  Another way to view 
the process of understanding rendered through a hermeneutical encounter with the world 
comes from the unlikely source of Adam Smith.  The hermeneutic circle is the synthesis 
                                                                                                                                                
in-the-world.  The correct point of departure for the analytic Da-sein consists in the interpretation of this 
constitution.  The compound expression “being-in-the-world” indicates, in the very way we have coined it, 
that is stands for a unified phenomenon.  This primary datum we see as a whole (Heidegger 1996, 49). 
127
 Scholars of Gadamer may be disappointed with the brevity of the examination of Gadamer’s theory of 
language; however, this is not the arena to offer a more thoroughgoing analysis.  
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of theoretical and practical imagination, the synthesis of our intellectual and practical 
beings.   
It is through the practical imagination that we ascribe actions to persons and see 
persons, including ourselves, as coherent or identical over time.  In other words, 
the practical imagination creates the moral world….  The theoretical imagination 
is… the foundation for all the arts and sciences.  It accounts for our ability to 
bring order and system in things and event around us so we can orient ourselves 
in life (Haakonssen 2006, 10).   
 
Generated through this is what Smith calls sympathy—a concept not unlike the fusion of 
horizons or the synthesis of individually decentered prejudiced views of the world.128  
Sympathy is characterized as an act of the imagination because we do not have 
access to another persons’ mind.  What we have access to is the other person’s 
observable circumstances, including his or her behavior.  The act of sympathetic 
understanding is a creation of order in the observer’s perceptions by means of an 
imagined rationale for the observed behavior.  As agents or moral beings, other 
being are, therefore, the creation of our imagination. …  The same can be said of 
ourselves; as moral agents, we are acts of creative imagination.  The central point 
is that we only become aware of ourselves—gain self-consciousness—through 
our relationship with others.  … Our imagination craves order in these actual or 
potential conflicts and that means a workable level of agreement about personal 
relations and things, as in questions of who is to lead and who is to own or have 
the use of what.  Our understanding of how others see us in these circumstances 
determines our view of who we are and how we stand in such relationships in 
life….  In other words, one only learns to see oneself as a person and as a 
member of a moral universe of agents through sympathy with others view of 
one’s identity and situation in the world.  Society is, as Smith says, the mirror in 
which one catches sight of oneself, morally speaking (Haakonssen 2006, 12-13).  
 
                                                 
128
 “In fact the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed because we are 
continually having to test all our prejudices.  An important part of this testing occurs in encountering the 
past and in understanding the tradition from which we come.  Hence, the horizon of the present cannot be 
formed without the past.  There is no more an isolated horizon of the present itself than there are historical 
horizons which have to be acquired.  Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons 
supposedly existing by themselves.  We are familiar with the power of this kind of fusion chiefly from 
earlier times…  In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new are 
always combining into something of value, without either being explicitly foregrounded from the other” 
(1997, 306).  A basic assumption of the use of the hermeneutical technique is that there can be fusion of 
perspectives across time (as Gadamer directly suggests) and across space.  
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It is also through this circle—this fusion of imaginatively sympathetic horizons-- 
that we begin to form our prejudices, or our ideal typical expectations of how things are, 
which later guide our experience of the world and our accumulation of further 
knowledge.  I refer here is what Gadamer describes as prejudices.  In short, Gadamerian 
prejudices are normatively valid claims of what we prefer “is” in the context of our own 
interpretation of our present surroundings.  These prejudices, captured in symbolic-
linguistic form, are sentences describing our ideal type preferences.  These preferences/ 
prejudices provide us with reference points for comparison of what is and what satisfies 
us.  These preferences provide us with a framework in which we can make individually 
valid claims to do something this way or that in a logically coherent framework.   
The recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives 
the hermeneutical problem its real thrust…  Actually, ‘prejudice’ means a 
judgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have 
been finally examined.  In German legal terminology, a ‘prejudice’ is a 
provisional legal verdict before the final verdict is reached. … the French 
préjudice, as well as the Latin praejudicium, means simply ‘adverse effect’, 
‘disadvantage’, ‘harm’. But this negative sense is only derivative.  The negative 
consequence depends precisely on the positive validity, the value of the 
provisional decision as a prejudgment, like that of any precedent. Thus 
‘prejudice’ certainly does not necessarily mean a false judgment, but part of the 
idea is that it can have either a positive or negative value (Gadamer 1997, 270).  
 
Prejudices are provisional normative claims that we make upon the symbols that 
organize our perceptions of our being and that of others, which foreground our attempts 
to make sense of the world in its full form.  Our prejudices, though quite possibly “felt” 
more than “verbalized”, have the character of normative validity claims and therefore are 
part of the formative basis of discursively ethical communicative action.  Normative 
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validity claims, like prejudices, arise within our sentences for describing the world in 
discursively useful terms.  
We have, then, a confirmation of what we stated above, namely that in language 
the world itself presents itself.  Verbal experience of the world is ‘absolute’.  It 
transcends all the relative ways being is posited because it embraces all being-in-
itself, in whatever relationships (relativities) it appears.  Our verbal experience of 
the world is prior to everything that is recognized and addressed as existing.  
That language and world are related in a fundamental way does not mean, then, 
that world becomes the object of language.  Rather, the object of knowledge and 
statements is always already enclosed within the world horizon of language 
(Gadamer 1997, 450). 
 
That we can know linguistically, through communicative instruments with 
intersubjective validity, the bureaucracy allows us a way to “deal with it” that is more 
than merely emotional.  We “deal with” bureaucracy linguistically through the 
enforcement of our expectations—formed from the synthesis of prejudiced horizons— 
upon our encounters with the bureaucracy.  How we know the bureaucracy defines who 
we are as citizens.  The encapsulation of understanding within the single individual who 
is a participant in both hermeneutic development of understanding and communicative 
action in a public sphere allows for the conditions of communication among diverse 
(differentiated) individuals necessary for political goods such as legitimacy or 
representation to come about.  The generation of socially mediated individual knowledge 
and prejudice, will, as it interacts with the social that is the bureaucratic environment 
marked by instrumental rationality, eventually coincide or overlap with homogenizing 
rational orientations (in this case Weberian or Taylorite expectations of bureaucratic 
processes), which are necessary for the legitimation of bureaucratic actions. 
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We know the value of our expectations through rational reflection upon these 
claims, an action that requires a formal world of communication between individuals 
that are subject-centered persons.   
Differentiation, reflexivity and the cultural rationalization accompanying them are… 
necessary conditions for an emancipated society.  ‘The more cultural traditions 
predecide which validity claims, when, where, for what, from whom, and to whom 
must be accepted, the less the participants themselves have the possibility of making 
explicit and examining the potential grounds on which their yes/no positions are 
based.’  Cultural rationalization, however, is not a sufficient condition for 
emancipation. Participants in rational communication processes must decide what 
they regard as the good life (Love 1989, 274-5). 
 
In the case of bureaucracy’s role in cultural rationalization, our understanding of 
bureaucracy envelops our common sensation of it.  The interpretation of that sensation 
through a linguistic media (expectations coded into sentences) provides the basis of 
communication of this knowledge in discourse.  Expectations are made and remade by 
our voicing of our individual and mutual dissatisfaction with the (none) conformance of 
bureaucratic behavior with our expectations.   
 
Expectations of Bureaucracy: Function and Structure 
Expectations of bureaucracy include expectations of how bureaucracies in 
general will appear and how they will act.  We expect the bureaucratic office to not only 
look and “feel” a particular way, but that it will “behave” in a certain consistent manner.  
These expectations, again, are a product of hermeneutically derived, communicatively 
accumulated, experiences.  Citizen’s satisfaction with the bureaucratic experience – a 
key component to the utilization of bureaucracy as a legitimately representative 
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channel—we can measure as the conformance of bureaucratic actions with citizens’ 
prejudices and expectations.  Expectations of the bureaucracy are beliefs about the way 
that bureaucratic actors work and how bureaucratic mediation occurs.  Our expectations, 
captured in the language produced through our hermeneutical encounter with 
bureaucracy, have both structural and functional consequences for the shape of the 
bureaucracy within the public interest generating public sphere. 
 The ideas of the bureaucracy and the public sphere impart an idea of structured 
space.  By structured space, I mean the places—physical edifices, park boundaries, 
offices—that we can call public, meaning open without legal or procedural constraints to 
inquiry to all persons who wish to do some form of “business” pertaining to their private 
or commonly-held-with-others interests.  Public spaces allow an individual to freely 
move about, into out of, or through, in their interest seeking.  Likewise, we encounter 
fully public spaces as sources of freely available goods and services and information.  
Semi-public spaces have the quality of freedom of entry and traverse, yet may be 
restrictive of to the behavior that individuals can exhibit within them.  An example of 
this is the expectation of payment.  Those places often called public, such as public 
transportation in a metro-system, are public only in a limited sense—there is no 
complete access to all services entailed in the idea of public transportation.  That is, for 
full service, one must forfeit a quality of their private selves—a degree of their private 
wealth—for the benefit of the service.  Therefore, there are, in a sense, no fully public 
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“agonistic” spaces available for public discussion.129  By agonistic space, I mean a space 
where all interpretive possibilities for communicating ones interests are open and 
unrestricted by anything other than personal resources available at the time.   
 In the modern state, there is no fully public space.  Spaces, for a number of 
reasons, are restricted according to access, utilization, behavior, and so on.  Non-
restricted spaces are indeed rare, although the ideal public library may come close to 
representing a fully public space.130  Public spaces in the modern welfare state are only 
semi-public—there exist restrictions to entry, barriers to behavior, and economic barriers 
to full unfettered access.  A few examples may suffice to make this clear—the 
courthouse is fully public, except to a person intent on bringing weapons into the facility 
without prior permission or a homeless person seeking shelter for an extended period.  
The public hospital (and in cases of emergency, any hospital) is public, except one 
cannot enter with weapons and anyone entering for a service must agree to the terms that 
payment or proof of indigence is required for service.  Most university grounds are open 
to agonistic types of protest, but only in certain locations and with appropriate 
permissions/ permits granted first.131  These “open” spaces are not open to full agonistic 
discourse.  No edifice with fully open doors and fully open dialogue—to evoke a 
                                                 
129
 An agonistic space is one that is radically open to all comers, goers, and interlopers who may use the 
space in whichever way they deem fit for the moment.  However, theorists such as Mouffe (2000) may 
laud the forum as an agonistic space, her use of the term folds in on itself when we consider the history of 
the forum as space with marked restrictions on access for all parties.  
130
 Though the rules of access to public libraries have changes, the ideal public borrowing library does not 
restrict access to the main function of the library—reading or learning—according to ability to pay.  
However, it does request conformance to particular behavior standards.  
131
 There is much concern on the matter of the closing of university spaces for performance and debate.  
As universities find themselves liable for the behavior of those persons on their grounds, the open space of 
the university will become more and more limited.  The space for free love and free debate in the 21st 
century university campus is now closed.  
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common term of public sphere theory—presently exists.  All public space is mediated 
space. 
Though an intriguing problem, it is not the characteristics of the edifice of the 
public sphere that will concern me for the remainder of this section I am most concerned 
with the actions of the actors in the public sphere.132  Architecture and public 
architectural pieces are mutable and contingent in their social and political importance 
(Goodsell 1977, 1988, 1994, 1997).  In terms of their public role, places transform from 
public to semi-public to private as ownership or stewardship changes hands.  Moreover, 
as these places transform through the interaction of state and economy, our interaction 
with them and within them also adapts to suit.  In all of the public spaces mentioned 
above, it is the task of actors of the state—bureaucrats or public administrators—to 
mediate the space.  This mediation is often no more than “doing one’s job,” but 
bureaucratic employment is, in many unremarkable cases, an act of policing and 
mediating in the open on behalf of the public.133  The mediated public space, those 
spaces described above, but also include schools, roads, or downtown sidewalks, can 
also be described as bureaucratic or bureaucratized spaces.  However, we should not 
interpret this through the pejorative sense of the symbol bureaucratic—bureaucrats as  
                                                 
132
 Most theorists of the public sphere, Habermas included, would find the notion of an edified public 
sphere unusual.  As conceived, it is the space of conversations, in Habermas’ terms, those conversations in 
the emerging critical media of the 18th century.  To the extent that the public sphere has an edifice is to the 
extent that a newspaper or a pamphlet has an edifice.  To architecturalize the public sphere is to 
architectualize text.  Texts wrap our lives in words in such a way that words do become real in the sense of 
a building.  That we can use the word “bureaucracy” to indicate a set of behaviors and a place is 
suggestive in this regard.  
133
 One is lead to think perhaps of the very political role of the local bureaucrat operating as school 
principal.   
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independent or invidious police agents do not mediate bureaucratic spaces.  It is on 
behalf of and by citizens’ expectations of the space that bureaucratic, semi-public spaces 
adapt.  Firstly this is done through the embodiment of citizens interests in public policies 
made in a representative system and, secondly through the representation of citizens 
interests through the citizen-bureaucrat.  Mediation occurs through the reflexive 
interchange between citizens seeking conformance of bureaucrats with their expectations 
and bureaucrats seeking to serve citizens.  Our expectations as citizens color the way in 
which bureaucracies are structured and how they will function.  Similarly, our 
expectations of government shape our interaction with it.134  These expectations are 
neither fixed nor concretely knowable as law-like; these expectations are the mutable 
product of communication among decentered individual subjects whose own 
hermeneutical interaction with the world generates a reflexive product on multiple 
levels.   
In America, for reasons of history, these expectations are inclusive of a rational, 
economized, and “scientific” paradigm.135  This much can be seen in the rise of the  
                                                 
134
 Peters makes this much clear in The Politics of Bureaucracy: “… just as the child learns the prevailing 
norms concerning economic behavior, social interaction, and child rearing, he or she also learns how to 
understand and evaluate politics and government.  This process of learning political values and political 
culture is referred to as political socialization. …  The social and economic systems of a country place 
boundaries on the actions of government, and more specifically public administration.  Political culture is 
equally important to setting boundaries, although the boundaries are less tangible than those determined by 
economic conditions.  By defining what in government is good and bad, the culture may virtually mandate 
some actions and prohibit others” (2001, 38).  Peters does not offer a reflexive approach, but given the 
theory of social communication elaborated throughout this work, I take it as given that this works in 
reverse as well.  
135
 The shaping of the American concept of the state as a product of the historical evolution of political 
theories has been examined elsewhere by theorists such as: Frost and Sikkenga (2003), Davis (1995) and 
Frisch and Stevens (1971).  Attentions to the administrative aspects of this we find in the works of Rohr 
(1986, 1989, 1995, and 2002).  I will not elaborate further on this but acknowledge the importance of the 
work in this field for the remainder of what I say here.  
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administrative state as subject of concern for scholars of scientific management.136  
Indeed, there have been numerous commissions and reports touting a scientific or more 
rational version of bureaucratic reform capable of “reigning in” or making more efficient 
the public bureaucracy (Kim and Wolff 1994).  
The current idea of reinventing government is the latest of eleven major reform 
initiatives to make the federal government work better since Theodore Roosevelt; 
these include the Keep Commission (1905-1909), the Taft Commission (1910-
1913), the Joint Committee on Reorganization (1921-1924), the Brownlow 
Committee (1936-1937), the first Hoover Commission (1947-1949), the second 
Hoover Commission (1953-1955), Study Commissions on Reorganization (1963-
1968), the Ash Council (1969-1971), the Carter Reorganization Review (1977-
1979), the Grace Commission (1982-1984), and the 1993 National Performance 
Review. All began with an assumption that government as typified by the federal 
government was badly organized and incapable of performing at the level 
acceptable to the public (1994, 73-74).    
 
Certainly, the emphasis of the current (Bush) administration on performance 
budgeting (a program of program assessment piloted in 2002 and begun formally in 
2003, administered by the Office of Management and Budget) should be included in this 
litany of rationalization efforts.  That the federal bureaucracy has been directly studied 
for its efficiency (and, by extension of economic logic, goodness) for 30 out of 105 years 
is suggestive of a pattern of practices within the government that have a cultural impact 
upon citizens’ appreciation (apprehension) of the bureaucracy.137  As a product of the 
                                                 
136
 See Hood 2005.  
137
 The role of the media (particularly if we define media coverage as a type of artistic performance) vis-à-
vis bureaucracy is to promote heteronomous condition in viewers.  In particular, the performance of media 
players in the coverage of the recent FEMA incidents was not merely to perform an act of artistry or an act 
of informing.  Rather, the role of media was to “bait” the viewer with particular value judgments 
embedded in broadcasts in order to promote additional viewership.  The effect was a pronounced negative 
attitude towards FEMA as a whole.  
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evolution of media based campaign technology as well as instantaneous and continuous 
news, citizen expectations of the bureaucracy changed.   
 The expectations of citizens exhibit two loosely differentiated groups, functional 
and structural.  Functional expectations refer to expectations of outputs anticipated by 
citizens.  The function of bureaucracy is to produce goods or services (including the 
provision of information and control) to and for the public.  To the extent that 
information is believable, goods and services are appropriate to the organization and are 
satisfactory in terms of quality relative to private goods, we can point to the satisfaction 
of functional expectations.  Structural expectations refer to the expected manner of 
output generation.  Structure and function cannot be decoupled.  The structural 
expectations of bureaucracy include anticipations of who is responsible for what and 
who is accountable to whom.  Structural expectations of bureaucracy are those 
expectations of hierarchy, division of labor, expertise, and management.   
These terms are, not coincidentally, economic terms; structural expectations of 
good and service providers in America arise out of the provision of such things in the 
private sector.  For example, economic models of bureaucracy expounded upon by 
Tullock (2005) and other social choice theorists, as well as modified social-choice 
theories, such as those embedded in the propositions of Downs (1967), Osbourne and 
Gaebler (1992) and later, public management scholars such as Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 
(2001), espouse a particularly economic model of the structure of bureaucracy.  The 
economic structure proposed—of inter and intra firm competition, self-interest and rent-
seeking, and provision of services to customers—is designed to impart into the 
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bureaucracy a version of good that is economized.  In most instances, this is economic 
efficiency, or the maximization of profit and minimization of costs.138   
 The expectations that citizens have of the bureaucracy do more than shape the 
way that bureaucratic officials respond to our claims, they shape our expectations of 
democratic governance and our experience of the public sphere.  As I have elaborated 
upon earlier, there exists no fully public space in the modern welfare state that we could 
describe fully outside of mediation by bureaucratic action.  The mediating effect/ 
mediating action of expectations are simultaneously the conformity of public space 
mediation by bureaucrats to such expectations and the acceptance of the performance of 
such actions by the citizenry.  As a confluence of structures, bureaucratic language and 
action form the borders for acceptable actions within the public at all.  Our experience of 
the world conforms to the synthesis of our present expectations of the structure and 
function of the state system and the consequences of reactivity between that system and 
us. 
 
Bureaucracy and the Mediation of the Public Sphere 
 We must view the complexity of the synthesis of our expectations through both 
speech and action.  However, as speech and action interconnect in the public sphere and 
the generation of its logical product—the public interest—it is essential to focus on the 
confluence of the two in the idea of the bureaucratized public sphere.  The public sphere 
                                                 
138
 The work on public management by Lynn Heinrich and Hill (2001) employs an explicitly economic 
view of public service provision.  This is representative of the public management paradigm in general 
(See Hood 2005). 
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is an arena of open communicative discourse among free subjects who, through making 
valid, rational claims for state action, serve as the legitimately sovereign formative force 
for the goals of the state, and by extension the goals of the economy.  The public sphere 
as an arena of both speech and action by communicating partners is not open in the 
Foucauldian, fully agonistic sense.139   
The first sense in which the public sphere mediates communication is through 
expectations of reason and rationality.  Rationality forms the bedrock of power used as 
force for mediation in Habermas’ public sphere theory.  However, in the world of 
governance, where bureaucracy is the ultimate organ of state and economic 
rationalization, the bureaucracy truly mediates the public sphere through its adaptation 
and reflection of economically rational expectations.  This combined effect of reflexive 
reciprocity results in greater porous-ness of the boundaries between citizens, 
bureaucracy, institutions of “political principals,” and the public sphere of which all are 
part.  The reflexivity of expectations and performance, speech and action, citizen as 
clients and citizen as co-productive partner renders the problem of “fuzzy boundaries” 
                                                 
139
 See for example, Love 1989, 280-218 on the Foucaulidan interpretation of the constraints of discourse 
that invariably arise.  “In volume one of The History of Sexuality, Foucault describes western man as the 
‘confessing animal’.  Confession, he argues, is the characteristic discourse of reflexive subjects, a 
discourse in which subjects discuss themselves.  A confession produces truth in two senses.  First, 
individuals must confess the truth about themselves.  Foucault argues that our Christian heritage, now 
secularized, requires individuals to reveal their desires as well as their transgressions in discourse.  He says 
that ‘we are forced to produce the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, in order 
to function: we must speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to confess or to discover the truth.’  
Second, this discourse itself aims at truth.  In confession, we submit our true desires for examination and 
evaluation to determine whether they are true, whether they conform to accepted and/or acceptable norms.  
‘In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, and determined in our undertakings, destined to a 
certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourse which are the bearers of specific effects 
of power.’  Discourse not only judges desires but administers them….  He concludes that the 
multiplication of discourse involves an intensification of interventions of power.  When subjects know and 
control themselves, they are also known and controlled.”  
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more complex than suggested by models of institutional interaction based on clear 
separation of powers, or fully rational actors, or democracies of public and private 
actors. 
Kettl suggests that the fuzzy boundary problem is the result of a confluence of 
historical factors and theoretical models that are inefficient predictors of reality.  The 
historical factors he traces to the competition between Jeffersonian, Madisonian, 
Hamiltonian, and Wilsonian traditions of politics/ administrative design.   
At the core of this [competing tradition] issues lies the fuzzy boundary problem. 
Each of the four traditions grew from efforts to draw lines defining the roles and 
responsibilities of each of the players.  The transformation of governance, in each 
case, blurred those historic boundaries…  That, in turn, framed the central problem 
of American public administration.  Administration, in general is about defining the 
nature of work; breaking work down into its component pieces; developing expertise 
for managing each of those pieces; and matching expertise to the job to be done.  
Administration is about devising and honing routines to accomplish complex tasks.  
That requires fixing responsibilities as drawing boundaries.  … Administration has 
always struggled to create and manage the boundaries that contain it (Kettl 2002, 74-
75). 
 
The struggle to define and maintain administrative boundaries is a problem of mutual 
sensation, understanding, interpretation, and reinterpretation.  The mutuality of the 
process of administrative creation renders efforts to establish clearly the bounds of 
administration a fundamentally hermeneutical problem.   
In the process of administrative creation, we are attempting to synthesize the past 
(constitutional, foundational traditions), the present (adaptations of citizens’ roles as 
service seekers, co-producers, sovereigns and funding agents (Kettl 2002, 70-73), and 
the expectations of the future of a number of individually decentered subject authors, 
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each positing a solution or expectation deriving valid normative weight from their 
prejudices (the interaction of self and tradition culminating in a ‘being in the world’).  
This occurs simultaneous to the striving for a fusion of horizons in limited institutionally 
mediated discourse contexts and the larger democratic discourse context.  The struggle 
to define administration in the present is a formative process that is on going: 
In fact, the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed 
because we are continually having to test all our prejudices.  An important part of 
this testing occurs in encountering the past and in understanding the tradition 
from which we come.  Hence, the horizon of the present cannot be formed 
without the past.  There is nor more an isolated horizon of the present in itself 
than there are historical horizons which have to be acquired.  Rather, 
understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by 
themselves.  We are familiar with the power of this kind of fusion chiefly from 
earlier times and their naïveté about themselves and their heritage.  In a tradition 
this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new are always 
combining into something of living value, without either being explicitly 
foregrounded from the other (Gadamer 1997, 306). 
 
The lingering problem of border-establishment in the administrative tradition is the 
fusing of fuzzy horizons into concrete boundaries in a web of interpenetrating traditions. 
 This hermeneutically derived fuzzy boundary problem remains a problem in 
administrative thought.  The solution to the problem involves re-centering the political 
selves of citizens and bureaucrats and political principals back into a single perspective 
of citizen sovereign in the bureaucratized public sphere.  This requires, to evoke 
Frederickson (1997) —not a reinvention of government but a reinvention of the way we 
think about governance.  “George Frederickson has contended that genuine reinvention 
of government that focuses only on reinventing the administrative process will fail.  He 
argues for ‘total quality politics’ to supplement ‘total quality management’” (Kettl 2002, 
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72).  The total quality of politics reinvented entails remaking the notion of bureaucracy 
(management) into a political concept with a representative task.  The reinvention of 
government is more than a reinvigoration of reinvented management of public political 
agencies.  It involves rethinking the direction of citizen sovereignty as one that comports 
more closely with the idea of the public sphere as the sum of public interest generating 
institutions, institutions of public interest implementation, and the critical reflective 
process of citizens’ critiques of each.  
I have already posited that we must examine the process expectations/ language 
of bureaucracy as hermeneutically involved in a reflexive generation process.  I now 
return to the idea of bureaucratic space in order to expand further on the idea of 
administrative boundaries and the public sphere.  The citizens’ imagination of and 
encounter with politics today involves either a minimalist legislative centered scheme of 
democratic government (voting à la Schumpeter (1942) or Bobbio (1989), see Held 
1996) or an expanded customer service centered scheme (as propounded in Total Quality 
Management rhetoric, for example (Zbaracki 1998)).  As with many things, the truth lies 
somewhere between the two models.   
The “golden mean” of citizen politics entails the idea of citizens as sovereign co-
producers of a state that they themselves want as the producers of their welfare.  The 
first step to realizing this is the reconfiguration of previously closed bureaucratic- 
political space as citizen-administrative space (pace the deliberative democrats, though I 
will attend more fully to the deliberative requirements of this in the next chapter).  To do 
this, we must revisit the idea of bureaucratic employees as citizen administrators and 
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consequently, bureaucratic space as citizen administrative space.  To paraphrase from 
Wamsley et. al. (1989), we must re-invoke the “agency” perspective.   
Citizen administrative space is the space in which a public administrator, 
invested heavily in his/her citizen role, brings to bear the idea of citizens’ values on 
decision-making.  Cooper emphasizes the extensive role of the citizen in his definition of 
the citizen administrator: 
Public administrators and scholars of public administration should begin their 
redefinition of the public administrative role from an understanding of 
citizenship because that is where the clarification of the role in a democratic 
society leads.  The source of their authority is the citizenry.  Public 
administrators are employed to exercise that authority on their behalf.  They do 
so as one of the citizenry; they can never divest themselves of their own status as 
members of the political community with obligations for its well-being.  A search 
for a redefined public administrative role requires an exploration of what it 
means to be a citizen administrator (145).  The administrator of the public’s 
business is not primarily a technician, not most essentially a specialist in some 
policy arena, nor simply an employee of a public organization; the most 
fundamental role of the public administrator is that of citizen.  Public 
administrators are best understood as citizen administrators. (Cooper 1991, 139).  
 
This revised and expanded theory of bureaucratic citizenship, and therefore of 
citizenship in general, requires that we reconceptualize the space of citizenship practices.  
Other scholars of public administration, notably Wamsley, et al. (1989) have 
conceptualized this space as the agency.  These citizen administrators operate in an 
agency space that stands for the rights of citizens to exercise their rights as members of 
the common will, not in the space normally posited by theorists promoting an 
economizing function for bureaucracy.  
In order for public administrators to be viewed as legitimate agents, the Agency 
must stand for: 1) the broadest possible definition of the public interest derivable 
from its statutory mandate, requirements for fiduciary responsibility, and 
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consistent with the Constitution; and 2) a sincere search for a consensus on the 
‘common good’ within the realm of the substantive policy concerns that fall 
within the agency’s ambit.  It must not only satisfy or balance the most powerful 
interests impinging upon it as any successful institution would, but it also must 
seek to represent the unspoken interests of unwitting stakeholders and thus to 
invoke a higher common good.  The agency thus must act as an agent for those 
citizens not present and indeed serve as the agent-trustee for all citizens…  
(Wamsley, et. l. 1989, 117). 
 
To recapitulate on a position developed in an earlier section of this chapter “… 
theories of citizenship should be based on exploration of the sometimes contentious, 
sometimes cooperative, sometimes legitimate dyadic relationship, between the state and 
the capitalistic economy” (Somers 1993, 588).  The theory of citizenship in this 
rethought state must be one that takes the public sphere as all public spaces, in many 
cases including spaces such as the Agency, as legitimate arenas for critical dialogue on 
the state and its functions.  The expanded definition of the public sphere, then, “… 
denotes a contested participatory site in which actors with overlapping identities as legal 
subjects, citizens, economic actors and family and community members, form a public 
body and engage in negotiations and contestations over political and social life” (Somers 
1993, 589).  This involves remaking the activities of citizenship as an institutionalized 
form.  
As the mediating actor between society, economy, and state, public agencies 
always already permeate those arenas of the public sphere described above.  That is, 
institutions of immigration define and affirm citizenship through what Wamsley calls the 
Agency.  To go further into the intimacies of the state, the family is housed in a space 
made safe by bureaucratic actions and, in some cases, is housed through the bureaucratic 
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affirmation of a particular status vis-à-vis state definitions of class and desert.  Each of 
these arenas described form an area of “contestation over political and social life” in 
which bureaucracy plays an integral role for those persons—stakeholders and 
communicative partners—involved.   
 Some areas of the bureaucratic or agency space, however, are more directly 
contested than others.  Some areas are open to direct citizen appeal, while others remain 
contestable.  Those indirectly contested areas are those that are most important for a full 
theory of citizenship in the bureaucratic state.  Specifically of concern are those areas 
that Kettl describes as between bureaucratic layers or between bureaucratic offices 
themselves.  While citizens are typically understood to be external partners to 
bureaucracy—kept out of internal spaces by occupational qualifications—they can also 
be seen as agents operating within these layers under the revised definition of 
bureaucrats as citizen administrators.  
When the ‘government bureaucracy’ interacts with its external partners … it is 
not just a monolithic entity.  The ‘bureaucracy’ is really composed of different 
individuals at different levels with different instincts and goals.  These officials 
interact, in turn with counterparts with other officials in other bureaucracies who 
share similar characteristics.  Officials at different levels tend to behave 
differently; as the interact with other officials at different levels in different 
bureaucracies, problems in communication, performance and accountability 
arise.  … failure to bridge the boundaries between levels can create tenuous 
breakdowns, chronic performance problems, political embarrassments, and, 
sometimes, great tragedies (Kettl 2002, 65).  
 
These between bureaucratic spaces, previously regarded as internal only and 
beyond citizen reach, become citizen spaces in the agency-- bureaucratized public 
sphere.  As citizen administrators, bureaucrats (even those devoted exclusively to 
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internal relations between and within the agencies) bring to bear their citizen capacities 
and horizons into these spaces.  Each of their understandings, interpretations, languages, 
and prejudices come into this rethought space.  That is, citizens as bureaucrats bring into 
the space their hermeneutically defined selves when entering the doors of upper level or 
internal workings of the bureaucracy; the impulse of tradition (Bildung) permeates these 
spaces as well.  Citizens occupy these spaces indirectly, but occupy them nevertheless.  
Rendering these spaces directly available for citizen consumption would be problematic 
in a welfare state marked by sensitive and complex information systems.  In order to 
make these truly direct citizen spaces, we must re-imagine the citizenship of ordinary 
citizens and citizen administrators to be symbolic of partially fused horizons, rather than 
discrete horizons without overlap.  Under conditions of even a partial fusion of horizons, 
ever changing as citizens and citizen administrators interact, there arises a possibility 
that understandings that are more advanced (and secondarily, legitimacy) may surface.  
 
Conclusion 
 I have elaborated in this chapter upon the idea that bureaucrats and 
bureaucracies, through their speech-action interactions with citizens, shape the public 
sphere that all members of the society are potentially part of.  Bureaucracy, in this case, 
serves to encapsulate and to mediate the needs and wants of citizens through its reflexive 
and reflective interaction with citizen’s demands for redressive correction to problems 
arising in the function of the state and economy.  The concluding point of this chapter is 
that language and the expression of language through speech and action to and through 
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the bureaucracy, forms the most critical layer of direct citizen sovereign governance left 
in the modern welfare state. 
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CHAPTER VII 
PRODUCING LEGITIMACY THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE 
REPRESENTATION 
 
A well ordered society is ‘a society effectively regulated by a public conception 
of justice’” (Chambers 2006, 83; Rawls 2001, 5) 
 A truly democratic public interest includes the interests of all members of the 
state affected by the implementation of policies designed to fulfill this standard.  As the 
rightful body of participations, that representatives ought to account for, the public is an 
expansive mutable body of persons.  As a unit encompassing pluralities, the public will 
express itself in a multitude of differing ways.  Therefore, the standard necessary to 
reach a fully “public” public interest standard—total discursive participation— must be 
itself a highly idealized form of pluralism that defies simple realization.   
The issues of plural participation in the construction of the public interest are as 
numerous and varied as the number of persons participating in the first place.  In the 
process of realizing a true public interest as more than an ideal, the long-standing 
impediments to full social participation—justice, recognition, toleration, and 
representation—must be attended to.  Realizing full social justice means addressing the 
following problematic question: how can all members of the public—the entire public 
sphere in a modern state—come together, under the conditions of a truly communicative 
situation, to articulate the public interest?   
 213 
The answer to this question lies in unpacking the process through which public 
participants move towards the fulfillment of justice.  In this process, participants must 
come to recognize each other, build bonds and/or bridges with each other, develop a 
fully tolerant position where each is allowed to speak his/her perspective fully without 
fear of repression (but also without the motivation for sublimating their position or of the 
deliberative process/ public sphere itself), represent their values or act to represent the 
values of their groups’ identity, and monitor the transmission of these values within the 
resulting political structure.  The processes themselves are complicated and involved, to 
say nothing of the variability that humanity as social construct introduces.  
Much of the contemporary literature on justice, in either its social or political 
form, focus on justice as an end state; it is a destination to be “arrived at”.140   The 
enormity of the concept and its ramifications often eclipse the processes necessary for 
the realization of justice.  The precursory processes of recognition, toleration, and 
representation fall temporarily to the wayside.  Further, and significantly for the matter 
here, the literature on justice—even it is political form-- does not fully address matters of 
policy implementation as ordinary processes of governance in the name of justice.   
As depicted in the many elaborations of contemporary democratic theory, 
discourse or deliberation is an independently valuable process, or an end that is distinct  
                                                 
140
 The contemporary literature on justice is vast, but remarkably “centripetal” around Rawl’s theory of 
justice.  Absent Rawls’ canonical contributions (1999a, 2001) in particular, significant tracts on justice 
include: Ackerman 1980, Barry 2005, Fraser, 1997, Galston 1980, Miller 1976 and 1999, Tomasi 2001, 
Walzer 1983, Young 1990 
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from the administrative institutions of governance.141  Depictions of deliberation divorce 
administrative institutions even from the administration of the conversation itself.142  
While a number of discursive and deliberative, democratic theorists laud the long-dead 
constructs of the town-hall meeting, the forum, or the ekklesia as locations of true 
deliberative possibility, in doing so they continue to ignore the centrality of 
administrative institutions and administrators in these spaces.  In doing so, do they fail to 
address the effect that citizens’ deliberations with administrators, or citizens’ 
deliberations as administrators, have on the justice outcomes of political policy.  This 
separation of discursive processes from the goals of government and the segregation of 
participants in deliberations reifies a false theoretical world that fails to make 
meaningful progress in the study of justice as real. 
 In the previous chapter, an argument for considering administrators/ bureaucrats 
as legitimate discursive partners because of their equal citizenship status developed.  
Bureaucrats, like all citizens, must have their “citizen” and professional interests fully 
represented in the formation of a public interest standard that is fully worthy of the 
description “public”.  While in the previous chapter the focus was on the “citizen” 
interests of bureaucrats, here the argument progresses a step further to depict the unique  
 
                                                 
141
 Like the literature on justice, the literature on deliberative and discursive theories of democracy is quite 
vast.  Notable theorists include: Benhabib 1996, Bessette 1994, Bohman 1996, Bohman and Rehg 1997, 
Cohen 1986 and 1988, Dryzek 1990, 2000, and 2003, Guttmann and Thompson 1996 and 2004, James 
2004, Knight and Johnson 1996, Michelman 1997, Mouffe 2000, Rawls 1999a, Young 1990, 2006,  In the 
public administration literature, Forester (1985, 1993, and 1999)  and Fischer (2005) stand out as 
luminaries.  
142
 One continues wondering who is the “Robert” behind Robert’s Rules of Order.  Moreover, more 
importantly, who granted it Robert’s legitimate right to impose “order.”  Whom, we might say, does 
Robert work for?  (Robert, Evans, Honeman, and Balch, 2000). 
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professional capacity that bureaucrats have relative to the production of justice.  
Specifically, bureaucrats operate in the public sphere not only as citizens who by chance 
occupy a particular public office, but also as a body of participants whose function is to 
serve as facilitator for the inclusion of other citizens’ interests in public policy—that is, 
public interest—deliberations.143   
In the way that citizens experience politics in the late modern state, bureaucracy 
is the state.  Despite the claims of the dispositional anti-bureaucrats,144 bureaucrats as 
class of citizens, serve a distinct function in society.  As has been made clear by scholars 
of representative bureaucracy (Kingsley 1944, Evans 1974; Selden 1997; Subramaniam 
1967), “…a representative bureaucracy is a good to be provided… a bureaucracy 
broadly reflective of the interests, opinions, needs, desires and values of the general 
public has a legitimate claim to participate in the policy process” (Keiser et al 2002, 
553). 
Following this position, representative bureaucracies perform a social good that 
is normatively legitimate in a justice seeking democracy.  Bureaucrats as representatives 
help to bring groups marginalized by gender, traditions of non-participation, 
socioeconomic status, or race, back into the discourses.  Bureaucrats, as citizens and as 
representatives of citizens, are a unique body of participants in the political public 
sphere.  The public service of public servants (another name for bureaucrats) includes 
                                                 
143
 When using the term citizen throughout this chapter, I mean all of those persons affected by social 
political policy.  However, I do this with an eye towards the unique role that bureaucrats play vis-à-vis 
more marginalized subsets of the population.  
144
 Recalling from earlier in the work: the disposition of anti-bureaucracy is a “mood” that has stricken the 
modern political philosopher and compels him/her to argue that bureaucracy is pathological, and does ill 
for society, while enjoying (contradictorily) the fruits of bureaucratic labor such as social pensions, clean 
water, and police patrol.   
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both transmission of the values of those ordinarily silent in the making of policy and 
advocacy for social justice deliberation.  Bureaucrats are, for the objective of public 
sphere discourse, a lynchpin that holds the citizen to the state.   
The concept of the bureaucrat as representative takes as a starting point the idea 
of bureaucratic citizenship, stewardship, and advocacy as useful activities for the 
realization of democracy and justice.  This definition contradicts significant tracts of 
literature in political theory that is wont to declare bureaucratic activity, outside of 
“counting manhole covers,” an affront to electoral democracy.145 For citizens, 
bureaucrats serve as readily accessible agents of the governing structure.  Through 
interaction with administrative institutions, citizens may directly challenge the state for 
recognition of their identities, assess the degree to which their identities are permitted/ 
tolerated by the state, and gain representation through commonly accessible channels.  In 
their capacity as representatives and stewards, bureaucrats play a role of recognition of 
citizens, toleration of citizen identities, and transmission of citizen values through active 
representation. 
The estimation here of the political value of bureaucrats as stewards and 
representatives, echoes a common refrain from the earliest Greek thought, that 
bureaucrats are guardians—members of a protectorate class-- that intervenes in the 
complexity (perhaps, even the impossibility) of direct democratic participation by voice, 
                                                 
145
 Note the vast literature of political control.  Though this literature is not often included as part of the 
political theory literature, encapsulated in this section of thought are significant ideas on the importance of 
political principals (legislators, executives, judges) control of the bureaucracy.  Primarily the arguments 
suggest that political control of bureaucrats, through a variety of machinations, is the only way to secure 
government from spinning into oligarchy, corruption, and tyranny.  See McCubbins, et.al. (1989). 
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vote, or “click” (Pool, 1998).  Bureaucrats, as stewards of the citizenry, play the role of 
intermediary between citizens and the law making institutions of government.  
Bureaucratic stewardship involves a challenging degree of communicative interaction 
between citizens and bureaucrats, including a number of actions that make 
communicative interaction valuable in a government structure dependent on 
representation, such as a liberal, constitutional democracy.  Specifically, the 
communicative, democratically valuable actions of bureaucratic stewardship of citizens 
are (broadly) recognition, toleration, and representation. 
 
Social Justice and the Process of Representation 
 The ideal of “justice for all” as the ultimate political good is a core notion in 
modern theories of politics.  Within an overwhelming majority of theories of politics, 
political processes, and political institutions justice figures as the telos of all that is 
political.  While definitions of the term “justice” vary, the basic principles for modern 
politics, elaborated in summary form by Rawls are:  
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.  Second: 
social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and b) attached to positions 
and offices open to all” (Rawls 1999a, 53).146    
 
Justice, to echo a refrain in multiple elaborations, concerns what individuals are  
 
                                                 
146
 The plausibility of these two principles as elementary to social justice remains up for debate in 
political theory.  However, the contests over the means by which social justice happens are more important 
here. 
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rightfully due.  As an idea, justice serves to categorize our perceptions of desert and 
goodness, excess and badness.  As an idea guiding institutions, justice serves to 
categorize actions as deserved or excessive in either punitive or palliative measure.  
In the context of public administration, justice is a normatively laudable good for 
the guidance of action.  Justice is, to reprise an earlier theme, the heart of the public 
interest.  The public interest is normatively good when it serves the end of justice.  The 
fulfillment of Rawls’ two principles of justice and the notion of justice as desert guide 
normative thought about public administration practice.  Justice administered cannot 
escape the social—it cannot escape the regulation of the society in which it evolves.  
Full social justice arises through those evolving processes of culturally, politically and 
economically manufacturing the social.  This requires conceptualizing the processes of 
participation so that bureaucratic actors are include as integral in the institutional efforts 
towards realizing social justice.  
The co-evolutionary process of the public interest and political administrative 
processes diminishes the utility of Rawls’ position on justice, as it defies the practical 
understanding that public administration scholars have of the world in which they 
operate.  Specifically, in the context of public administration, there can be no original 
position where the world is unknown.147  For public administrators as citizens and the 
                                                 
147
 The conditions of the original position are (1999a, 118-119): “… the parties do not know certain kinds 
of particular facts.  First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor 
does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, 
and the like.  Nor again does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan 
of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or 
pessimism.  More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own 
society.”  There is much more said here on the lack of knowledge that original participants have, however 
the few particular facts described here as unknown already presuppose a condition that public 
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representatives of citizens, social justice comes out of the process of an already 
constituted political and social system modified through conscientious institutional 
pressure alone.  “Citizens… know everything about themselves and in particular they are 
very aware of the way their fundamental moral and religious ideas diverge” (Chambers 
2006, 83).   
Social justice, if we are to take the political interpretations of Rawls seriously, 
requires action on the part of political actors (citizens) and political institutions (public 
administrators).  In elite and minimalist theories of democratic politics, voting is the 
highest political act available to the average citizens in modern states (Przeworski 1999).  
In fact, participation in the political sphere (which was formerly the highest political act 
in more Aristotelian conceptualization of politics) as interaction in political decision-
making is interpretable through this minimalist lens to be merely voting or not voting.  
For minimalist conceptualization of citizens’ participatory efforts, checking a box and 
dropping a slip into the ballot box, not active engagement participation in the 
formulation or formation of law, is acting politically in ordinary times.   
Alternatively, in a more active conceptualization of the democratic state, the 
highest political act is to represent those who are not present in the process of law 
formation (Young 2000).  Representation-- transmitting the values of a constituency to 
whom one is connected deeply but who are not otherwise present into the processes 
involved in making the situation-- is the highest political act available to men in 
                                                                                                                                                
administrators cannot accept as useful for the articulation of a socially just system.  Social justice in public 
administration entails efforts to reach the two principles of justice in the context of the “real” of valid 
concern for administrators themselves.  My effort to describe social justice as a process is an effort to 
describe a “real” path to social justice in which public administrators play a critical part.  
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democratic systems in the modern time.  The act of representation, being an ultimate act 
of politics, is the culmination of a series of previous acts that are integral to justice itself. 
 
Processes of Representation 
 Representation theories of modern thinkers of politics include such categories as 
authoritative, active symbolic, substantive, thick or thin (Pitkin 1969).  Conventional 
descriptions of representation offer a view of representation as a legislator’s activity vis-
à-vis a citizen constituency only, not a function of other branches of government.  The 
conceptualization of representation in much of conventional political theory takes a 
particularly limited view of the role of bureaucratic institutions and the role of 
representation in the process of realizing social justice (Hindera 1993a, 1993b; Hindera 
and Young 1998; Kingsley 1944; Keiser et al 2002; Meier 1975, 1993; Meier and Nigro 
1976; Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999; Nachmias and Rosenbloom 1973; Nigro 
1974).  
Thus far, many descriptions depict representation as a good in and of itself.  Not 
until Young’s interpretation (2000) representation was it conceived of as integral to the 
process of realizing social justice.  This is not to suggest that representation is a final 
achievement or outcome possessed wholly by any institution or party.  Rather, this 
means that the processes of representation are continually on going and non-autopoetic 
with respect to the political and social whole.   
 The process-oriented evaluation of representation draws upon the recent and 
remarkable work of Young, and draws upon the older work of Dewey, particularly his 
 221 
work on the continuity of experience.  For Dewey, representation was a part of the social 
processes of making sense of those problematic aspects of social life together.  That is, 
one represents another, knowing that the person whom they are representing has a 
problematic view of the situation.  Without the insertion of a problematic viewpoint, 
there is, to be clear, no need for representation of the other’s viewpoint as such.  If views 
are homogenous or symmetrical about a situation, the presentation of the present 
individual’s values will suffice to satisfy all others.  In the plural situation of 
heterogeneous or asymmetric viewpoints, representation becomes necessary so that no 
persons engaged in a particular situation will feel themselves outside of the social 
conditions of the situation.  
 Representation, though, as part of the distinct situation, involves multiple stages 
and modes of experience in a particular situation.  As Dewey indicates in Experience 
and Education (1938a), the understanding of a situation envelops the process of 
experiencing the situation both socially and objectively, through continuity, progress, 
and interaction.  Representation of another’s values or perceptions of a situation occur 
socially and objectively through a continuous process of interaction (Hall 1996).  
Pragmatic representation is the re-presentation of another’s experience with in a given 
situation. 
A number of descriptive qualifiers come along with the concept representation in 
modern political theory and political science.  The most useful of these for discussing the 
relationship of public administration to the process of representation is active or passive 
(Mosher 1978).  Mosher distinguishes two meanings of bureaucratic representation.  
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Passive representation ‘concerns the source of origin of individuals and the 
degree to which, collectively, they mirror the total society.  It may be statistically 
measured in terms, for example of locality of origins and its nature (rural, urban, 
suburban, etc.), previous occupation, father’s occupation, education, family 
income, family social class, rage, religion.’  In contrast, in active representation, 
‘the individual (or administrator) is expected to press for the interests and desires 
of those whom he is presumed to represent, whether they be the whole people or 
some segment of the people’ (Lim 2006, 194).  
 
Active representation is not distinct from the prior acts involved in the process of 
representation; to represent another actively requires the continuous interaction with the 
other’s experience.  As process of experiences shared, representation requires multiple 
prior actions.  These actions include greeting, interaction, recognition, 
acknowledgement, toleration, inclusion, intercourse, and participation.  Additionally, 
these processes must be recurring constantly in the social interactions of the moment.   
 
Unity of Representation Processes 
Greeting, interaction, recognition and acknowledgement, while being identified 
as conceptually distinct here, occur in our every day lives so quickly as to seem almost 
simultaneous.  Particularly when recognition is part of our realization that we “know” 
someone from previous interactions (with that specific person or with their obvious 
identity markers), there is a compression of the acts of greeting, interaction, recognition, 
and acknowledgement into seamless social action.  Indeed, in this age of information, 
where alternative identity constructs and their obvious markers are “known” as novel 
points of social information, the prior actions necessary to reach recognition and 
acknowledgement are compressed as the information exchanges previously necessary to 
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reach this point are made less demanding given expectations of (and a real probability of 
possession of) prior information.  The utility of making the processes distinct however, 
is necessary here as bureaucrats, as government stewards, mediate the interaction 
between citizens and “the state” in each of these processes culminating in representation.   
 
Greeting 
It is difficult to differentiate conceptually interaction and greeting.  Indeed, in 
many of our daily activities, we may interact with others without formally greeting them 
or them greeting us.  However, even in the perfunctory interaction of purchasing a basic 
service, we often experience a form of greeting prior to our interactions that, while 
possibly unspoken often takes the form of an expectant look or nod of the head.  
Greeting is the initial (possibly, but not necessarily, verbal) step taken in social 
interaction.  The function of greeting is to open of the possibility of further interaction.  
While “hello” may seem to be a perfunctory statement in much ordinary interaction, its 
functional value is to introduce to other participants in the social interaction, the 
possibility that we intend continued interaction with them.  The mere greeting opens the 
possibility of deliberation and social power exchange.  Greeting says to the other actor 
that we sense their being and wish to respond to it.   
In the moment of communicating I call greeting, a speaker announces her 
presence as ready to listen and take responsibility for her relationship to her 
interlocutors, at the same time that it announces her distance from the others.  … 
The gestures of greeting function to acknowledge relations of discursive equality 
and mutual respect among the parties to discussion, as well as to establish trust 
and forge connection based on the previous relationships among the parties” 
(Young 2000, 59). 
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Interaction 
 While a type of interaction, greeting itself is functionally prior to what will be 
defined here as “interaction.”  Interaction, as described (and here, borrowed from) 
Arendt, is the “putting forward of ourselves” for judgment, appreciation and/or critique 
within mutually exchanging (reflexive) speech and action.  This “putting forward of 
ourselves” is done in the context of being public actors and therefore, being inevitably 
political.   
Being an active participant in the public political space ties one into the project 
of realizing the full plurality of social existence as communication.  Drawing heavily on 
her own Aristotelianism, Arendt couples social interaction and being-at all in the process 
of interacting in public.  Interaction is the process through which we come to make real 
our own social existence equally in the public and political realm, as a space distinct 
from the apolitical individualism of the private.   
Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that 
everybody sees and hears from a different position.  This is the meaning of public 
life, compared to which even the richest and most satisfying family life can offer 
only the prolongation of one’s own position with its attending aspects and 
perspectives…. Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects 
without changing their identity, so that those who are gathered around them 
know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably 
appear (Arendt 1957, 57) 
 
Arendt, like Dewey, appreciates the very nature of the social as the interactive and vice 
versa.  Similarly, both appreciate the necessity of openness to multiple forms of 
interaction, what Dewey would describe as “freedom of social inquiry and of distribution 
of its conclusions” (1927, 166).  This openness Arendt will see social interaction as 
“performative”, while Dewey will see it as “communicative”.   
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There can be no public without full publicity in respect to all consequences 
which concern it [the notion that men may be free in their thought].  Whatever 
obstructs and restricts publicity, limits and distorts public opinion and checks and 
distorts thinking on social affairs.  Without freedom of expression, not even 
methods of social inquiry can be developed. For tools can be evolved and 
perfected only in operation; in application to observing, reporting and organizing 
actual subject-matter; and this application cannot occur save through free and 
systematic communication (1927, 167). 
 
Publicity is part of the shared experience of interaction between persons and those 
artifacts (tools) which they people produce to manage their lives shared in common.   
Interaction, active and importantly tied to interaction, is more than merely 
“doing.” Interaction is equivalent also to political listening.  Drawing upon Arendt again 
for definitions of listening and political equality:  
One kind of ‘equality attending the public realm’ is political equality. Political 
equality is an equalizing of unequals; it gives equal standing to those who may 
otherwise be unequal…. Political equality makes peers out of those who are 
different.  In equalizing us, political equality creates a space where we ‘are 
listening and can be listened to’” (Bickford 1996, 57).  
 
In the interactive realm of the public, not only speaking but also listening, counts 
towards the quality of the interactive character of the public sphere.  
 
Listening 
 Despite its passive connotation in ordinary speech, the act of listening is an 
active phase of the process of social interaction.  Listening is the action where we absorb 
for purposes of interpretation the information about others as put forward through the 
media of speech, performance, and interaction in its various forms.   
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Political listening is not primarily a caring or amicable practice, and I emphasize 
this at the outset because ‘listening’ tends immediately to evoke ideas of empathy 
and compassion.  We cannot suppose that political actors are sympathetic toward 
one another in a conflictual context, yet it is precisely the presence of conflict 
and differences that makes communicative interaction necessary.  This 
communicative interaction—speaking and listening together—does not 
necessarily resolve or do away with the conflicts that arise from uncertainty, 
inequality, and identity.  Rather, it enables political actors to decide 
democratically how to act in the face of conflict, and to clarify the nature of the 
conflict at hand.  Deciding democratically means deciding, under conditions in 
which all voices are heard, what course of action makes sense (Bickford 1996, 
2). 
 
Listening in the truly interactive sense is not passive—it is decidedly active and political.  
In political listening, we absorb information put forward to us, form questions of 
clarification, and engage in the process of categorization of our experiences and those of 
the “other.”  The interactive component of listening becomes clear when we ask 
questions that arise, reformulate of our categorization because of mutual interrogation, 
and use the information drawn from the processes (Forester 1999).  This interactive 
process of listening (and speaking), in its ideal political form, is iterative.  The iterative 
nature of interaction requires that participants do more than merely listen and speak; 
listening requires the simultaneous action of recognition.   
 
Recognition 
 Recognition is not monological or dyadic between individuals alone, but is rather 
dialogical and mutual between individuals and individuals, and individuals and 
institutions.  Tully (2004) rightly suggests that recognition is always bound into the 
social process of government and being governed.  In the struggle for recognition 
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between individuals and institutions, the challenge is not directly against the institution 
as institution, but is rather a challenge against the manner that the institution’s effects 
misunderstand the outside world or harm the life/livelihood of the individuals seeking 
recognition.  Consequently, we can view individual to institution recognition claims as: 
Struggles over recognition are struggles over the intersubjective norms (laws, 
rules, conventions, or customs) under which the members of any government 
recognize each other as members and coordinate their interactions.  Hence, 
struggles over recognition are always struggles over the prevailing 
intersubjective norms of mutual recognition through which the members 
(individuals and groups under various descriptions) of any system of action 
coordinated (for the practice of governance) are recognized and governed 
(Markell 2003, 86-87).   
 
In the context of recognition, the intended effect of changing practices is paramount.  
The effort to change minds is a subsequent concern more properly called toleration.148 
 The act of recognition in the context of bureaucrat-citizen (institution-individual) 
interaction is practically distinct from the act of recognition performed by citizens by 
way of each other.  Recalling the fundamental thinker of recognition—Hegel—the 
pursuit of recognition is the pursuit of an autonomous individual for acknowledgement 
from his/her social surroundings to be a separate and equal, legally universal, being 
(Honneth 1995, 16-18).  In Hegel’s thought, and in the thought of the some toleration 
scholars who have followed, the act of recognition always supposes some form of social 
stratification between actors prior to the situation at hand.  Recognition is always part of 
                                                 
148
 My attention to the concept of toleration is certainly brief and a more thoroughgoing analysis would 
include much more attention to the medieval period.  For more attentive analyses, see Nederman and 
Laursen 1996 and Nederman 2000.  
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the effort of one actor aiming for the equalization or just distribution of power from one 
to another.   
From the perspective of the citizen, recognition claims inhere in a desire for 
recognition as a secondary consequence to the provision of either psychosocial or 
politic-economic goods.  According to theorists of recognition such as Charles Taylor 
(1994), Will Kymlicka (1995) and Axel Honneth (1995; and Fraser and Honneth 2004), 
the basis of recognition claims is a deep-seated need for individuals to be “known”—to 
be granted a socially valuable resource of individual identity status—on the basis of their 
own estimations of themselves.  Conversely, according to others such as Nancy Fraser 
(2004), the basis of recognition claims are desires for redress of structural and economic 
inequalities that stymie the individuals’ ability to express their identities as fully as they 
would like.  For still others, Galeotti (2002), claims to recognition are claims to equal 
rights to a social good—true plural toleration of one’s identity as valued identity—based 
upon a personally felt need to affect a truly egalitarian liberal democracy. 
Reflecting on the act of greeting and its relation to the act of recognition, the 
practice of greeting ties greeting- recognition into the tense situation of anticipation of 
reciprocity as recognition of equal claim to the situation.  As Young (2000) makes clear, 
greeting as part of the social process may potentially break down from non-reciprocity of 
the greeting act.  That is, if one actor assumes all of the social power exchange for 
him/herself, mutual recognition falls flat at the outset.  Power between individuals is no 
longer transferable if one actor denies the validity of or reproaches the other for, the 
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greeting initiated.  In order for recognition to occur, there must be a possibility of parity 
between actors.149  
Power, in the situation of recognition, manifests in actors seeking a legitimate basis 
upon which to amass the social currency necessary to coerce another.  Rather, relations 
of power govern the terms upon which each individual founds their claims to seek self-
authority.  Seeking of recognition as self-authority occurs only in the public performance 
of the resolution to the Hegelian master-slave dialectic.  The authority won in the context 
of power exchanging recognition is the authority of one actor to define his or her 
identity—to have identity authorship—distinct from the direct relationship of him or 
herself to the other.  To re-invoke the Hegelian distinction, the effort of the slave to be 
recognized is the slaves’ desire to define him/herself not as a slave but as an individual 
with both self-prioritized attributes and an individual standing vis-à-vis the rules of 
social justice (and its consequences) (see Honneth 1995; Pelczynski, 1984).  The 
psychological need for recognition at the individual level then is the desire to self-
prioritize one’s multiple identities as the individual sees fit according to his/her own 
conceptualization of what is valuable. 
 
Recognition and the State 
In common use, recognition is non-reciprocal when it occurs between individuals 
and institutions.  Between individuals and institutions, recognition happens when the 
                                                 
149
 Parity, to evoke the French political movement’s use of the term parite, is the achievement of 
universally equal status by acknowledging the differences that inhere in us all, but moving beyond them to 
realize the higher goal of more equal (dare I suggest more universal) decision making procedures and 
consequences of decisions (Wallach Scott 2005).   
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institution responds in a regularized, procedural, way to the individual’s claim of need.  
Recognition, however, is also a “desire” or need of institutions (in Markell’s case, the 
state) to be recognized.  That is, recognition requires reciprocity, whether from other 
individuals or from institutions.150   
However, the continued interpretation of the bureaucratic arm of the state as 
divided from the process of representation, of which recognition is a critical part, is self-
limiting in the discussion of justice.  Young offers the following defense of the state and 
its bureaucracy as necessary institution for all aspects of social life: 
State institutions in principle are the most important means of regulating and 
directing economic life for the sake of the self-development of everyone.  Only 
state institutions have the kind of power that can limit the power of large private 
enterprises and facilitate the use of that private power for the collective well-
being.  Well-organized states accomplish large-scale collective goals by 
facilitating social co-ordination among individuals and groups.  To manage such 
co-ordination states must be centralized and regulative: the must gather useful 
information, monitor implementation and compliance, and rely on coercion in 
case of non-compliance.  Only state institutions can facilitate the co-ordination 
required for a society to ensure investment needs, skills development, 
infrastructure, and quality environment for everyone, and to organize many 
useful occupations so that those not employed or working for private enterprise 
have options for meaningful work.  Democratically legitimized states are not 
necessary evils; potentially and sometimes actually, the exhibit uniquely 
important virtues to support social justice in ways no other social processes do 
(2000, 186).  
 
Unlike Young, who offers a more institutionalist focus to her argument for the 
importance of the state in representative processes, Markell couches his interpretation of 
the state’s claim of and need for recognition in the language of sovereignty.  He suggests 
                                                 
150
 That institutional recognition is just the procedurally determined recognition of one individual by 
another is a possible argument.  However, in the situation of the individual and the state, individuals are 
requested to recognize their role as part of and as constituent of the state.  Institutional recognition is not 
merely the aggregated recognition of a critical mass of individuals in institutional roles; it is the 
recognition of the institution qua institution by the individual. 
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that, “the ideal of recognition… anchors sovereignty in knowledge, that is, in the 
prospect of arriving at a clear understanding of who you are and of the nature of the 
larger groups and communities to which you belong, and of securing the respectful 
recognition of these same facts by others” (Markell 2003, 12).  The politics of 
recognition demands then that citizens recognize the state and its sovereignty (despite its 
always already present status) in their individual demands for recognition.    
Recognition of the sovereignty of the state, like the needs for sovereign 
recognition as individuals, is problematic.  But the elemental reality remains, the politics 
of recognition are not unidirectional, but are dual and reflexive in that there are present 
demands made by both the state and individual.  Following Markell’s explanation:  
States’ claims to sovereignty are also typically different from other moves made 
within the politics of recognition in two respects, both of which suggest that 
these state claims may demand special critical attention.  First, they are less often 
perceived as demands for recognition than are say, the claims of subordinated 
people and groups, which are already socially marked as ‘particular’ and 
therefore do not enjoy the privilege of appearing pre or extrapolitical in the way 
the idea of state sovereignty, among others, so frequently does.  Second, and 
relatedly, the political encounter between a state and an emergent political 
constituency demanding an end to some injustice in relations of identity and 
difference is, typically, highly asymmetrical.  This is in large part because the 
state, while not necessarily truly sovereign in the way it purports to be, 
nevertheless does command extensive social and political resources; and it does 
so partly by virtue of the fact that it can usually draw upon a history of relatively 
stabilized relations of recognition—relations from which it derives authority and 
power—with other, often much larger and more powerful constituencies.  For 
this reason, creating incentives for people to frame their claims about justice in 
ways that abet rather than undermine the project of state sovereignty (Markell 
2003, 30). 
 
In terms of the interaction of citizens (or even non-citizens in some cases) seeking 
recognition from the state, the motivation for seeking recognition and the basic concept 
of recognition remains essentially the same.  However, the power of the “always already 
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sovereign” state over the citizen makes the “doing” of recognition in individual-
institutional interactions different according to the law of the situation.  Markell (2003) 
tries to reconceptualize the act of the state’s recognition of citizens as the mending of a 
previous ontological error.  That is, prior to the citizen’s approach to the state for 
recognition, the state has fundamentally misunderstood the citizen’s state of being and 
action.  The state, in misrecognizing the citizen ontologically, has failed to understand 
the actions and circumstances unique and necessary to the citizen’s life.  The process of 
recognition (on the state side) is the act of re-cognizing—reworking the ontological 
status of—the citizen appropriately, based upon the self-prioritized values of the citizen 
themselves.  To re-invoke the pragmatist description of representation above, 
recognition as part of the representation process requires the reintegration of the other’s 
experience of the situations.  That an individual feels “unrecognizable” to the state 
suggests that the continuity of interaction between the two—citizen and state—has 
broken down.  Though the breakdown of social processes may occur at a number of 
junctions in the process of recognition, depictions often include a breakdown in the 
recognition of an individual’s rights claims vis-à-vis the law. 
 
Recognition and the Law 
When citizens petition the state for recognition, they are asking for 
acknowledgement of the prior misunderstanding of their relationship as universal legal 
being with rights claims to freedom within the state.  The redress for the subsequent 
misapplication of this fault in the implementation of recognition is the outcome preferred 
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by citizens seeking resolution.  These demands, if successful, ought to culminate in the 
eventual redrawing of the lines of laws and norms to re-accommodate the citizen.   
Law, when speaking of recognition, is the codification of public interest 
expectations made based on previously known citizen ontologies, their circumstances, 
and interactions.  The breakdown of recognition then is the codification of a public 
interest that is not just.  The language and application of the law does not recognize the 
rightful desert claims of each voice.   
Laws, however important for citizens, we know experientially only, that is, in the 
context of their administration.  Moreover, the need for recognition being a need felt 
experientially, not textually, requires the recognition claims be leveled against the 
institution that makes law initially meaningful to citizens.  Again, following Appleby:  
The real meaning of law appears only in the course of its administration.  It is 
only as assessments are made, for example, that there is any demonstration of 
what revenue a tax law will provide and what burdens it will impose.  Citizens 
who study and use the technical provisions of the income-tax law aid the 
government in actually determining what the law is (Appleby 1952-76-77).   
 
The effort of seeking recognition from law as merely terms would be itself pointless, as 
law itself has no inherent “felt” or “practical” effects on citizens’ lives before its 
administrative actualization.  Recognition comes from bureaucrats who implement law. 
Law, and the implementation of law, is problematic for the politics of recognition 
because, as Markell (2003) has pointed out, the identities codified into legal structures 
are often misrecognition not in accord with the evolving self-reprioritization of citizens 
embedded in culturally defined identity and recognition formation process.  Law, as 
related to identity, lags (at minimum) one iteration.  As such, as bureaucrats attempt to 
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implement law, they are always attempting to implement a law that misrecognizes to 
start.  Following Fraser, if the law fails to recognize citizen’s own psychological 
demands for true recognition, it is an affront to the citizen’s wellbeing.  Following 
Hegel, that there is an implementation of law that does not take into account the 
autonomous individuality of each universal legal subject, is a crime.  Such indictments 
as the potential for creating situations of criminal negligence of citizens, gives the debate 
over the politics of recognition an alarmist air of both finality and immediacy. 
Following Galeotti (1993; see also Lukes 1997), that a state fails to 
accommodate—to recognize-- those “excluded identities” places the state (as both an 
institutional and population) in question.  That a state does not recognize those identities 
excluded suggests that such identities are not publicly acknowledged as equally valuable 
by a group of people (whose identities are recognized) that hold exclusionary and/or 
threatening attitudes towards difference.  That a state fails to recognize a particular set of 
identities, whether stateness is measured here as procedures or people, suggests that the 
state is itself intolerant and, again following Galeotti, illiberal, discriminatory.   
This much is also apparent in the description of the politics of recognition 
described by Taylor (1994):  
Taylor has suggested that the ‘politics of recognition’ has come to mean either of 
‘two rather different things’: a difference-blind politics of equal dignity, deriving 
from Rousseau and Kant, of which the contemporary liberalism of equal rights is 
an example, and a politics of differences, involving claims to distinctness and for 
reverse discrimination, not just to allow the old blind rules to come back into 
force but ‘to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever’ (Lukes 
1997, 216).  
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Particularly if we view bureaucrats as directly implementing law with no 
modification to accommodate changing social structures, bureaucratic action will 
consistently be out of step with the process of recognition and toleration on going in 
society.  The lags inherent in law, and the subsequently worse lag in bureaucratic 
implementation, are then clearly problematic in a state attempting to achieve recognition 
as a goal of the representative process.  
The redress of failures in recognition lies ultimately in the law formation process 
itself.  However, the role of the bureaucrat-citizen communication process for 
ameliorating mis-recognition is a potential temporary solution.  Recognition by the state, 
something seen through the application of the laws, requires engagement of the full 
process of representation.  That is, the solution to the matter of recognition comes from 
the process of making the state “just” or reworked with full inclusion in mind. 
 
Acknowledgement 
 Just as greeting and interaction do not lead directly to recognition, but propel the 
generation of social power through the process itself, demands for recognition do not 
necessarily create a situation of toleration.  Rather, recognition flows into the process of 
acknowledgement, then to welcoming, to become toleration.  Acknowledgement is more 
than just recognition—it is an affirmation (or negation) of the validity of content of 
claims to recognition.  To utility, the language of Galeotti, in the acknowledgement 
stage, the public recognition of a previously excluded identity is “justified.”  
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Acknowledgement entails the changing of minds of participants involved in the 
recognition process.  
Markell defines acknowledgement in four parts, which he finds distinct from the 
acts of recognition:   
So acknowledgement is in the first instance self—rather than other directed; its 
object is not one’s own identity but one’s own basic ontological condition or 
circumstances, particularly one’s own finitude; this finitude is to be understood 
as a matter of one’s practical limits in the face of an unpredictable and contingent 
future, not as a matter of the impossibility or injustice of knowing others; and 
finally, acknowledgment involves coming to terms with, rather than vainly 
attempting to overcome, the risk of conflict, hostility, misunderstanding, opacity 
and alienation that characterizes life among others. These four features of 
acknowledgment are, of course, very abstract, and they do not tell us what 
acknowledgment looks like—but, importantly, there is no general answer to this 
question, in the same way that there is no general answer to the question of what 
moderation or justice looks like (Markell 2003, 38).  
 
Important in the four components of acknowledgement is the realization of one’s 
individual finitude in understanding (making sovereign) the ontological status of 
another, and the acceptance that acknowledgement is more about “what we do in the 
presence of another, how we respond to or act in the light of what we do know” (2003, 
34).  Acknowledgement entails not only the attitudinal change of one to the other, but 
also a shift in motivation for action with respect to us and others as socially intertwined 
beings.  Acknowledgement, then, as subsequent to recognition, is the acceptance of the 
significance of another’s sovereignty and the assimilation of their recognition needs into 
your own.   
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Welcoming 
This attitudinal shift entailed in the act of acknowledgement ties into the 
subsequent act of what Arendt (1957) and Markell (2003) describe as “welcoming.”  The 
importance of welcoming in the social processes that culminate in, but are not finished 
by recognition, seems obvious.  That is, in order to represent someone, we must invite in 
the “being,” demands, and perceptions of the other into the sphere of deliberations.  
Welcoming, in the social process of representation, is the first of the steps to “taking in” 
what has been interacted with, acknowledged and, recognized. 
 Taking in the recognition claims of one by another assumes a power differential 
(one takes in from the other) that makes the mutuality of recognition problematic.  
However, the notion of welcoming developed in by Markell, simplifies this problematic 
somewhat:  
Welcoming, here, refers to the risky inclusion of another in a shared activity, 
without reference to her identity, or state of character, or degree of merit.  And, 
importantly, this “without” does not signify that the act of welcome is grounded 
in an appreciation of someone’s universality rather than her particularity; it is not 
the “without” of liberal abstraction.  To welcome someone says more about the 
welcomer than the welcomed: it represents a slackening of the urge to convert an 
uncertain activity into a predictable process by setting and enforcing strict 
boundaries to participation” (Markell 2003, 180).   
 
The act of welcoming does not require the welcomer to have all knowledge about the 
welcomed or is able to access/assess the sovereign position of themselves and the other 
independently.  The act of welcoming indicates a mutual appreciation that the social 
currency that one has is valuable to, valued by, and perhaps able to be spent by/on behalf 
of the other.   
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Toleration 
 Toleration, in its Lockean form, entails the establishment of a position of 
acceptance, not mere indifference to, the religious perspectives of others in the society.  
This acceptance was based not on the belief in the inviolability of negative liberties of 
the other, but rather the belief in the fundamental right of the other (granted by 
participation in Christianity) to believe as s/he sees fit.  As a belief, toleration is true 
acknowledgement—the attitudinal shift of acceptance subsequent to recognition of the 
other as equally valuable.  The act of toleration of the citizen by the state, however, is 
different.    
 Toleration as a state act is either active or passive depending on the response of 
the state to the initial terms of the struggle for recognition.  Active toleration by the state 
is the transformation of laws and norms to allow the recognized identity to be an integral 
partner to solving persistent problems that confront the state.  Passive toleration is the 
transformation of laws and norms to allow for the protection or maintenance of the re-
cognized identity as legitimately valid, but not “useful,” to the solution of state  
problems.151 
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 This, the readers will note, is a departure from Locke whose position on the role of magistrates 
(bureaucrats) in the process of toleration is certainly most active: “It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by 
the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all the people in general and to every one of his 
subjects in particular the just possession of these things belonging to this life.  If anyone presumes to 
violate the laws of public justice and equity, established for the preservation of those things, his 
presumption is to be checked by the fear of punishment, consisting of the deprivation of diminution of 
those civil interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and ought to enjoy.  But seeing no man does 
willingly suffer himself to be punished by the deprivation of any part of his goods, and much less of his 
liberty or life, therefore, is the magistrate armed with the force and strength of all his subjects, in order to 
the punishment of those that violate any other man’s rights.  …  Because the care of the soul is not 
committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to other men.  It is not committed unto him, I say, by 
God, because it appears no that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another as to 
compel anyone to his religion.  Nor can any such power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the 
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The procedural manifestation of toleration is the construction of a law that allows 
persons gifted with a challenging identity the permission to seek the “good life” 
according to their individually defined terms with as minimal interference as possible in 
the community of the state.  Active toleration is the construction of policies that 
encourage the realization of a person/ groups positive liberty by enacting laws that 
prevent the infringement of others upon the group (negative liberty).  But it is important 
to note that active toleration is not the enforcement of the state a notion of tolerant good 
(toleration as an end) upon all other groups to form an early (non-experientially based) 
estimation of the value of that group.  Actively tolerant law does not require state 
mandated sensitivity training or necessitate inclusion in affirmative action programs.  
Actively tolerant laws encourage groups to form, coalesce, express themselves as they 
see fit, and it inhibits the rights of in-groupers to interfere with them, but it does not 
subsume them into the state’s battery of norms, their identity construct is uniquely 
laudable. 
Passively tolerant acts by the state are those laws that inhibit the actions 
of out groups to infringe upon the potential expression of a group identity, but this does 
not include steps to facilitate the development of positive liberty.  Passive toleration, as a 
matter of course (except in extreme circumstances of subversive threats), precedes active 
toleration temporally.  States, as inherently conservative organizations seeking to 
                                                                                                                                                
people, because no an can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave to the choice of 
any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace.  For no 
man can, if he would conform his faith to the dictates of another.  …  In the second place, the care of souls 
cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force; but true and 
saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind…”  (Locke 1950).   
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maintain order, do not “wish” to tolerate any at all—toleration being an “expensive” act.  
It is only under duress that states will tolerate an identity at all.  This extreme toleration 
is a type of procedural toleration meant to quiet groups or individuals that threaten the 
state. 
Like recognition, the act of toleration does not go one-way (state to individual 
alone); toleration by the state involves some re-cognition of the state by individuals.  
Fundamentally, it means we must accept the state as an actor which enters into a 
relationship of reciprocal obligation that recognizes the sovereignty of challenging 
individuals.  In defining toleration as a state act, the idea of useful versus less useful (but 
not “useless” per se) identity constructs brought out through recognition struggles needs 
to be addressed.  States, like all other actors, must have a valid ontology recognized in 
social communication in order to participate in the process of true active toleration.  In 
addition to the suggestion made throughout the work, that we understand the state (from 
the citizen’s perspective) as the actions of the bureaucracy itself, we must also establish 
an understanding of the state: 
[the state is] a set of social institutions that is also among the central objects of 
identification onto which people displace, and through which they pursue the 
desire for independent and masterful agency.  It is, in short, both a participant 
and an artifact in the politics of recognition” (Markell 2003, 28).  
 
To describe the state as an actor, we must include attributes in a similar way to 
describing individual characteristics, such as having a particular interest defined with 
respect to both internal and external situations.  To draw from Morgenthau, the state 
(nation, in his terms) can and does have an interest.  This interest is not the attainment of 
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some abstracted universal moral purpose, but is the preservation of the nation and its 
subsequent moral principles (that arise because it is a nation of people at all) against the 
encroachment of all others within or without (Morgenthau 1951 3- 39).  States as 
ontologically valid beings have a degree of individual sovereign liberty to choose the 
manifestations of interests internally and externally.  The interest of states with respect 
to internal actors lies with the state’s determinations of who can further the actualization 
of the state’s interest with respect to protection from external actors.  Those who can 
meaningfully advance the normative or security interests of the state are those for whom 
toleration is a useful move.  To say that the state finds an identity useful to its interests 
means, then, in practical terms: the state’s toleration of a particular identity assists the 
state in acting (and reacting to) other states and or extra-state actors (religious fidelities, 
corporations, or multinational organizations). 
 This personification of the state as an entity with interests per se contradicts the 
Arendtian conceptualization of politics that does not permit the definition of the state as 
an actor.  The Arendtian conceptualization suggests that the state is only the aggregate 
consequence of other’s actions within an indefinable “it.”  However, there must be a 
personification of the state and the attendant demarcation of a state’s interests if the act 
of toleration is to be valid.   
The state must take on a reified quality if it is to be a place for recognition, 
realization, and appreciation of the identity of citizens (recognition and toleration).  The 
state personified as constitution or community has an interest and can differentiate what 
is in its interests or what it not.  Most importantly, it can recognize and execute acts of 
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toleration that are either merely “expedient” or more deeply “needed.”  The expedient 
type of toleration, or what Gray (2005) defines as modus vivendi toleration, is the 
granting of access rights to citizenship but not the acceptance (fully) into the community 
as part of the whole.  
The differing comprehensive doctrines [within a state] may be able to tolerate 
one another on their own terms, but the toleration itself will remain more of a 
modus vivendi.  This is so because, where there are deep empirical differences, 
“toleration” will not be possible as one group’s “toleration” may appear to the 
other as “license.”  Something that would be considered a “reliable method of 
inquiry” by one group may not be for another.  As a result, “toleration” may be 
an impossibility, leaving only mutual cessation of hostilities and temporary 
peace, but nothing more (Gray 2005, 18). 
 
Returning to the matter of the state’s interests, given the state as a people, the interests of 
the state manifested in modus vivendi toleration reflects the interests of maintaining and 
preserving itself through the management of order in a real politick sense.  Modus 
vivendi toleration is a grant to those identities that are less “useful” to the state’s interest 
in preservation.   
To elaborate further on the useful/ less useful distinction, the state, as an actor, 
will always be interested in seeking accommodation of identities if their appear to have 
the potential to be subversive.  To evoke the example of Antonio Negri—the state will 
always be interested in either giving acknowledgement to the productive intellectual as a 
valuable plural identity, or failing the pacifying effect of modus vivendi toleration, will 
jail him to preserve itself (2005).  The individual will do the same:  upon direct 
challenge, the sovereign individual will attempt to either assume or confine the 
sovereignty of the other, in order to continue.  The state as interest bearing actor will 
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move to both acknowledge and procedurally tolerate those who have the potential to call 
its existence into crisis, but will do so preferably with a utilitarian calculus in mind, not 
true intent to tolerate. 
This modus vivendi type of toleration, granted to those identities Galeotti (1993, 
2002) supposes fall outside of justifiable toleration, has important consequences for not 
only bureaucratic action but also for law itself.  Specifically, to the extent that particular 
groups receive modus vivendi toleration only, the law itself will be incomplete with 
respect to its constraint of the social.  Consequently, because law cannot be explicitly 
tolerant in an active sense, the definition of state actions as tolerant must employ some 
considerations of the bureaucracy.  The bureaucracy, as the institution that most readily 
personifies the word of the constitution through the actualization of law, is the source of 
citizen’s perception that a law misrecognizes or does not tolerate their identity.  
Additionally, bureaucrats may be the first representatives of institutions who may 
procedurally recognize a particular identity.  These “street-level” institutional 
representatives serve to categorize identities as tolerable or intolerable, justified or 
unjustified.  Bureaucrats, then, play a vital role as the gatekeepers of state tolerance.152  
Toleration, though, is not the end of the process of recognition; it is but a subsequent 
step in the processes of representation.   
 
                                                 
152
 Intriguingly enough, a point not-often acknowledged in the context of the (now axiomatic) case of the 
hijab in French used in much of toleration and recognition literature is that the (miss) recognition of 
Muslim women’s identity occurred in the context of a state school.  Identity markers become problematic 
in the implementation of regulation – bureaucracy challenges identity.  However, as I will later show, the 
bureaucratic interaction with identity is a reflexive process in which identity markers undergo challenge 
and change through citizen bureaucratic interaction. 
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Toleration and Inclusion 
The idea of bureaucratic toleration is distinct from the notions of toleration 
within the general community.  Toleration in the general sense entails a categorical shift 
in the content of community values to permit the peaceful coexistence of all members 
despite the possibility of identities expressed in aberrant, even threatening, form.  In 
contrast, toleration among citizens and bureaucrats as stewards entails the acceptance of 
the ongoing possibility of expression of aberrant values, as valid with respect to the law, 
that the bureaucrat is obligated to uphold whether s/he explicitly tolerates them or not.  
Particularly, if we accept a vocationalist notion of bureaucratic stewardship (as Cooper, 
for example, does), bureaucratic toleration must take on a particularly expansive form.  
Bureaucrats must be consciously tolerant of the identities of citizens with whom they 
interact in the work place and those whom they encounter as citizens themselves.   
Under a more limited, professional rather than vocational, model of bureaucrat-
citizen interaction, the possibility exists that a bureaucrat could tolerate an identity 
construct in their professional capacity, but adhere to an intolerant or merely indifferent 
position in their “citizen” lives.  Granted, this duplicitous (in) tolerance would be 
difficult to effect, given that the expression of intolerant attitudes by public bureaucrats 
in situations not pertaining to their professional capacities could result in professional 
sanctions.  However, the emphasis on a fully encompassing position on toleration among 
bureaucrats is necessary to prevent the devolution of truly tolerant positions vis-à-vis the 
public to those that are merely modus vivendi forms that would limit the remainder of the 
representative process.  
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Toleration in the process of representation, entails designing one’s position based 
on the validity of a claimants expressions and a pretense that the execution of that law at 
present contains significant faults.  It cannot be merely modus vivendi, as representation 
requires that the representative incorporate perspectives of the other on the situation.  
Further, a tolerant position in this definition does not require, on its own, a compulsion 
to action on behalf of the other.  Indeed, a bureaucrat could take his or her social 
interaction and the attendant responsibility to this point only and be merely sympathetic 
with the claimant.  Sympathy borne out of self-interested exit from the representation 
process at this point is not in and of itself a failure to take stewardship responsibilities 
seriously or to disavow a vocational stance of being a bureaucrat.  If, however, the 
bureaucrat takes his/her vocation of stewardship as encompassing and effectual, then 
subsequent steps towards full active toleration ought to be taken to realize a fully 
representative position.  
In the space between toleration and representation, three subsequent actions 
occur—inclusion, deliberation, and participation.  True toleration is ultimately about the 
peaceful inclusion of all into the community.  This community can of course be the 
community of liberally autonomous individuals or the community of like-minded 
adherents to a communal version of the good.  Nevertheless, the objective is the 
cohesion of the social unit.  Inclusion, then, is the result of toleration having worked—of 
minds successfully changed to the extent that there is little friction between the thoughts 
of persons towards others and their subsequent actions.  If we withhold toleration from 
any one person, they are certainly not included.  To be included is to have 
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acknowledgement and recognition and to have a real expectation of greeting or welcome 
appropriate to the social context when approaching by members of the community.  In 
addition, we can measure the inclusiveness of true toleration through assessment of the 
degree to which persons of a community invite one another to deliberations and continue 
to deliberate together.   
 
Interchange 
In social settings, interchange is oriented to the process of realizing the extent of 
plurality.  As the process of interaction links to the process of realizing plurality, 
interchange links to realizing plurality more deeply within the context of an already 
tolerant community.  Interchange, like interaction, is dependent on actions and speech.  
Through speaking and acting, we deepen our understanding of one another and realize 
the position of one with respect to another within the social context.   
Interchange, however, is not equal to participation as voting or other aggregative 
forms.  Participation is more than perfunctory and includes the deliberative processes of 
narration and storytelling; it is action and speech directed towards achievement of a 
purpose.  That purpose is, because of the logical connection between pluralism and 
politics, one that is inevitably public and political.    
 
Representation 
 Representation, to evoke Young, “is necessary because the web of modern social 
life often ties the action of some people and institutions in one place to consequences in 
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many other places and institutions.  No person can be present at all the decisions or in all 
the decision-making bodies whose actions affect her life, because they are so many and 
so dispersed” (2000, 124).  The norms of a communicative democracy rooted in the prior 
processes of recognition and toleration necessitate that representation be social, or as 
Young describes it, as relational.   
Representation is a process that takes place over time, and has distinct moments 
or aspects, related to but different from one another.  Representation consists in a 
mediated relationship, both among members of a constituency, between the 
constituency and the representative, and between representatives in a decision-
making body.  As a deferring relationship between constituents and their agents, 
representation moves between moments of authorization and accountability.  
Representation is a cycle of anticipation and recollection between constituents 
and representative, in which discourse and action at each moment ought to bear 
traces of the others (2000, 129).  
 
To conceive of representation as a relational social process intertwined with all prior acts 
of interaction, greeting, welcoming, recognition, acknowledgement, toleration, inclusion, 
intercourse, and participation, is to conceive of the possibility of representation as a 
process occurring across multiple facets of time and space.  These facets of time and 
space necessarily include the time and space of bureaucrat- citizen interaction.  Thus, 
bureaucrats who have been party to the process of the social all along, operating in a 
stewardship capacity can reasonably be representatives.   
 
Bureaucratic Stewardship as Representation 
 The consideration of the state and its relationship with citizens suggests active 
consideration of the role of the bureaucracy as the accessible point of contact between 
citizens and bureaucrats.  Bureaucratic stewardship is a decision, leading to an active 
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state of being, made by bureaucrats to take on a representative advocacy role for the 
citizens with whom they discourse in their professional and “ordinary” capacities.  As 
participants in a state, bureaucrats are ever presently bound into the acts that precede 
representation as both “participants and artifacts” of the politics of recognition (Markell 
2003).   
As stewards and advocates of those in the state, who, for reasons of historical 
marginalization or policies of intolerance, remain outside or only partially included into 
the processes of the representation of the state, bureaucrats operating in a stewardship 
role bring the state “closer” to the citizens it serves through direct deliberation about 
policies pertinent to the lives of citizens.  Bureaucrats, operating as agents of the state, 
fill a final role in the processes culminating in representation.  Bureaucrats bring to 
citizens a relational, communicatively based social good, which they are poised to fill 
more readily than legislators do. 
 To recapitulate briefly, bureaucrats are proximal to citizens in important ways 
that legislators, even state and local legislators, are not.  There are three key ways that 
bureaucrats are proximate to citizens: spatially, economically, and demographically.  
Spatial proximity is the degree of physical distance between citizens and bureaucrats in 
their daily lives.  Unlike legislators themselves, who must perform their primary 
business apart from the citizens they serve (restricted to law making in capitol cities) or 
must delegate the task of “being in” the social process of representation to office staff, 
bureaucrats are the next-door neighbors of the average citizen both at home and at 
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work.153  Likewise, bureaucrats, unlike legislators, operate and live in the far-flung 
localities where legislators do not find it profitable to travel.  
 Economic proximity requires address here as well.  In terms of economic 
proximity (measured by salary), average bureaucrats of the Federal Government (those 
in the General Schedule ) do not earn so much as to be out of touch with the economic 
needs of the average citizen.154  For the median Federal Government employee (those 
employed in the General Schedule), salaries can range from $16, 532 (Grade 1, Step 1) 
to $118, 957 (Grade 15, Step 10).  Although often compensated above the average 
citizen in terms of benefits (i.e., health and dental insurance), bureaucratic salaries are 
not overwhelmingly high compared to average citizens’.  However, compared to the 
salary of Congressional Representatives, $162,100 as base pay for Representatives and 
Senators, the distance between the average citizen and their elected representative is 
wide.  For local public servants or employees of individual state agencies (the vast 
majority of the bureaucratic arm of the nation), there is little evidence for a salary 
disparity, as public employees are the citizens in these locales.155  
                                                 
153
 There is an extensive (and growing) literature on the relationship between legislative campaign 
financing and contact.  Scholars such as (Hogan 1997) have found that direct contact (telephoning, 
canvassing, etc) has diminished in favor of less direct contact (radio, television, etc) as advertising dollars 
have become more tightly regulated by campaign finance laws and campaign costs.  The increased 
reliance on less direct (less labor intensive, “professionalized”) forms of campaigning has lead some 
scholars to declare the advent of “rubber glove campaigning” (Selnow 1994, 6; quoted in Hogan 1997).  
Other research on campaign finance and voter contact include Breaux and Gierzynski (1991), Campbell, 
Alford and Henry (1984), Coleman and Manna (2000), Gierzynski and Breaux (1996), Goidel, Gross and 
Shields (1999), Hogan (2001), to name but a very small number.  
154
 As an example, according to the Department of Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban 
Development assessment, the median family income of Athens-Clarke County Georgia was $52,900.  
155
 One needs only to think of the expansive bureaucracy that is public education.  Public educators (and 
the support staff of school districts), approximately 3 million employees in the classroom setting alone, 
make up almost 5% of the American workforce.  (National Center for Education Statistics, “Digest of 
Education Statistics Tables and Figures, 2005, Table 4) These employees—school teachers—are certainly 
in the category of “citizens” ordinarily defined.  
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 Lastly, and importantly for the concept of bureaucratic representation as is often 
depicted in the literature in public administration, “the bureaucracy” (to encompass 
federal and state employees) is argued to be more demographically representative of the 
full demos than is the private sector.  Whether as a result of the draw of public service, 
merit protections and tenure, “preferential hiring practices”, redistribution (Alisina, 
Baqir and Easterly (2000), or other more diffuse factors, the bureaucracy is populated 
more consistently with minorities, women or other persons representing previously 
unrecognized identities (for a summary of major findings see, Riccucci and Saidel 1997, 
425).    
 The concept of bureaucratic stewardship (or bureaucratic representation) has both 
negative and positive implications.  On the negative side, bureaucrats seeking to advance 
their own interests by way of their clients’ interests (Peters and Nelson 1979) perceive 
bureaucratic advocacy largely as the illegitimate assumption of power and authority.  
The fear of bureaucratic advocacy suggests that bureaucrats advocate for a particular 
interest based on their own needs alone and will turn consciously away from the proper 
guidance of the true public interest codified in the law.156   
On the positive side, bureaucratic advocacy is a form of advanced stewardship of 
citizen interests.  In its most laudable form, this advocacy advances the interests of the 
poor, minorities, or the otherwise marginalized.  Speaking particularly of “street level” 
bureaucrats, “street-level bureaucrats are often expected to be more than benign and 
passive gatekeepers, they are also expected to be advocates, that is, to use their 
                                                 
156
 Again, this perspective persists in the bureaucratic control literature.   
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knowledge, skill and position to secure for clients the best treatment or position 
consistent with the constraints of the service” (Lipsky 1980, 72).  In either 
conceptualization, bureaucratic advocacy entails the expression of interests of a subset of 
the population by non-elected officials.  
 
Communicative Action and Bureaucratic Stewardship 
The practice of bureaucratic representation of citizens’ interests occurs in two 
primary ways.  The first is the practice of bureaucrats speaking for citizens.  The other is 
the practice of bureaucrats allowing citizens to speak through them.157  Both forms 
presuppose a strengthened citizen-bureaucrat relationship that includes substantial 
knowledge on the part of the bureaucrat of the citizen’s life, interests, and needs— in 
short their full narrative.  This advocacy function, if done well and completely, must be 
fully representative of the citizens’ true needs, which mandates extensive bureaucratic 
participation in the social evolution of representation.  In either form of bureaucratic 
advocacy—speaking for or being a conduit for—the representative role of bureaucrats 
necessitates an interactive, deliberative role for bureaucrats with extensive 
communicative demands.  
The performance of this role entails communicative action on the part of both 
citizens and institutional representatives-- both engage in the act of speech and the act of 
listening with the goal of reaching a mutually understandable and mutually acceptable 
                                                 
157
 Speaking for citizens or allowing citizens to speak through are practices that fit within Mary Parker 
Follett’s conceptualization of “power with” rather than “power over.”  In many ways, my understanding of 
the role of bureaucrats in deliberation is allied with Follett’s as expressed in the New State, and Cooper’s 
interpretation of Follett’s contribution, particularly her view of democratic holism in which all citizens are 
interactive partners in the state.   
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position.  Through this process of communicative interaction, the actors interpret 
hermeneutically the meanings of the other’s expressions.  In deliberative 
communication, the bureaucrat and the citizen make themselves known to each other 
through a complex dynamic involving extensive cooperation and exchange.  As Forester 
makes clear, this dynamic of listening, deliberation, speech, and action occurs in 
multiple, often intense, ways: 
The deliberative practitioner learns from communication and argument, the 
actual interpretation and reconstruction of what parties working together say and 
do.  In deliberative practice, critical listening, reflection-in-action, and 
constructive argument all interact.  In practice, planners and policy advisers must 
do much more than rehearse public deliberations imaginatively before the fact.  
They must make them work.  They must convene and staff public meetings, 
provide briefings to participants, respond to the needs of several parties at once, 
and many times shuttle back and forth to meet with angry and conflicting parties.  
The resulting public deliberations are iffy and contingent, precarious and 
vulnerable, but planners can play mediating midwifery roles nevertheless.  Often 
planers must bring conflicting claimants to and through the public arena to 
deliberate practically together: to participate together and learn, to reach joint 
gains whenever possible, to craft effective strategies and real options, and to 
implement and to meet their needs—not just to encourage deal making behind 
closed doors, not to cool out angry publics, not to minimize participation to 
satisfy meeting requirements, not just to maximize noise at pro forma public 
hearings (Forester 1999, 12-13).  
 
Within this deliberative stewardship position, the bureaucrat designates 
him/herself as enforcing the importance of social forms of interaction.  Bureaucratic 
stewardship requires recognition, toleration, and inclusion so that communication 
according to standards of public reason and discourse ethics can occur.  It requires the a 
priori commitment to seeking intersubjective parity and adherence to the ethics of 
discourse, in order to establish a truly communicative space.  To do so requires 
appreciation of the precursory acts and the final effects of social justice.  
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Representation and the Bureaucracy 
 Suggesting a fully representative role for bureaucracy will likely garner criticism 
from a number of corners.  Scholars of American government, for whom the ideas of 
representative bureaucracy call up the specter of Jacksonian patronage and corruption, 
might find the idea of active bureaucratic representation includes significant ethical 
conundrums that beg for resolution.  Attempts to address criticisms of representative 
bureaucracy, particularly the active, advocative form that I suggest, first require that we 
know the roots of the concerns raised.  As examined in a previous chapter, there are 
many reasons why some scholars reject the idea of bureaucratic citizenship, much less 
active bureaucratic representation.  The disposition of anti-bureaucracy contains within 
its loose framework concerns ranging from bureaucratic tyranno-technocratic leanings to 
interference with the inner personae of public employees.  Additional concerns center 
primarily around the potential uses or abuses of power that bureaucrats have by way of 
citizens and the government structure itself.  The concerns over the representative role of 
bureaucrats stem primarily from worries about the potential misapplication of power that 
bureaucrats and bureaucracy possess.  These concerns manifest in claims that 
bureaucratic power should be constrained for reasons of ethics based upon the law.  
However, I argue that the power that inheres in bureaucracy can be understood—contra 
the concerns of dispositional anti-bureaucrats—as something that can be (and often is) 
ethical. 
 Early theories of representative bureaucracy take as the primary starting point the 
assumption that symbolic representation leads to more active representation (Mosher 
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1978; Thompson 1976; Meier 1975, 1993; Keiser and Wilkins et al 2002).  According to 
the theoretical framework and the empirical evidence generated by these and other 
scholars, when bureaucrats who are members of a gender or racial minority are present 
in a bureaucratic organization, there are positive outcomes for both members of those 
groups, as well as members of majority groups (Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999).158  
What mechanisms provoke these positive outcomes is an area left underdeveloped 
within much of this literature.  
 Though tentative (Thompson 1976), the link between symbolic representation 
and positive outcomes is, as suggested by Keiser and Wilkins et al (2002, 562-563), 
active representation.  The description of active representation used in much of this 
literature is that “the individual (or administrator) is expected to press for the interests 
and desires of those whom he is presumed to represent, whether they be the whole 
people or some segment of the people” (Mosher 1976, 12; quoted in Lim 2006).  Active 
representation by bureaucrats is similar to bureaucratic advocacy (Lipsky 1980), 
bureaucratic stewardship or citizen administration in that active representation entails 
bureaucrats speaking for others or allowing others to speak through them (Cooper 1991).  
 Key to the arguments of Rawlsian justice as fairness and those of deliberative 
democrats is the idea that all citizen (participant) voices have a place in deliberations 
over public policy and its applications.  As Young (2000) makes clear: 
In the deliberative model, democracy is a form of practical reason.  Participants 
in the democratic process offer proposals for how best to solve problems or meet 
legitimate needs, and so on, and the present arguments through which they aim to 
persuade others to accept their proposals.  Democratic process is primarily a 
                                                 
158
 See Lim 2006 for a summary of the most recent scholarship on the issue. 
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discussion of problems, conflicts, and claims of need or interest.  … Participants 
arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have the greatest 
numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees are 
supported by the best reasons (2000, 22-23).  
 
Under circumstances, that Young (2000) and Warren (1996) freely offers are ideal only, 
all participant voices would be present and available for deliberation.  However, because 
of the difficulty and contingency that democratic government entails (Young 2000 16-
17) and (as suggested by the scholars of representative bureaucracy) because of racial 
and gender barriers to participation that continue to plague democratic government, 
citizen voices must often be transmitted into the deliberations by representatives.   
 Under ordinary theories of citizen sovereignty and citizen directed legislation, 
legislators would be the direct representatives of citizens in the policymaking and policy 
implementation process.  However, as is well known from the policy-making literature 
and elite-centered democratic theory (Dahl 1971; Held 1996; Przeworski 1999), citizens’ 
values sometimes escape representation by legislators.  Instead, bureaucrats fill in the 
representative lacunae left by legislators through speaking for those citizens whom they 
represent either symbolically or through active representation of those citizen values 
they see as left out of the deliberative process.  
 Acting as representatives of their citizen clients, bureaucrats bring to the 
deliberative setting the values and positions of persons who, because of either structural 
(race or gender bias) or self-selection (the high costs of citizen participation) barriers, 
cannot participate in policy discourses.  As has been made clear, the expert, specialized 
discourses of much policy making debate is prohibitive of full or even partial citizen 
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participation (Warren 1996, 46).  Consequently, when acting in their professional 
capacity, bureaucrats, endowed with the specialized vocabulary necessary to participate, 
as well as physical access to the debates, and motivated by the desire to see that their 
clients’ (vis-à-vis themselves as in the case of purely symbolic representation) positions 
are represented, serve as the most proximate representatives of citizens in deliberative 
settings on complex policy issues. 
 The actively representing bureaucrats bring additional value to the deliberative 
efforts that citizens themselves may not bring under ordinary circumstances.  
Specifically, bureaucrats offer their authoritative voice in policy discourse.  Authority, 
even bureaucratic authority, as Warren indicates, “will serve to fill the vacuum [of direct 
participation] in any conceivable deliberative democracy” (1996, 46).  That the use of 
this authority to facilitate the production of a deliberative democratic situation is ethical 
is the problem to which I now return. 
 Grant (2006) makes the argument that even in situations of power asymmetries, 
uses of power can be legitimate if the intentions behind the use of power are good—
themselves motivated by legitimate ethical principles.  The three primary criteria of 
power application that Grant identifies as potentially legitimating the use of power as 
ethical include the legitimation of purpose, the legitimacy of voluntary responsiveness, 
and the effect of the use of power upon the character of the parties to the situation (Grant 
2006, 32).  While each of the concerns that Grant poses regarding the use of power are 
important for the bureaucratic context, that the purpose of the use of power is guided by 
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the desire to seek normative goods—those goods of social justice—is most important 
here.  Grant offers that: 
Power is legitimate only to the extent that the parties involved are treated as 
being capable for moral agency on account of their rationality and capacity for 
freedom.  People should not be governed as if they were beasts, though the 
exercise of brute force.  Somewhat more concretely, this means that incentives, 
like other acts of power, can judged by whether they serve a rationally defensible 
purpose, whether they allow a voluntary response or are based on freely given 
consent, and whether they accord with the requirements of moral character 
(2006, 34-35). 
 
On the importance of moral character, Grant develops the position that the motivation of 
persons to realize ethically defensible ends lends a more credible and trustworthy 
position to those who are capable of deploying power over others.  In the realm of 
bureaucratic advocacy, even though bureaucratic advocacy of a citizen’s position may 
entail the interpretation of law beyond conventional boundaries (something that is, 
technically, wrong), advocacy of citizens’ interests is ethical if done for selfless, 
reasonable and defensible reasons.  Likewise, bureaucratic advocacy is not wrong if 
done as a means to fulfilling Rawls’ second principle of justice.  Alternatively, when the 
institution of administration attempts to abide by the principle of justice as fairness, 
bureaucratic advocacy is democratically defensible.  To elaborate: 
The natural distribution [of talent] is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that 
persons are born into society at some particular position.  These are simply 
natural facts.  What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these 
facts.  … But there is no necessity for men to resign themselves to these 
contingencies.  The social system is not an unchangeable order beyond human 
control but a pattern of human action.  In justice as fairness men agree to share 
one another’s fate.  In designing institutions they undertake to avail themselves 
of the accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the 
common benefit (Chambers 2006, 85; Rawls 1999a, 102).  
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 Under the strictures of the anti-bureaucracy disposition, all bureaucratic 
interference in direct implementation will be wrong—even if done for the “right” 
reasons.  However, this perspective denies the possibility that there could be ethical 
bureaucratic behavior in most ordinary circumstances.  Even in situations were laws are 
specified completely at a particular time, the changes in both historical circumstances 
and the population of the nations means that in order for law to be implemented with the 
needs of fairness and currency in mind, there must be “real-time” adaptations.  The 
legislature is not the place for this, the bureaucracy is.  In the strictest terms of the 
disposition of anti-bureaucracy, the application of law beyond the specifications of the 
legislative process—even if it directly facilitates the continuation of the state itself or 
promotes the norms of full democratic inclusion—is an unethical use of bureaucratic 
influence and power. 
 Not only is this position untenable in the context of modern states, but it 
fundamentally misunderstands both the role of bureaucrats vis-à-vis the state and their 
clientele.  As regards the state, bureaucrats are obligated to act within both the norms of 
their professions and the limitations placed upon them by the constitutional oath they 
must take as a condition of employment.  Ethical uses of bureaucratic power in the name 
of the state includes defense of state actions to citizens and the use o such power to 
advocate to legislators the necessity of including, into deliberations over and the letter of 
the law, the needs of a marginalized population yet not represented.  That bureaucrats 
use the power of their position to advocate further the national interest or to advocate for 
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a fuller conceptualization of the public in the case of the public interest stands to redeem 
their use of power as ethical by virtue of defensible intentions.  
 This is not to suggest that bureaucrats must be Kantian moralists defending a 
universal categorical imperative or even Mandevelian beekeepers (Grant 2006).  In 
acting with good intentions in their use of the power encompassed in their position, we 
can accept that bureaucrats who advocate for the limited interests of their clientele, even 
if the interests of their clientele are their interests, are acting rightly by the ethical 
standards of power.  In the case of a plural democracy whose policies must be oriented 
to a democratically defined and defensible public interest, the active representation of 
citizens’ limited interests as insertion of previously unheard voices in the deliberative 
situation is neither the sublimation of the full public interest nor the capture of the 
legislative process by juridical interests.  Rather, as interests should be plural and 
multiple in democratically defensible deliberations about government policy and action, 
the active representation of interests is an act justifiable through the norms of 
democracy.  Active bureaucratic representation that serves to facilitate democratic social 
justice through the continual performance of social activities that precede and include 
representation is an ethical use of power by bureaucracies in a plural democratic state.  
 
Conclusion 
 The need for bureaucratic representation in a complex society opened to all 
through the ease of information access seems minimal at best, and at worst elitist.  
However, the prospects of democratic participation by all, particularly in the face of 
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information overload and the rising prominence of economic stability concerns over 
political participation needs requires the intercession of an intermediary force that is 
proximate to both citizens and the debate itself.  Due to the complexity involved in the 
social manufacture of true representation through deliberation, this is impossible in the 
established channels of representation conceived of in theories of liberal civil society.  
True representation of citizens’ interests requires the elaboration of a new discursive 
frontier that is always already present in the lives of citizens.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: PRAGMATIC THOUGHTS ON IMPLEMENTING 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
 
 Developed here is a theory of democratic legitimacy of the state that takes as a 
principle starting point the importance of state administration for the continuation of the 
state itself.  I have attempted to weave together theories of democratic communication, 
bureaucratic representation, social justice, legal neutrality and bottom-up democratic 
control into one framework that provides justification for an expanded role of citizenship 
for bureaucrats and an expanded role for bureaucrats in the project of making citizens.  
As a theory of the state, it is much more expansionist than some may like, and indeed it 
has overtones that may suggest to some readers the usurpation of citizens’ power over in 
the state by those that ostensibly work for and under it.  I have developed a tale that 
gives to bureaucratic institutions the prerogative to treat citizens as more than 
instruments for achieving performance scores or the commands of legislators.  The 
notion of the state here requires for its completion the notion that the state has a 
function—that it is more than a fictive organization of covert domination.   
 In arguing for the reassertion of state power, it follows quite consciously in the 
tradition of modernity of both Dewey and Habermas.  I also follow Dewey and 
Habermas in arguing for the importance of communication for founding the legitimacy 
of the modern state.  My reliance on these authors may seem, at times, too much and my 
analysis too little.  To the extent that I have fully captured the intent of either author is 
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left to the judgment of the reader; I realize I may have provided too clipped a version 
here, to expansive a notion there.  Nevertheless, I do hope that the connections made are 
at least provocative, if not clear.  I confess that, from my perspective, at the end of this 
work, much more is left unclear than I had hoped.  
 A common complaint among scholars of public administration, when reading the 
works of political theorists (and even more philosophically inclined administrative 
theorists), is that there is little attention paid to the practical consequences of their work.  
Therefore, to avoid disappointment here, I will speculate on the practical consequences 
of the work as developed.  Specifically, I will briefly describe what changes would need 
to occur to create and support a legitimizing function in the office of the ordinary “street-
level” bureaucrat. 
 First and expectedly given the amount of time and effort that would be required 
for genuine communicative engagement, more personnel are necessary to staff the “line” 
positions in local bureaucracies in particular.  In addition to more manpower in sheer 
number of bodies and hours, a different ethos of service must reign within the offices of 
these officials.  As Denhardt (1986) and others have pointed out, bureaucratic 
employment is often, and unfortunately, seen as “work of last resort”-- the best and the 
brightest do not occupy the positions of state office.  The regression towards mediocrity 
in the office of the state simply will not do.  
In order for citizens and citizen-bureaucrats to engage communicatively, the 
communicative competence of bureaucrats must be great.  This, I believe, requires the 
installation of citizens of exceptional education and experience into office.  Yet, in order 
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to attract such employees to the state as an employer, certainly the second requirement 
needs attention.  In addition to workers, additional financial resources are necessary.  In 
order to attract ideal employees, the public sector must outpace the private sector.  Since 
in America, the opportunity to rely on prestige (as one may do in France (Rohr 1995)) is 
not possible, the necessity of reliance of money becomes paramount.  Pecuniary benefits 
however, will only go so far.  We must, to echo the recommendations of Cooper 
(1991,1998), Denhardt (1986), Frederickson (1995), Kettl (2002), Rohr (1995), Terry 
(2003), and Waldo (1984), bring into compensatory scheme of the public bureaucracy, 
the warmth of appreciation from one’s well-served clients.  In short, the attitude towards 
and within government would need to change.  There must be a resurrection of politics 
as participation, not pass-time for partisans.  
The problems of mass democracy is its almost inevitable deficiency of 
institutions for vital participation in the community’s public life.  Responsibility 
for something one takes no active part in is difficult to arouse and maintain.  We 
are becoming a nation addicted to spectator sports, and politics bids fair to be just 
another one of them.  Lack of personal participation does not prevent the fans 
from being rabid partisans, a fact that has been known since the Greens and the 
Blues of Byzantium (Long 1962, 189). 
  
 This brings me to a final recommendation—not that modes of participation be 
democratized alone (pace Mouffe (2000)), but that participatory space be democratized 
(pace Goodsell 1977, 1988).  That space must be democratized, suggests that the 
institution of bureaucracy be given another look.  As bureaucratic power theorists such 
as Rourke (1986) suggest, bureaucracy and its affects pervade every place and touch 
everyone.  Bureaucracy in the modern state, which is most democratic in its 
consequences and its symbolic importance, reaches out to and is accessible to, the many.  
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In sum, bureaucracy is the institution for modern democracy.  To that end, we must 
make greater efforts to recognize and grasp the representative potential indwelling in the 
offices of bureaucrats (Grin and van de Graaf 1996).   
 Nevertheless, these recommendations are nothing new.  The resolution of 
problems through the application of more money and/or manpower is a common 
solution trotted out that, in many cases, does not address the heart of the issue.  When 
the heart of the issue, however, is whether the government itself has a claim to be the 
justified or “right” authority to wield coercive power over a people, failing to address the 
significant issue is unlikely to be a tenable solution for long.  A government that does 
not re-address the problems of its own legitimacy from time to time will not be a 
government for long.  
 The problem that Dewey describes in The Public and Its Problems—the eclipse 
of the public—is not resolvable through the application of money or manpower from 
external sources, solutions come from within.  In addition, to solve the problems of a 
democracy from within, means that citizens of all walks must turn towards each other 
with the objective of understanding one another fully—mutually, of reaching 
einverständnis.  This process of turning towards mutual conversation cannot occur 
without the incorporation of the administrative apparatus of the state, or the joint 
between the system and the lifeworld. 
 As Habermas describes in his critique of Luhmann at the end of Legitimation 
Crisis, in the state propelled toward the goals established by the rationally discoursing 
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public, there must be a balance in the administration between the task of providing 
economic steering and of motivating the production of the generalizeable interests.  
…The scope of action of the administrative system [is] limited on two sides: in 
steering the economic sector, by the parameters of a property order that it cannot 
change; in creating motivation, by the independent development of normative 
structures that are irreconcilable with the suppression of generalizeable interests 
(Habermas 1973, 135).  
 
The administration must always already set the course and steer the way through the 
problems of legitimacy that may emerge.  That is, the administrative apparatus of the 
state must be intimately involved not only in “proving” itself the right (legitimate) 
authority, but also in determining rightness to begin with.  The administration is 
responsible for the development and articulation, as well as the implementation and 
evaluation, of the policies of the public interest.  Such expansive goals are attainable 
only if the full public is involved in the conversations on both ends, if citizenship in a 
democracy takes on a revivified dimension of meaning. 
From this vantage here at the end of the work, it seems we are left here with an 
irresolvable problem: in order to fix the legitimacy problem in government, bureaucrats 
must be empowered to engage communicatively with citizens, but without an 
improvement in the perception of legitimacy on the part of citizens, citizens will not be 
motivated to engage communicatively with bureaucrats.  Within this work, I have 
attempted to circumvent this circular problem by redefining citizenship in such a way 
that the dichotomy of citizen-bureaucrat is resolved in favor of a unitary theory of 
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citizenship that takes seriously the notion of citizens’ sovereignty as exercised through 
the multiple channels of control in the modern state.  
Much has been made of the responsibilities of citizens to one another in my 
examination of communicative action, likewise I have said of the responsibility of 
bureaucrats to citizens.  However, the responsibilities of citizens to bureaucrats—of 
citizens to the rights of the state—are still under-defined.  In order for the project of 
legitimation to have any meaning, there must be clear obligations of citizens to the state.  
Long (1962) in The Polity, makes these obligations clear: 
Perhaps the first task of securing citizenship is the development of the sense of 
moi commun. There have to be citizens who feel responsible and they have to 
have something to feel responsible for.  … Quite clearly in the class of citizen we 
have a wide range of roles and attitudes. There are those who are in active 
contention to man the public offices, and of these there are those who are merely 
birds of passage as well as those who in a sense make a profession of public life.  
The differing levels of government provide different theaters of action, with 
better or worse critics and media of criticism, wider or narrower, informed, or 
uninformed audiences.  …While it is necessary as a means of enforcing 
responsibility on the active citizens who conduct the government that all should 
have the right of voicing their grievances in a compelling manner.  …the citizen 
may not only be voicing his demands as a consumer of government policy, but in 
addition, showing responsible concern for the government in terms of some 
notion of a common good (1962, 184-189). 
 
In short, the obligation of citizenship (for those active and passively involved) is 
to consider one’s relationship with the whole, the public interest in toto, when voicing 
grievances against the state.  In a democracy where citizens strive together for the public 
interest-- communicatively in a forum accessible to all-- to the extent that policymaking 
and policy enforcement occurs with this public interest in mind, we can call that state 
legitimate. 
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